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Abstract   
                          
Determinants of Foreign-Owned Banks Efficiency in New Zealand:  
A Stochastic Frontier Approach 
by 
Ying Fang Lu 
The banking sector in New Zealand is characterised by the dominance of foreign-owned banks, 
and in particular from Australia. The objective of this study is to examine the efficiency 
performance of foreign-owned banks relative to domestically owned banks, with major focus on 
the determinants on the differences of foreign banks’ efficiency. The parametric stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA) is employed to extend the existing bank efficiency studies that used the non-
parametric approach--Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Ten major banks which have 
continuously operated over the period 2002 to 2011 were selected and both industry- and bank-
specific characteristics are tested using quarterly data for 40 quarters with the consideration of 
macroeconomic conditions. The one-step SFA approach of model is used in order to obtain the 
cost and profit efficiency scores and the inefficiency effects simultaneously to avoid any bias on 
the results. 
 
The empirical results suggest that the presence of foreign banks in New Zealand has contributed 
to the efficiency of New Zealand banking system as a whole. The results also support the limited 
global advantage hypothesis (Berger, DeYoung, Genay, & Udell, 2000) that foreign banks from 
specific nations (Australia in this study) have operated efficiently due to having less liabilities of 
foreignness in the host nation. Other distinguishing determinants factors on the differences in cost 
and profit efficiency between foreign and domestic banks are bank size, the level of equity, asset 
quality, as well as the market concentration and interest rate and inflation environment in New 
Zealand.  
 
Keywords: Foreign Banks, Cost Efficiency, Profit Efficiency, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, New 
Zealand 
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2 
efficient and sound New Zealand banking system has benefited from the strong presence 
of foreign-owned banks.  
 
Greater banks’ efficiency can promote financial system soundness and economic growth, 
while an inefficient banking system can cause financial instability. Thus, the demand for 
bank efficiency analysis in any nation is primarily due to a desire for better policy 
decisions to enhance financial system stability and economic growth opportunities, which 
in turn helps to improve banks’ managerial performance. In the New Zealand context, 
foreign-owned banks have dominated the nation’s banking system for more than a decade 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2004a), and the evaluation of foreign-owned banks 
efficiency is therefore of particular interest to both policy makers and academics.  
New Zealand was regarded as the most regulated country in the world prior to 1984. 
Competition between the banks was severely constrained by barriers to entry to limit 
foreign ownership (Walsh, 1988). Since 1984, the wave of reforms in financial markets, 
such as the removal of restriction on interest rates and lending criteria, and, in particular, 
the removal of the prudential restrictions on foreign ownership of financial institutions, 
has essentially opened the door to foreign banks’ new entrants (Grimes, 1998).   Foreign 
banks tend to be attracted to countries with higher per capital income, low taxes, and a 
stable and efficient financial market, and invest in a country with less regulatory 
restrictions (Claessens et al., 2001), New Zealand has exhibited such characteristics since 
the deregulation in 1984.  
The historically closer Trans-Tasman integration between New Zealand and Australia in 
regulation and supervision of economic and financial markets, has allowed more 
Australian banks to establish their physical presence in the New Zealand financial market 
compared with other nations. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) explains that bilateral 
factors such as distance, trade linkage and institutional similarity between home and host 
countries can significantly contribute to the development of an integrated market. An 
increased integration of the financial market is supposed to bring price convergence and 
improvement in banks’ cost efficiency via increased competition in the local market 
(Andrieş & Căpraru, 2012).  
Foreign banks which operate in New Zealand are either locally incorporated banks or 
branches of overseas incorporated banks. As of December 2011, there were a total of 18 
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factors and foreign banks’ efficiency levels are often debatable in the literature. The choice 
of efficiency measurement methods is also contestable among the various studies.  
Foreign bank efficiency studies in developed countries have their origins in the US market. 
Early studies in the early-mid 1990s using the US data DeYoung and Nolle (1996); 
Mahajan, Rangan, and Zardkoohi (1996); Chang, Hasan, and Hunter (1998); Peek, 
Rosengren, and Kasirye (1999) found that foreign banks entering the well-developed US 
financial market generally had difficulties competing in the dominantly domestically-
owned banking market in the US.  Similarly, a study by Berger et al. (2000) of France, 
Germany, Spain, the UK, and the US during the 1990s, found, on average, domestic banks 
have higher efficiency than foreign banks in those countries. Recent studies in Australia 
(Sathye, 2001; Sturm & Williams, 2008, 2009, 2010)  also support the US findings, despite 
its banking system being dominated by the big four domestic banks5 which have acted as 
barriers to foreign banks’ new entrants (Sturm & Williams, 2004).The common feature of 
the banking system in these developed countries is the dominant position of domestically-
owned banks.   
In contrast, studies in developing countries suggest that foreign banks are more efficient 
than domestic banks. Berger et al. (2000) and Isik and Hassan (2002),  Havrylchyk (2006) 
suggest that foreign banks generally capitalise well on their advantages and exhibit a 
higher level of efficiency than their domestic counterparts.  Cross-country evidence can 
be found in studies of Central and East European (CEE) countries (Kasman & Yildirim, 
2006; Naaborg, 2007; Rossi, Schwaiger, Winkler, & Nationalbank, 2005)  ; 40 African 
countries (Figueira, Nellis, & Parker, 2006), and 20 Latin American countries (Figueira, 
Nellis, & Parker, 2009). Some single-country studies in Asia-specific countries (for 
example Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009) in China; Tahir and Haron (2008) in Malaysia; 
Sharma, Gounder, and Xiang (2013) in India) support the general findings which suggest 
that economic reforms have significant effects on foreign bank entry and their efficiencies 
in developing countries. 
                                                          
5  The big four domestic banks are Commonwealth Bank Australia( CBA), Westpac Banking Corporation 
(Westpac Australia), Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ Australia) and National Australia 
Bank (NAB), which are parent banks of ASB bank, Westpac bank, ANZ bank, and BNZ bank respectively 
in New Zealand.  
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The relationship between foreign ownership and foreign banks’ efficiency has been 
examined among the previous foreign bank efficiency studies reviewed. Two popular 
hypotheses, the home field advantage hypothesis and limited global advantage 
hypothesis6, have been developed (Berger et al., 2000) and tested in the literature. Berger 
and Mester (1997) reviews 130 bank efficiency studies, of which a few addressed the 
impact of foreign ownership on banks’ efficiency, suggest that foreign banks in developed 
countries likely experience higher costs, lower profitability and diminished 
competitiveness with regards to domestic banks, thus the efficiency disadvantages of 
foreign banks relative to domestic banks, on average, tend to outweigh the efficiency 
advantages (home field advantage hypothesis). Previous studies in the US (Chang et al., 
1998), European countries (Curi, Guarda, Lozano-Vivas, & Zelenyuk, 2013; Naaborg, 
2007) and Australia financial market (Sturm & Williams, 2008, 2009, 2010) appear to 
support the home field advantage hypothesis. 
Some foreign banks, however, are likely to be able to overcome some cross-border 
disadvantages when they operate in host nations with similar financial markets, regulatory, 
or supervisory conditions, as opposed to banks from nations with less similarity between 
home and host countries (limited global advantages hypothesis). Evidence can be found in  
Sturm and Williams (2009,2010) in Australia, Lensink, Meesters, and Naaborg (2008), 
Naaborg (2007) in the European Union (EU) market,  Curi et al. (2013) in Luxembourg,  
Berger et al. (2009) in China, and Vu and Nahm (2013) in Vietnam.  In the New Zealand 
context, To and Tripe (2002) found that Australia-owned banks were more competitive 
compared with foreign banks from other nations (Netherland, Germany, the US, Japan, 
Korea, etc.), which is attributable to the knowledge, experience and general managerial 
expertise their parent banks have in the New Zealand  financial market. 
Organisational form has also been documented in a few foreign banks’ efficiency studies 
(for example, Curi et al, 2012, Luxembourg; Isik and Hassan, 2002, Turkey). Evidence in 
Luxembourg suggests that foreign branch banks are more efficient than subsidiary banks. 
However, Isik and Hassan (2002) suggest that organizational forms of foreign banks do 
not play an important role in determining foreign banks’ efficiency in Turkey’s banking 
                                                          
6 Berger et al. (2000) developed home field advantage hypothesis and the global advantage hypothesis. There 
are two forms of global advantage hypothesis: general form and limited form. Under the general form, 
efficiently managed foreign banks, regardless of their parent nations, can overcome disadvantage and operate 
efficiently in a foreign market, which has not been supported by the foreign banks’ efficiency literature.  
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sector, both subsidiary and branch forms exhibit higher cost and profit efficiency than 
domestic banks. 
There has been a trend that foreign banks establish a physical presence in the host country 
through cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to improve scale, scope, product 
mix or X-efficiency (Berger et al., 2000). In recent times, mergers and acquisitions among 
foreign banks within one single nation have become more frequent in many countries. The 
impact of M&As has been addressed in several foreign bank efficiency studies (Berger et 
al., 2000; Havrylchyk & Jurzyk, 2011; Peng & Wang, 2004) which suggest that two larger 
merged banks have competitive advantages in pricing thus reflecting the banks’ cost 
efficiencies and better risk management in the local market. Liu and Tripe (2003) and 
Tripe (2003) support the premise that banks’ efficiency gains are associated with bank 
merger and acquisitions in New Zealand.  
Some foreign bank efficiency studies have also sought to disentangle foreign banks’ 
managerial inefficiencies by examining the general bank-specific characteristics such as 
bank size (Sabi, 1988)  capital requirement (Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007), asset quality 
(Havrylchyk, 2006) and market concentration ((Berger & Hannan, 1998; Berger & Mester, 
1997; Chan, Schumacher, & Tripe, 2007).  Findings are not unanimous on the impact of 
bank size, capital requirement and market concentration on foreign banks’ efficiency 
levels, however, efficient foreign banks generally are found to have a lower level of non-
performing loans or impaired assets (Berger & DeYoung, 1997). More importantly, these 
bank specific factors can be part of accounting for different risk preferences, which affect 
the banks’ goal of cost minimization or profit maximization. If these factors are excluded 
in the bank efficiency assessment, then banks’ efficiency can be mismeasured (Berger & 
Mester, 1997).  
Macroeconomic factors, generally included in cross-country bank efficiency studies, are, 
however, neglected in the single country studies due to foreign-owned banks and domestic 
banks operating under identical financial environment conditions. There are only a few 
studies examining GDP growth per capita and interest rates as economic indicators 
(Louzis, Vouldis, & Metaxas, 2012; Tripe, 2003; Vu & Nahm, 2013) which produce 
inconsistent findings.  
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With regard to the measurement techniques in foreign banks’ efficiency literature, frontier 
efficiency estimations7 have been applied intensively. The basic framework is to identify 
the best practice firms as efficiency leaders to represent the technical efficiency optimal 
frontier, then compare the efficiency degree of other firms or groups with the optimal 
performance under the assumption that the firms face the same market conditions (Farrell, 
1957).  The two principal frontier efficiency estimation methods when measuring foreign 
banks efficiency are Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA), which involve mathematical programming and econometric methods, respectively. 
The choice of the techniques can be affected by the data sample, data availability: ( in 
particular pricing data), the purpose of the research, and other factors (Coelli, Rao, 
O'Donnell, & Battese, 2005). 
 
The DEA approach8 is a linear mathematic programming method which constructs a non-
parametric frontier over the data to calculate the efficiency measures relative to the 
frontier. Comprehensive details of the method are available in the discussion on the 
frontier efficiency studies by Berger and Mester (1997) and Coelli et al. (2005). The DEA 
method can be used when price data is not available and works well with small data 
samples, for example, Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) in Greece; Sharma et al. (2013) in 
Fiji; Lozano-Vivas, Pastor, and Hasan (2001) in 10 small European countries; Anayiotos, 
Toroyan, and Vamvakidis (2010) in 14 emerging European countries, and in the New 
Zealand literature. This non-parametric technique typically focuses on technological 
optimization rather than economic optimization, and usually does not allow for random 
error in the data (Berger & Mester, 1997).              
 
In contrast, the Stochastic Frontier Analysis9 (SFA) approach as a parametric frontier 
measurement method requires assumptions to be made about the distribution of 
inefficiency in a functional form to reveal the relationship between inputs and outputs, 
thus it generally accounts for both random error and systematic difference (Berger & 
Mester, 1997; Coelli et al., 2005); (Kumbhakar & Wang, 2005). Berger and Humphrey 
                                                          
7  According to Berger and Mester (1997) there are five common efficiency estimation techniques: data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), free disposable hull analysis (FDH), stochastic frontier approach(SFA), thick 
frontier approach (TFA) and distribution-fee approach (DFA). More discussion can be found in their study.  
8  DEA approach was originally defined by Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993) and has been developed by 
Coelli et al. (2005).   
9  Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) was originally defined by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), Battese 
and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977).  
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established domestic Kiwibank in 2002, and ANZ’s acquisition of the National Bank in 
2003. Thus, bank efficiency evaluation should have been promoted by addressing these 
changes in the competitive environment in New Zealand, particularly following the global 
financial crisis during 2007 and 2009 (Bloor & Hunt, 2011). Unfortunately, no empirical 
studies in New Zealand literature have undertaken this task.  
 
Previous New Zealand bank efficiency studies mostly focus on estimating the efficiency 
of major, locally incorporated foreign banks and domestic banks between 1989 and 2003, 
with all large foreign-owned banks (ANZ, The National Bank, BNZ, ASB and Westpac 
bank) and TSB (a small regional domestic bank) included in the data sample for all six 
bank efficiency studies. However, the studies have neglected some specialist foreign 
branches that have concentrated on a particular market niche in which they have a 
comparative advantage in the New Zealand banking industry (Rhoades, 1998),for 
example, Rabobank, specialising in rural banking and  Deutsche bank in investment 
banking. Excluding these banks in the data sample could have possibly resulted in 
overestimated efficiency levels for the major banks in those studies. 
 
In addition, the techniques of efficiency measurement in the New Zealand studies are not 
diversified and tested, with the DEA approach the principal technique used in all existing 
New Zealand bank efficiency studies. This could be the result of the small bank sample 
size and data availability in New Zealand (Tripe, 2005b), as the DEA approach can avoid 
imposing specific functional forms on pricing data and bypass problems associated with 
price data and data heterogeneity in the New Zealand banking sector. However, the method 
has no control of measurement errors, which could also lead to overestimated efficiency 
scores (Tripe, 2003).  
                     
According to Berger and Mester (1997), estimates of bank efficiency can vary 
substantially across studies due to differences in data sources, efficiency concepts and 
measurement methods. In light of the gap in the literature, the purpose of this study is to 
employ a parametric frontier estimation-Stochastic Frontier Analysis approach - to extend 
the existing bank efficiency studies in order to seek new empirical evidence on foreign-
owned banks efficiency in New Zealand.  
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peaked at 24 in 1990, but fell to below 20 by 1994, then remained fewer than 20 until 
March 2011(Matthews & Rex, 2013). The relatively static number of registered banks has 
been largely due to the highly competitive New Zealand financial market and the costs of 
setting up a new banking operation given the small scale of the market (Bollard et al., 
2011). 
As at 31 December 2010, there were a total of 20 registered banks in New Zealand, with 
total assets of $380 billion, accounting for 195% of New Zealand GDP and 80% of the 
total financial system assets. Of the total 20 registered banks, 17 were foreign-owned 
banks, accounting for 89% of total banking assets in the banking system (Bollard et al., 
2011). The high degree of foreign ownership by large offshore parent banks has particular 
implications for New Zealand banking regulatory regimes, such as the disclosure and 
capital adequacy requirements. 
Based on the Financial Stability Report (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012a) as at 31 
December 2011, the highest percentage of market share11 of foreign-owned banks in New 
Zealand is held by Australia (87.6%), followed by banks from the Netherlands (2.7%), the 
UK (1.3%), the US and Germany (0.8% each), Japan (0.6%) and South Korea (0.1%).  
The big-four Australian-owned banks in New Zealand 12 have significant market shares 
(measured by the percentage of the total banking sector assets) in New Zealand, with 
29.2% for ANZ National Bank Limited (ANZN13), 18.25% for Bank of New Zealand 
(BNZ), 17.1% for Westpac Banking Corporation, New Zealand Branch (Westpac NZ), 
and 16.6% for ASB Bank limited (ASB).Their parent banks are the four major domestic 
banks in Australia: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), National Australia 
Bank Limited (NAB), Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac) and Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia (CBA) respectively. This implies that the structure of New Zealand’s banking 
                                                          
11 Total registered banks’ assets as a proportion of the total assets of the banking system, including domestic 
banks but excluding the Co-operative Bank limited and Bank of Baroda (New Zealand) Limited and Bank 
of India (New Zealand) limited. (Reserve Bank of New Zealand: (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012a) 
12  There were ‘big five’ banks in New Zealand before National bank was acquired by ANZ Banking Group 
(New Zealand) Limited in 2003. 
13 ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited amended their registered name to ANZ National Bank 
Limited in 2004 after the acquisition of the National Bank, and on October 2012 amended again to ANZ 
Bank New Zealand Limited  (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2014a). 
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system is heavily dependent on developments in the Australian banking system (Rodgers, 
2003). 
No domestic banks have held a dominant position in any segment of the financial market 
in New Zealand. For example, there were only four domestic banks in New Zealand by 
December 2011 accounting for only 5.7% of total banking assets in 2011: Kiwibank Bank 
Limited (3.7%), TSB Bank Limited (1.3%) and The Southland Building Society (0.7%) 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012). TSB, registered in 1987, was a regional bank with 
branches in certain areas only while Kiwibank, registered in 2002, operated from 
government owned Post Shops throughout the country. The other two new banks, The 
Southland Building Society (registered in 2008) and the Co-operative Bank Limited 
(registered in October 2011) were formerly building societies.   
The dominant position of foreign-owned banks in New Zealand’s banking system raises 
the issue of the relationship between the home and the host supervisory agencies and 
central banks. The RBNZ openly acknowledges the New Zealand banking system derives 
benefits from the home regulatory authorities of the parent banks. Foreign banks in New 
Zealand have, for example, access to the expertise and technology present in the foreign 
operations of global companies, and funding and operational support from parent banks 
and related parties (Chetwin, 2006). However, the RBNZ also recognizes the potential 
diverging and conflicting interests between home and host authorities, such as in the 
allocation of capital and risks across a multinational group of banks (Bollard, 2004b).  
In order to be a responsible host supervisor to foreign-owned banks in New Zealand, and 
also  maintain a sound and efficient financial system in New Zealand, the RBNZ has 
adopted a local incorporate policy in 2006, which requires that all systemically important 
foreign banks, (all of which are Australian owned) must be incorporated rather than 
operate as a foreign branch in New Zealand, and that foreign-owned banks in New Zealand 
are not to be overly reliant on parent bank or other outsources’ functionality (Chetwin, 
2006). After RBNZ introduced the locally incorporated policy in 2006, Westpac Banking 
Corporation was required to incorporate its retail banking business (as Westpac New 
Zealand Limited), separated from its wholesale banking business in New Zealand 
(Matthews & Rex, 2013).                                    

 
 
16 
example, the Act of Parliament 1989 virtually ruled out new bank entrants into New 
Zealand, and there had been no new entrants for over 30 years, since 1951(Grimes, 1998). 
The legislation prior to the financial reforms in 1984 split the financial service market into 
different segments and restricted their products and services’ boundaries. Trading banks 
and savings banks were the two major types of banks. Prior to 1987, the legislation 
required a specific Act of Parliament to establish a trading bank, which were mainly 
allowed to serve business clients and provide cheque accounts to individuals. Savings 
banks were also governed by legislation and were largely restricted to providing services 
to meet individual’s other financial needs(Grimes, 1998). There were only four designated 
trading banks and some smaller savings institutions prior to 1984.  
The financial reform process was completed in 1984, although the New Zealand 
Government started to ease the restrictions on financial institutions in 1957 (Evans, 
Grimes, Wilkinson, & Teece, 1996). The major reforms of 1984 include the removal of all 
interest rate controls and directed lending criteria; the removal of credit ceilings; the 
elimination of exchange controls, and the move to a floating exchange rate (Grimes, 1998). 
The most significant effect of the removal of those restrictions was to put financial 
institutions on an equal footing to compete more actively for market share, and develop, 
defend and retain a secure niche in the market place (Russell, 1985). 
The deregulation was not intended to discriminate against particular types of institutions, 
however, along with pressures from the continued recession in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
the registered banking sector underwent substantial restructuring, involving mergers and 
acquisitions, withdrawals, reorientation of strategic direction, internal restructuring and 
cost cutting. The new operating environment thus caused some adjustment difficulties for 
many financial institutions, and, eventually, some of the domestic banks sought shelter in 
foreign ownership and converted to foreign-owned banks, while some of the existing 
foreign and domestic banks were acquired by other financial institutions or withdrew from 
the New Zealand market (To & Tripe, 2002). For example, the Post Office Savings Bank 
was acquired by ANZ in 1989; Trust Bank by the Westpac Banking Corporation in 1996 
to form WestpacTrust and ABN Amro New Zealand (a foreign branch bank) left the 
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The process of integration between New Zealand and Australia, formerly referred to as 
Closer Economic Relations (CER), was inaugurated in 1983 before major reforms began 
in New Zealand in 1984. CER is a series of agreements and arrangements with the 
objective of expanding free trade by eliminating barriers to trade and promoting fair 
competition between New Zealand and Australia.  
 
Since 1990, both countries have moved progressively towards much deeper cooperation 
in policies, laws and regulation regimes through the process of coordination, mutual 
recognition and harmonisation (Ministry of Foreign Affaris and Trade, 2013) .  The Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement (TTMRA) of 1998 is the key driver in the 
integrated Trans-Tasman market for the sale of goods and the registration of occupations, 
lowering compliance costs for business and reducing technical barriers to trade, and has 
contributed significantly to increasing the Trans-Tasman mobility of goods and labour 
(Conway, Meehan, & Zheng, 2012). 
 
In the banking sector also efforts were made, with longstanding bilateral support for 
improving the degree of cooperation between the systems in New Zealand and Australia 
(ANZ, 2012). These included areas such as taxation (e.g. mutual recognition of franking 
and imputation credits, capital and withholding tax reform), prudential standards (e.g. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), crisis management and bank resolution 
(alignment of bank resolution schemes such as deposit insurance), transaction banking 
(seamless transaction banking) and super portability (movement of retirement savings 
accounts across the Tasman).  
 
The successful implementation of prudential standards in capital requirements by RBNZ 
generally required liaising with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
(Orr, 2010). For example, RBNZ and APRA worked closely to smooth the implementation 
of Basel II for Australian-owned banks in New Zealand. The development of the Terms 
of Engagement (ToE) in 2005, in particular, recognises APRA’s rights as the home 
supervisory for Australian banking groups and RBNZ’s rights as the host supervisory for 
Australian-owned incorporated banks in New Zealand when setting up minimum levels of 
capital requirement. The ToE optimises the use of supervisory resources and reduces 
compliance costs, aiming to enhance the efficiency of the RBNZ and APRA by sharing 
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Table 2.1: Registered Banks: 2002-2011 
Foreign-owned Banks  Details                        
Locally incorporated banks  Registered  Ownership 
ANZ National Bank Limited   2004 Australia 
(ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited)b 1987 Australia 
Bank of New Zealand 1987 Australia 
ASB Bank Limited 1989 Australia 
Westpac New Zealand Limited  2006 Australia 
Branches of overseas-incorporated banks     
Westpac Banking Corporation 1987 Australia 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 1987 The UK 
Citibank N.A  1987 The US 
Deutsche Bank A G  1996 Germany 
Kookmin Bank 1997 Korean 
Rabobank Nederland 1996 Netherland 
Rabobank New Zealand Limited                                                   1999 Netherland 
The bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (UFJ), Ltd 2004 Japan 
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA 2007 The US 
Baroda (New Zealand) Limited  2009 India 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia  2000 Australia 
BOI (New Zealand) Limited                                                  2011 India 
             Domestic-owned Banks     
TSB Bank Limited                                                             1989  
Kiwibank Limited                                                                   2001  
The Co-operative Bank of New Zealand 2011  
Southland Building Society 2008   
Sources: Reserve Bank of New Zealand   
Notes:     
a. Banks locally incorporated in New Zealand all have 100% of foreign ownership by 2011 
b: ANZ Banking (New Zealand) Group Limited was amended to ANZ National Bank Limited 
after the acquisition of the National Bank in 2003. 
c: In November 2006, Westpac New Zealand Limited was registered to separate the retail 
business of Westpac Banking Corporation New Zealand branch and incorporate it to Westpac 
New Zealand Limited. 
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For the purpose of this study20, we provide profiles for the banks21which were in 
continuous operation over the study period between 2001 and 201122.  
They are the four systematically important Australian-owned banks (ANZ National Bank, 
BNZ, ASB and Westpac as a branch), four major foreign branch banks (Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank, Rabobank Nederland and HSBC), and two major domestic banks 
(Kiwibank and TSB Bank).  In addition, we include the ANZ Banking Group (NZ) Limited 
and The National Bank due to the involvement of the ANZ’s acquisition of the National 
Bank. Rabobank New Zealand Limited and Westpac New Zealand Limited are also 
discussed in the profile of their consolidated group (Rabobank Nederland and Westpac 
branch) in New Zealand.  
Table A.2 in Appendix A summarises the reviews of the New Zealand banking industry 
between 2002 and 2011 to provide readers a better understanding of the performance of 
the industry.  
The profiles of the major banks which operated in New Zealand over the period 2002-
2011 are summarised below based on information from the Financial Institutions 
Performance Survey Reviews by KPMG (2002-2011a), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
website (www.rbnz.govt.nz), individual banks’ websites, and  Matthews and Rex (2013):          
Foreign banks’ profiles: 
ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited (ANZ NZ):  The fourth largest banking 
group in New Zealand by total assets prior to acquisition of the National Bank in 2003. 
ANZ acquired Post Bank from the New Zealand government in 1989 and operated it for 
five years before amalgamating the legal entity into ANZ Bank in 1994, then acquired 
EFTPOS New Zealand Limited during 2000. ANZ has a significant market share in funds 
management and business banking.  
                                                          
20  The banks not listed here are either those with a small market share or newly established.  Price data is 
not available for our study.  The four banks with small market shares as at 31 December 2011 were: CBA 
branch, 1.5%, Kookmin Bank, 0.1%, JPMorgan Chase Bank, 0.3% and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, 
0.6%). The 4 newly established foreign banks are Bank of Baroda (New Zealand) Limited and Bank of India 
(New Zealand) Limited, while domestic banks are Southern Building Society (SBS, registered in 2008), and 
the Co-operative Bank Limited which registered on 26 October 2011 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
2012a). 
21 For complete bank profiles, see (Matthews & Rex, 2013) and (KPMG, 2002-2011a). 
22 Table A.1 in Appendix A provide the list of banks registered in 1987 but relinquished before 2011.  
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ANZ National Bank Limited (ANZN). In December 2003, the ANZ Banking Group 
(New Zealand) Limited acquired the National Bank from Lloyds TSB Group PLC, and 
became the largest banking group in New Zealand in terms of total assets.  The two banks 
operated for a further 10 years as separate brands until 2013. There has been increasingly 
intense competition across both wholesale and retail banking since 2003, when ANZ 
acquired the National Bank.                                   
The National Bank of New Zealand Limited (NBNZ): Founded in London in 1872, The 
National Bank was a 100% owned subsidiary of Lloyds TSB Group PLC before being 
acquired by the ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited in 2003. It was recognized 
for its strong retail network, securities and derivatives market, funds management and 
wholesale banking and rural lending.  
Bank of New Zealand (BNZ):  BNZ was owned by the New Zealand government before 
being sold to the National Australia Bank in November 1992. It is one of the largest banks 
in total assets with significant market share in all areas, especially business banking, rural 
banking and credit cards.  
Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac): Westpac (Australia) is Australia’s first bank, 
dating back to 1817, focusing on domestic markets in Australia, with some overseas 
operations. It registered with the RBNZ on 1 April 1987 as Westpac Trust, formed by the 
merger of Westpac and Trust Bank in 1996, and operated in New Zealand as a branch of 
Westpac Banking Corporation (Australia) until November 2006, when its retail business 
was separately incorporated as Westpac New Zealand Limited.   
ASB Bank Limited (ASB):  100% owned by Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) 
since October 2000 when CBA purchased the remaining of 25% share from the ASB 
Community Trust, ASB is stronger in the traditional Auckland market. It has undertaken 
expansion throughout New Zealand since the 1990s and achieved strong asset growth and 
profit over the last decade.  ASB has been recognized as the leader in the use of technology 
in the banking industry.  
Citibank:  A registered bank since deregulation of the banking industry in 1987, it is part 
of Citibank’s network of 100 world-wide locations. The bank’s focus in New Zealand is 
to serve international customers in New Zealand and make the bank’s international 
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network available to their customers, specialising in foreign exchange, derivatives, and a 
full range of balance sheet lending. 
Deutsche Bank:  Registered as a branch in New Zealand in 1996, it is not a trading bank, 
its activities are more in investment banking and securities trading. The bank’s business 
strategy is to focus on the integrated delivery of high value products to a broad range of 
domestic and international, global, corporate, and institutional clients in New Zealand.  
Rabobank: The Netherland based Rabobank is an international bank with a focus on the 
food and agri-business industry with a credit rating of triple “A”. It registered two entities 
in New Zealand --- Rabobank Nederland branch (in 1996) and Rabobank New Zealand 
Limited (in 1999). The branch conducts corporate banking, food and agribusiness banking 
and structured finance activities while Rabobank New Zealand limited is responsible for 
the rural banking business. The disclosure statements for Rabobank Nederland are 
consolidated with Rabobank New Zealand Limited. 
The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC): Operates in 
New Zealand as a branch, wholly owned by The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Limited. The London-based multinational bank primarily focusses on the 
corporate market but has seen recent rapid growth in both commercial and personal 
financial service sectors. The New Zealand branch employs around 200 people on average.  
Domestic banks: 
TSB Bank Limited: Registered in 1989, TSB bank is the most established New Zealand 
owned registered bank and has marketed its services beyond its community in Taranaki to 
a national customer base.  
Kiwibank Limited: Registered in 2001, this is a subsidiary of the Government owned 
New Zealand Post Limited, providing New Zealanders with a locally owned, more 
accessible and cheaper banking service. In the early years, Kiwibank launched a range of 
services with low or no fees for home loan applications, tertiary and child accounts. The 
bank changed the dynamics of the retail banking industry and took a price leadership 
position in terms of home loan and term deposits.  
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According to KPMG (2003), the year 2002 exhibited a record 16.9% improvement in 
profitability for New Zealand’s registered bank sector. The overall net profit after tax for 
the sector increased by 25.8%, equivalent to 2.2% of GDP in 2002 (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, 2004a). 
Prior to the global financial crises, the four major banks contributed almost 90% of the 
total sector profit which reflects the variation in performance of some smaller registered 
banks. ANZ National, ASB and BNZ increased their profit, on average, by 16.20% 
compared to the 7.0% increase across the sector (KPMG, 2006).  
During the global finance crisis period between 2007 and 2009, banks experienced 
significant falls in profit which were mainly driven by the increase in impaired assets and 
reduced interest margins. With liquidity support from the New Zealand government and 
the RZBN, there was no bank failure during the crisis period, rather a continuation of profit 
growth in registered banks from 2010 (KPMG, 2011).  
 
In fact, the total profit of registered banks increased from 2.09% in 2010 to 2.20% in 2011 
while the net profit after tax increased by 19.2% from $2,775 million  to $3,306 million . 
The low interest rate environment and increased borrowing volume played their parts in 
the increased interest income while interest expenses increased, but to a lesser extent in a 
flat lending environment (KPMG, 2011).  
 
Foreign banks clearly enjoyed an advantage and achieved high profits before tax over the 
study period 2002 to 2011. Domestic banks also seemed to be responding positively to 
foreign banks’ competitive pressure, especially during the global financial crisis period, 
due to less dependency on off shore funding resources.  
The performance of the parent banks in Australia has a direct relevance to the performance 
of the Australian-owned banks in New Zealand. According to the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (2004a), the financial system in Australia was in a sound condition and banks 
were profitable, with low levels of impaired assets and adequate capital, maintaining a 
credit rating of A or better.  
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Figure 2.3 Registered Banks: Impaired Assets ratios (2002-2011) 
      
        Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand Statistic 
 
The trend in Figures 2.3 reflects that New Zealand major banks enjoyed a relatively flat, 
low, impaired asset level (between 0.11% to 0.19%) from 2003 until a significant increase 
in 2007, which suggests a significant reduction in banks’ credit quality due to the global 
financial crisis (GFC) and domestic recession between 2007 and 2009. One should be 
aware that data on impaired assets tend to be lagging indicators of changes in credit quality 
while credit quality in turn can be lagging indicators of changes in the economic cycle. 
Therefore, banks should be alert to signs of any deterioration in asset quality and ensure 
that provisioning levels are adequate to the circumstances.  
KPMG (2012) also reported that banks’ asset quality improved and moved away from the 
legacy issues of the GFC in 2011, with the total banking sector impaired asset expenses 
decreasing by 35%. The total impaired asset expenses of average loans and advances in 
2011 was 0.28%, compared to the peak of 0.7% in 2009, due to the best value recovery 
strategies realised and implemented by the banks. Kiwibank had the highest ratio of 0.72% 
among the major banks in 2011 due to the Christchurch earthquake and certain specific 
business lending accounts, followed by Westpac with 0.39%. 
The level of impaired assets of foreign banks’ branches (excluding Westpac) were, 
however, different from the foreign subsidiaries. For example, while the subsidiaries 
commanded 54% of the lending in residential mortgages in 2005, branch banks had only 
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banks (foreign-owned and domestic-owned) in New Zealand. Branches of overseas 
incorporated banks are not required to maintain capital in New Zealand. 
Capital serves as a buffer against banks’ unexpected losses and as a basis for their medium-
term growth (Yeh et al., 2005). The challenge for banks and regulators is determining an 
appropriate amount of capital to be held to absorb unexpected losses in the event of bank’ 
failure. Like many other countries (such as Australia, the US), Basel I had been applicable 
as a capital adequacy requirement in New Zealand from 1988 (until Basel II was 
introduced in 2008). Basel I designates banks’ capital as Tier 1 and Tier 2, according to 
the banks’ loss-absorbing or creditor-protecting characteristics. Tier 1 capital includes 
common stock and retained earnings, while Tier 2 includes subordinated debts to provide 
some protection to depositors in the event of bank failure. In New Zealand, all registered 
banks are required to maintain a minimum ratio of 4% Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted 
exposures, and 8% as total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital) to total risk-weighted 
exposures. 
Figures 2.5 shows registered banks in New Zealand’s Tier 1 ratios ranging from 7.62% to 
10.61% over the period 2002 to 2011 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2015a), which is 
above the 4% minimum Tier 1 capital ratio required by the RBNZ. It indicates the banks’ 
own capital capacity to absorb losses while still continue their business growth. Retained 
earnings have the best ability to absorb unexpected losses to a certain level without a 
significant disruption to banks’ trading (Yeh et al., 2005). 
Figure 2.5 Registered Banks: Tier 1 Capital Ratios (2002-2011) 
Source: Statistic, Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
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From 1 January 2008, Basel II was introduced as the risk-based capital requirement for 
banks and applies to all locally registered incorporated banks (foreign-owned and domestic 
owned) in New Zealand. It focuses on the conflict between home and host regulators 
regarding how to verify and share information and how to allocate banks’ capital to 
account for the exposure to insolvency risks (Kane, 2007). A major development of Basel 
II is allowing banks to use their own models and techniques to measure the major risks 
they face, along with the probability of loss and the capital requirement to meet that loss 
(Yeh et al., 2005).                              
During the GFC and domestic recession period between 2007 and 2009, the capital 
position of New Zealand banks compared favourably to most overseas banks, which 
reflects the relative quality and simplicity of the New Zealand banks’ assets (KPMG, 
2010b). Since 2011, New Zealand banks have predominantly relied on retained profits to 
provide increases in capital.  
The incorporated bank sector had a total capital ratio of 12.5% in 2011, with Tier 1 capital 
ratio increased to 10%, consistent with global trends to strengthen Tier 1 capital (KPMG, 
2011). The major domestic bank, TSB bank, exhibited the highest total capital ratio of 
15.8% while retaining a sizeable portion of its profit, which essentially reflects the 
domestic ownership model of the bank requiring higher capital in the event of a crisis due 
to the difficulties in raising capital in a crisis compared with foreign-owned banks. 
However, Kiwibanks’ capital ratios decreased significantly in 2011, possibly driven by the 
increase in risk weighted exposure, primarily through the increase in lending without any 
assurance of further capital (KPMG, 2011)  
Basel III was released by the Basel Committee in late 2010 and incorporates lessons 
learned from the GFC. It was implemented by international banking authorities and 
focused on quality of banks capital, consequently, from 1 January 2013, all locally 
incorporated registered banks in New Zealand are required to comply with the new 
framework of a common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5%, a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6% 
and a total capital of 8% 25 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2013). 
                                                          
25 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2013) provides the regulatory impact assessment of Basel III capital 
requirements in New Zealand.  
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Economies of scale refer to how the banks’ scale of operations (size) is related to cost 
while economies of scope refer to how the banks’ choice of product mix is related to cost. 
X-efficiency measures how well bank management aligns technology, human resources 
management and other resources to produce given levels of output; it gauges the degree of 
friction and waste in the production process (Berger, Hunter, & Timme, 1993). Scale and 
scope economies and X-efficiency are different aspects of performance, with scale 
economies and scope economies referring to selecting the appropriate outputs, while X-
efficiency refers to selecting the appropriate inputs (Mester, 2003). 
X-efficiency has two components: technical and allocative efficiency. Technical 
efficiency refers to a firm operating below the production frontier due to unmeasured 
factors (“X” inefficiency), such as managerial or motivational issues. Different from 
technical efficiency, allocative efficiency measures how optimally mixed inputs minimise 
total input costs at given output quantity and input prices (Berger et al., 1993). 
To achieve technical efficiency, a firm must seek the minimum combination of inputs to 
produce given outputs or the maximum combination of outputs obtainable from given 
inputs. From an economic perspective, a firm’s economic objective is cost minimization 
and profit maximization. Cost minimization requires technical and allocative efficiency to 
avoid excessive input use and a non-optimal input mix, while profit maximization also 
requires both, as well as operating at a right scale to achieve these efficiencies (Kumbhakar 
& Lovell, 2003). The production of a given output is economically efficient if there are no 
other ways of producing the output that use a smaller amount of inputs (Pearson Education 
Canada Inc., 2005). 
Berger and Mester (1997) considered the most important economic efficiency concepts 
cost and profit efficiencies. The authors believed these concepts “have the best economic 
foundation for analysing efficiency of financial institutions because they are based on 
economic optimization in reaction to market prices and competition rather than being 
based solely on the use of technology” (Berger & Mester, 1997, p. 898). 
Cost efficiency measures how close a bank’s cost is to what a best practice bank’s cost 
should be to produce the same output using the same input. It is derived from a cost 
function in which the cost variables depend on the prices of variable inputs, the quantities 
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Farrell (1957) explains that the basic framework for measuring efficiency by the frontier 
method is to identify the best practice bank as the efficiency leader to represent the 
technical efficiency frontier, then compare the efficiency degree of other firms or groups 
with the optimal performance, assuming the bank faces the same market conditions (Bauer 
et al., 1998; Von Furstenberg, 2008) . Berger and Humphrey (1997) describe the frontier 
efficiency analysis as essentially a sophisticated way to benchmark the relative 
performance of production units” within the financial industry. It provides an overall, 
objectively determined, numerical efficiency value and ranking of financial institutions, 
which is not otherwise available. Thus, frontier efficiency analysis can be used by bank 
managers to improve their managerial performance by identifying the “best practise” and 
“worst practise” banks associated with high and low efficiency measurements, 
respectively.  
Overall, there are two main streams of frontier approach employed in the empirical 
literature; non-parametric (or programing) and parametric (or econometric). Fried et al. 
(1993) identified the two essential differences between them. First, the programming 
approach is deterministic, with a combination of noise and inefficiency, whereas the 
econometric approach is stochastic, attempting to distinguish the effects of noise from the 
effects of inefficiency. Second, the nonparametric approach is less prone to  specification 
error while the econometric approach is parametric, confounding  the effects of 
misspecification of the functional form. 
The large variations in banking data necessitates the application of frontier analysis in a 
number of bank efficiency studies, despite there being no consensus on the best method 
for estimating bank efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 previous 
studies on efficiency and identified the five most common estimation techniques : Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposable Hull analysis (FDH), which are 
nonparametric techniques, and the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), Thick Frontier 
Approach (TFA) and Distribution Free Approach (DFA) being the parametric methods. 
3.2.4.1 Non-Parametric Approaches 
The non-parametric frontier approach employs mathematical programming techniques to 
estimate efficiency scores with the two main nonparametric frontier approaches, Data 
Envelopment Analysis and Free Disposable Hull (FDH), as previously stated. DEA is a 
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linear programming model introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and 
extended by  and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984). The technique envelopes observed 
production possibilities to obtain an empirical frontier and measures efficiency as the 
distance to the frontier (Ruggiero, 2007). FDH is a special form of DEA, where the points 
on the lines connecting the DEA vertices are excluded from the frontier. Both approaches 
permit efficiency to vary over time and make no prior assumptions regarding the form of 
the distribution of inefficiencies across observations.  
 
DEA has been extensively used to examine banks’ X-efficiency (in particular, technical 
efficiency) and scale efficiency. The objective of DEA is to measure the relative efficiency 
among similar units that share the same technology for similar goals using similar 
resources (Toby, 2006). The primary advantages of the DEA approach, according to 
Ruggiero (2007) and (Tripe, 2005a, 2005b), are the nonparametric nature of the method 
and the ability to handle multiple outputs and inputs. It also has the advantage of being 
computationally simple as it does not require assumption of a particular functional form 
of relationship between outputs and inputs. In addition, DEA generally works well with 
small samples. 
The main drawback of the DEA method is that it assumes no random fluctuations, so that 
all deviations from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency (Rangan, Grabowski, Aly, 
& Pasurka, 1988). This could lead to two biased results with either the unit under analysis 
biased relative to the frontier or the frontier  biased upwards because of measurement error 
(Ruggiero, 2004). 
DEA efficiency studies generally use a two-steps approach to obtain efficiency estimates 
then regress the efficiency scores on a number of explanatory variables using popular 
regression models such as Tobit or Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, the second 
step regression correlates with one side of the error term in the first-step, and the covariates 
in the second-step are likely to correlate with that of the first step. This means the errors 
and covariates in the first-step cannot be independent and generally require further 
complex methods to overcome the drawbacks discussed above. Furthermore, most of them 
do not examine the determinants of efficiency (Duygun-Fethi & Pasiouras, 2009). 
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3.2.4.2 Parametric Approaches 
Parametric approaches, as alternative frontier estimation methods, can be dated back to 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977). This approach assumes a 
given functional form for the relationship between outputs and inputs where, in a specified 
functional form, unknown parameters are estimated using econometric techniques. There 
are several parametric frontier approaches, including the Stochastic Frontier Approach 
(SFA), Thick Frontier Approach and Distribution Free Approach. 
The SFA approach employs econometric techniques to estimate efficiency scores by 
allowing an error term with two components: a normally distributed random effects 
component and an asymmetrically (typically half-normally) distributed technical 
inefficiency component, estimated via maximum likelihood. This approach has a 
purported advantage of having the ability to measure efficiency in the presence of 
statistical noise (Coelli et al, 2005). Further reviews on SFA are provided in the data and 
methodology chapter. 
Berger (1993) developed a “distribution free” approach (DFA) to separate efficiencies 
from random error in a different way when panel data are available. It assumes an average 
efficiency for each firm which is constant over time, while the random error tends to 
average out over time. Although DFA is less dependent on a priori distributional 
assumption than SFA, it relies on the strong assumption that the firm’s X-efficiencies are 
constant over time, and if there are changes in the X-efficiencies, then one can only predict 
the firm’s average inefficiency over the past (Wagenvoort & Schure, 1999).  
Berger and Humphrey (1991)  consider another “distribution free” way to estimate cost 
frontiers using panel data, the so called ‘Thick Frontier” approach. The TFA does not 
assume a precise cost or production frontier edge, instead, it sorts the data in arbitrarily 
selected groups of firms (i.e., instead of quartiles other quantiles can be chosen), then 
estimates a “thick-frontier” cost function for two frontiers, one with the lowest average 
and one with the highest average quartiles, with inefficiency then measured as the 
difference between the upper and lower frontier.  
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Comparisons of the above parametric methods and DEA, a non-parametric method, can 
be found in a number of studies (Bauer et al., 1998; Berger & Mester, 1997); Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990); (Hasan & Hunter, 1996) and, more recently, Coelli et al. (2005).                                            
There are some common functional forms used in the above approaches, as summarised 
by (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 211): the linear, Cobb-Douglas, normalised quadratic and 
translog functional forms. Among these forms, the second order translog function,  is more 
flexible, thus usually preferred, although it could face econometric difficulties due to the 
possibility of excessive parameters being estimated in the function.  
Panel data, a time series of information for a cross-section of firms in the market, are 
commonly used in studies that are interested in investigating the efficiency of each firm 
using either non-parametric or parametric frontier analysis. Under the general framework 
of parametric frontier efficiency analysis, efficiency is essentially a measurement of the 
distance between the estimated frontier and the observed firms, which, in most situations, 
is captured by a residual. With panel data, the residuals of each firm are available, which 
allows the testing of structural hypotheses on the efficiency or statistical significance of 
the efficiency of each firm (Kneip & Simar, 1996).   
It is widely accepted that comparisons of bank efficiency should be between banks 
undertaking similar activities, producing the same outputs and service quality, and 
operating in a similar environment, so that a common frontier can be defined for a 
meaningful comparison. However, different expertise and strategic objectives between 
foreign and domestic banks, and subsidiaries and foreign branches, can lead to differences 
in product lines, which can distort the definition of the common frontier. Without a 
common frontier or benchmark, it is difficult to compare the efficiency level and ranking 
in a frontier efficiency analysis, in either parametric or non-parametric methods (Bos, 
Koetter, Kolari, & Kool, 2009) . Thus, using a common frontier, controlling for systematic 
differences due to the data heterogeneity across the banks, has been favoured by some 
studies (Bos et al., 2009; Cavallo & Rossi, 2002; Valverde, Humphrey, & del Paso, 2007).  
If the sample data does not fully capture the heterogeneity in bank inputs and outputs, 
unmeasured differences in product quality could lead to incorrect measures of the bank’s 
efficiency (Berger & Mester, 1997).   
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The SFA results from several of the cross-country studies (see Table B.2) in transition  
economies show that foreign banks are more cost and/or profit efficient than domestic 
banks (Bonin et al., 2005a; Fang, Hasan, & Marton, 2011; Fries & Taci, 2005; Kasman & 
Yildirim, 2006; Rossi et al., 2005; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). For example, (Fries & 
Taci, 2005) examined the cost efficiency of a sample of 289 banks in 15  East European 
countries for the period 1994-2001. The authors found evidence that privatised banks with 
foreign ownership of at least 50% of the shares were the most cost efficient banks, 
compared to the least efficient privatised banks which had major domestic ownership. 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006) found that foreign banks were more profit efficient on 
average than domestic banks in 8 CEEs  from   1995 to 2002, although all banking systems 
displayed significant levels of cost and profit inefficiency over that time. Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007) reported that foreign banks were more cost efficient but less profit 
efficient than domestically owned banks in 12 European transition countries over the 
period 1993-2000.  
Similarly, some single nation studies in EU emerging markets (see Table B.3) also show 
that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks. Styrin (2005) employed both 
SFA and DEA methods to measure banks’ X-efficiency in the Russian banking sector 
between 1998 and 2002. Isik and Hassan (2002) found that foreign banks in Turkey 
strongly outperformed domestic banks, while El‐Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) explained 
that foreign banks utilised advanced technology compared with domestic banks in Turkey.  
Havrylchyk (2006) in Poland employs the DEA technique and reports that foreign banks 
exhibit higher technical and allocative efficiency compared with domestically-owned 
banks between 1997 and 2001, despite the Polish banking system not improving over the 
study period. 
Conversely, a few studies in emerging EU countries, such as Turkey, show foreign banks 
as less efficient than domestic banks, with Zajc (2006) finding supporting evidence in 6 
CEEs, between 1995 and 2002. Aysan, Karakaya, and Uyanik (2011) examined banks’ 
efficiency in the Turkish banking sector using the SFA method on a sample of 32 banks 
between 2002 and 2007. Their empirical results suggest that foreign banks overall 
exhibited poorer cost efficiency compared with state-owned and domestic-owned Turkish 
banks, despite foreign banks exhibiting strong profit efficiency in comparison.  
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Interestingly, there are limited studies on foreign banks’ efficiency in developed 
economies in the European banking market. A cross-country study by Berger et al. (2000) 
in France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US, and  single nation studies by 
Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) in Greece, Béjaoui Rouissi and Bouzgarrou (2012)  in 
France and Curi et al. (2013) in Luxembourg are reviewed here. 
Berger et al. (2000) test the cost and profit efficiency in France, Germany, Spain, the 
United Kingdom and the US, finding domestic banks in most of the countries have both 
higher cost and profit efficiency than foreign banks operating in France, Germany and the 
UK. Foreign banks in Spain, however, exhibited lower cost efficiency but higher profit 
efficiency than domestic banks over the study period 1993-1998. In addition, Béjaoui 
Rouissi and Bouzgarrou (2012) compared cost efficiency between 62 domestic and 40 
foreign-owned commercial banks in France. The authors’ SFA results showed foreign 
commercial banks were more cost efficient than domestic counterparts in France over the 
period 2000-2007, supporting the findings of Berger et al. (2000). 
Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) examined banks’ efficiency in a sample of 18 foreign and 
21 domestic banks in Greece from 1999-2004 using a DEA model. Their results showed 
that foreign banks were more scale efficient despite having lower technical efficiency (TE) 
than domestic banks in almost all the years during the study period. However, both TE and 
scale efficiency (SE) were not statistically significant, which  implies foreign banks were 
less efficient than domestic banks in Greece over the period 1999-2004, during which 
Greece was considered a small but developed country .  
Curi et al. (2013) employed the DEA method to test foreign bank efficiency in 
Luxembourg over the period 1991-2009. Their results indicate that foreign branch banks 
are more diversified and foreign banks from the European region exhibited higher 
technical efficiency, on average. The banking sector in Luxembourg is highly dominated 
by foreign banks with a total of 148 foreign banks in 2009 compared with only two 
domestic banks, where most banks are subsidiaries and foreign branch banks.  
It should be noted that one should be cautious with  efficiency results from cross country 
comparisons in the European banking markets, as they are easily distorted by differences 
in the distribution of banks, in terms of size and type (foreign versus domestic banks) 
(Bikker & Bank, 2002).  
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sample of 204 banks in 20 Latin America countries during 2001. Their DEA and stochastic 
cost function (SCF) results showed that foreign-owned banks were not as efficient as their 
domestically owned counterparts in 2001, with differences in efficiency more related to 
the national regulatory and economic environment than banks’ ownership, in each country. 
Similarly, Wezel (2010) investigated the X-efficiency of domestic and foreign banks in 
the Central American region from 2002-2007. The author’s DEA and SFA results show 
that foreign banks in Central America were not necessarily more efficient, on average, 
than the local or regional banks  from Brazil (Tecles & Tabak, 2010) showed that foreign 
banks were less cost efficient but more profit efficient over the post-privatisation period 
of 2000-2007.  
Foreign banks have played a smaller role in most Asian financial systems than in CEEs 
and Latin America, reflecting regulatory limits on foreign banks entry into Asia. Chan and 
Karim (2011) provided cross-country evidence on  four selected ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) countries  that foreign banks were more profit efficient than cost 
efficient relative to their domestically-owned banks. On the other hand, foreign banks 
operating in Malaysia exhibited higher cost and profit efficiency compared to foreign 
banks in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
There are also some single nation studies investigating the efficiency of foreign and 
domestic banks operating in Asian countries such as China, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, and 
Japan. Berger et al. (2009) reported in their study that China’s state-owned banks were the 
least X-efficient banks while foreign banks were the most efficient with the presence of 
foreign banks in China challenging the domestic banking system to become more 
competitive and efficient, according to Xu (2011). However, Jiang and Yao (2010), using 
the SFA method in their study, showed that foreign banks were less cost efficient than 
domestic banks in China, but outperformed major domestic banks in their profit efficiency 
model. Tahir et al’s (2010)study showed similar results in the Malaysian banking sector 
with Sufian ’s (2011) DEA results revealing foreign banks from North America were the 
most efficient banking group in Malaysia. Sensarma (2006) showed that foreign banks had 
poor cost efficiency and productivity in India over the study period 1986-2000. Vu and 
Nahm’s (2013) study showed that Vietnam’s state-owned banks were more profit efficient 
than other domestic banks in the country. However, their study also found that foreign 
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New Zealand over the period 2000-2002.  New Zealand’s banking industry was found to 
be competitive, and banks in New Zealand became more efficient over the study period, 
with supremely high efficiency scores ranging from 0.86  to 0.96, which are consistent 
with the results reported in Liu and Tripe (2003), Tripe (2003) and Adjei-Frimpong et al. 
(2014). The National Bank was highly efficient over the study period before being 
acquired by the ANZ in 2003(Vedula & Tripe, 2004). 
Tripe (2004) is one of the few studies which addresses the effect of foreign ownership on 
bank efficiency in New Zealand. Tripe’s study shows that New Zealand banks (ANZ, 
ASB, BNZ, NBNZ, TSB, and Westpac NZ) with branch networks are more efficient than 
Australian banks (ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac Australia) with branch networks over 
the period 1996-2003. Using a DEA model with capital as the input, Tripe’s results show 
significant differences in average efficiency scores (0.908 for Australia major banks and 
0.868 for New Zealand businesses) comparing  Australian major banks and their New 
Zealand counterparts. However, no significant difference was found when taking into 
account the level of equity suggesting a strong link between the New Zealand banking 
system and the major Australian banks.  
Tripe (2005a, 2005b) then measured the efficiency levels of six major retail banks (ANZ, 
ASB, BNZ, NBNZ, TSB, Westpac NZ) in the New Zealand banking market from 1996 to 
2003. The author applied the DEA panel data approach as it allows the use of a range and 
size variables and is less constrained, which is more applicable than the  traditional DEA 
method in the New Zealand case (Tripe, 2005b). The studies found that improvement in 
bank efficiency in New Zealand is possibly due to reductions in the general interest rate 
over the study period.   
Chan et al. (2007), examining the efficiency of major banks in New Zealand between 1996 
and 2005, indicated that the New Zealand banking market  exhibits oligopolistic behaviour 
to new entrants to the banking sector. The efficient structure hypothesis revealed that 
larger banks enhanced the whole banking sector performance in New Zealand during the 
study period.  
It is apparent that the DEA model applies to all the existing efficiency studies in the New 
Zealand literature. The authors explained one of the reasons for choosing DEA as the 
frontier estimation method was the difficulty in constructing sufficiently large data 
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DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found that foreign banks in the US exhibited an inability to 
develop customer relationships necessary to raise and maintain core deposits, 
consequently, foreign banks financed their growth in the US market with  higher-cost 
funding sources (such as offering higher deposit rates than domestic banks). Supporting 
evidence can also be found in other US efficiency studies by Chang et al. (1998), Hasan 
and Hunter (1996), and Peek et al. (1999). 
There are also other single nation studies in developing countries, Hasan and Marton 
(2003) in Hungary; Gaganis and Pasiouras (2009) in Greece; Aysan et al. (2011) in 
Turkey, Jiang and Yao (2010) in China, supporting the home field advantage hypothesis 
that foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks in these nations. For instance, 
Jiang and Yao (2010) employed the SFA approach to examine the effect of ownership on 
bank efficiency in China. The authors found that foreign ownership participation has a 
negative effect on foreign banks’ profit efficiency, despite foreign banks initially acquiring 
profitable Chinese-owned banks. The authors suggest that the profit inefficiency of banks 
with foreign ownership participation could be caused by investing more in upgrading their 
technology to improve service quality or being required to hold more loan loss provisions 
by bank regulation in the host country. China’s legal and financial systems are not well 
developed compared with those in developed countries (Berger et al., 2009).  
3.5.1.2 Global advantage hypothesis  
In contrast to the home field advantage hypothesis, under the global advantage hypothesis, 
foreign banks might benefit from competitive advantages relative to domestic owned 
banks. Berger et al., (2000) considered two forms: the general global advantage form and 
limited global advantage form.  
Under the general global advantage form, efficient foreign banks from several nations are 
able to overcome competitive disadvantages when operating in distant markets with 
foreign economic, cultural and regulatory environments. 
According to Berger (2007), there are two types of efficiency advantage for foreign-owned 
banks. Firstly, foreign banks generally have a multinational presence, which may allow 
the foreign banks to serve customers in multiple nations. Secondly, foreign banks also 
diversify their risks across nations or regions.  Foreign banks, therefore, may be able to 
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lower their cost of funds by providing superior financial stability (global reputation) to 
customers, lower cost risk management, cost of capital, and better risk-return profiles to 
compete with domestic banks in the host country. 
Supporting empirical evidence for the general form of the global advantage hypothesis can 
be found in the context of the Australian banking market  in Sathye (2001), and in  the 
European market by El‐Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) in Turkey, and Béjaoui Rouissi and 
Bouzgarrou (2012) in France. Sathye (2001) finds that foreign banks with superior 
management or production technologies generally have higher efficiency (lower cost) 
compared with domestic banks in Australia. Béjaoui Rouissi and Bouzgarrou (2012) 
investigate the efficiency levels of 62 commercial domestic banks versus 40 foreign banks 
in France between 2000 and 2007. Their SFA results reveal foreign banks exhibit higher 
cost efficiency than domestic banks. The deterioration of the cost efficiency of domestic 
banks allowed foreign banks to increase their market share in France, and to settle easily 
in France. 
Under the limited global advantage hypothesis, efficient foreign institutions headquartered 
in specific nations with specific favourable markets, and/or regulatory or supervisory 
conditions, can operate more efficiently than domestic institutions (Berger et al., 2000). 
Cross-border banking is more likely to take place when the home and host countries are 
geographically close, share common languages and legal systems, have similar sized 
economies and similar levels of economic development, share a common labour market, 
and agreements over trades and  services, competition policies and public purchasing 
(Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, & Haubrich, 2004). The macroeconomic conditions can 
reduce the liability of foreignness for foreign banks, which has significant positive impact 
on foreign banks’ efficiency (Miller and Parkhe, 2002).  
The limited global advantage hypothesis has been tested in some foreign banks’ efficiency 
studies (for example, Naaborg, 2007; Lensink et al. 2008; Sturm and Williams, 2009, 
2010; Sufian, 2011; Vu and Nahm, 2013) with their findings similar to studies under the 
limited global advantage hypothesis. At the international level, Lensink et al. (2008) 
examined the relationship between the foreign banks’ efficiency and the quality of 
financial institutions in the home and host countries, confirming that foreign bank 
inefficiency is reduced with greater  similarity between home and host country.  Mian 
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(2006) supports that closer institutional distance between the home and host country may 
reduce informational, agency, or enforcement costs for foreign banks operating abroad.  
Similar findings from Havelchyk (2005) in Poland and Vu and Nahm (2013) in Vietnam 
also support the limited global advantage hypothesis. Havelchyk (2005) finds Dutch banks 
in Poland achieved higher efficiency than banks from other countries, while bank 
efficiency was inversely related to US banks’ ownership.  Vu and Nahm (2013) find that 
the level of profit efficiency for banks from Australia, Japan, the US and Europe are higher 
than domestic banks’ and those from other Asian nations in Vietnam.  
Sturm and Williams (2009) test the limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al 
(2000) when examining the factors that affect differences in foreign bank efficiency in 
Australia. The study considers foreign banks’ efficiency from the perspective of the host 
nation, Australia, and found that banks from Japan and the UK displayed superior revenue 
creation efficiency relative to domestic banks. On the other hand, banks from the US and 
Switzerland were less efficient than domestic banks  The results are consistent with the 
limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al., (2000), which suggested that banks 
from the UK and Japan are able to overcome the diseconomies of cross-border operations 
in Australia due to various unspecified advantages. Sturm and Williams (2010), extending 
their 2009 study, concluded that the limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al., 
(2000) was relevant for banks from the UK, while banks from the US were again, on 
average, less efficient compared with domestic banks in Australia. 
Minh To and Tripe (2002) examining the performance of foreign-owned banks in New 
Zealand, suggest that the Australian parent banks have advantages in knowledge and 
experience in the New Zealand market, including managerial expertise. These are the most 
important factors determining the foreign banks’ performance in New Zealand.  
However, Miller and Parkhe (2002) compared the differences in X-efficiencies of foreign 
banks from home countries with similar and dissimilar regulatory and financial system 
environments to the host country. Their results provide no evidence that the X-efficiency 
of foreign-owned banks is  affected by similar or dissimilar regulatory environments 
between home and host countries, which suggests that foreign-owned banks from 
dissimilar environments are able to conform to the new host country environments and 
overcome the liability of foreignness. 
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3.5.1.3 Organisational form  
In the foreign banking literature, the choice of organisational form, i.e. foreign branch or 
subsidiary, is largely influenced by regulations in the host countries, meaning foreign 
banks are less likely to operate as branches in countries that limit their activities (Cerutti, 
Dell’Ariccia, & Peria, 2007).  In New Zealand, systemically important foreign-owned 
banks are required by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to be locally incorporated 
subsidiaries, under the financial crisis management supervisory legal framework (Bollard, 
2004). However, the literature on the relationship between organizational form and foreign 
bank efficiency is scarce, and findings are inconclusive. 
In the US banking market, subsidiaries were found unlikely to benefit from large gains in 
efficiency compared to a foreign branch bank with wholesale or investment banking 
markets focus. This may imply that lower scale efficiency is associated with higher cost 
when establishing a subsidiary in the host country (Casson, 1990).  
Foreign subsidiary entrants in Australia are found to provide more strategic and valuable 
information compared to similar domestic firms in the Australian market, contributing to 
the competitive advantages in pure technical efficiency for foreign bank subsidiaries 
(Sturm and Williams, 2004). The authors also report that foreign banks in Australia do not 
dominate the banking sector in terms of sizes, however, the diversity in the types of foreign 
banks participating in the host market is likely an important source of competitive 
improvement in foreign banks’ efficiency. 
Curi et al (2012) estimated foreign banks’ efficiency in Luxembourg, after controlling for 
heterogeneity due to different organization forms, the level of asset diversification and 
exchange rate risk. The authors’ results showed that foreign bank branches were 50% more 
efficient than subsidiary banks; however, the difference in foreign banks’ efficiency 
between branches and subsidiaries disappeared when controlling for other characteristics 
such as macroeconomic conditions. The study also found that specialised foreign bank 
branches performed more efficiently than specialised subsidiaries, while subsidiaries 
performed better when their banking activities were more diversified.  
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Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that it is important to determine the efficiency effects 
of bank mergers and acquisitions within the context of the rapid growth of cross-border 
banking consolidations worldwide. Their results indicate that banks which have survived 
at least one merger over their sample period have higher profit efficiency, while on the 
other hand, efficiency for the acquired banks appears to be associated with higher cost 
efficiency.  
Tripe (1999), however, provides no support for the premise that merged larger banks have 
the benefits of economies of scale in New Zealand’s banking market. The economies of 
scale could be exhausted by the consolidation of large firms typically involved in 
international activities (Berger et al, 2000), for example, when bank assets are over US 
$10 billion (Berger & Mester, 1997).    
The importance of bank size in foreign bank efficiency has also been discussed in a number 
of bank efficiency studies. The impact of bank size depends heavily on the foreign banks’ 
activities, developed in the host market. In countries where foreign banks are small they 
tend to remain niche players, targeting only specific customers, and not adding to domestic 
financial development. In contrast, in countries with greater foreign banks’ presence, they 
seem to engage in more competition in financial intermediation (Claessens & Van Horen, 
2014).  
In general, foreign banks with large parent banks may be able to exhibit scale efficiency 
in the host nation at a relatively lower cost (Sabi, 1988).  Larger parent banks also allow 
wider penetration of markets and increase in revenue at relatively less cost, opting to 
operating with thinner margins by increasing volume to generate more profits and hence 
increase efficiency (Misra & Das, 2005). Small banks may possess some operational 
advantages due to relatively lower overhead costs that bring about higher efficiencies, 
while in contrast, costs (such as originating, servicing and monitoring costs on loans) for 
large banks might be higher than small banks. Tecles and Tabak (2010) found that large 
foreign and domestic banks in Brazil have outperformed their counterparts with smaller 
sized banks.   
Isik and Hassan (2002) examine the impact of commercial banks’ (foreign, and domestic 
private, and state-owned) size on bank performance in the Turkish banking system over 
the period 1988-1996, with results suggesting that both average cost and profit efficiency 
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find that foreign banks in Luxemburg with higher equity ratios are more efficient, which 
indicates that well capitalized banks tend to perform better.  
Berger & Mester (1997) further find that foreign banks with higher loan to asset ratios are 
associated with a higher alternative profit efficiency but a lower cost efficiency, which 
suggests that foreign banks could possibly gain lending power in the local market due to 
competitive advantages. However, when foreign banks increase lending to risky borrowers 
in the local market, they can incur monitoring costs to manage the risks, thus negatively 
impacting their cost efficiency. 
Credit risk also plays a crucial role in foreign bank efficiency. Asset quality, as an indicator 
of bank credit risk, is generally measured by the total impaired bank assets relative to total 
lending or total bank assets. Impaired assets are typically loans which are at risk of not 
being fully (including interest on the loans) repaid to the bank. A bank needs to control 
the risk characteristics of bad loans to produce output in an efficient manner (Mester, 
2003). 
Banks with higher impaired asset ratios tend to have high costs and low profit (Berger & 
Mester 1997). Evidence from Havrylchyk (2005) on Poland, and Isik and Hassan (2002) 
on Turkey, shows that banks (domestic and foreign) with poor risk management are 
inefficient in their operation. However, Vu and Nham (2013) found that foreign banks in 
Vietnam exhibited lower levels of bad loans in their portfolios during the Asian crisis of 
the late 1990s, which partially contributed to the higher foreign banks’ efficiency average, 
relative to domestic banks in Vietnam. 
Banks also need to create loan loss provisions when they believe they are likely to lose 
money on loans. The loan loss provisions to total assets ratio is an indicator of a bank’s 
asset quality. Risk-averse managers may be willing to incur additional costs (provisions) 
in making higher quality loans and monitoring loan performance, which could lead to the 
bank being more efficient and profitable. Since the loan loss provisions depend on the 
probability of loans’ repayment, higher provisions indicate higher probability of non-
performing asset ratios, hence, a lower ratio is desirable, as documented in the bank 
efficiency literature (Tripe, 2004).  
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developed by Berger et al., (2000). The empirical results from international foreign banks’ 
efficiency studies reveal that foreign banks did not have a competitive advantage 
compared with domestic banks in any given countries. However, supporting evidence is 
found in studies of both developed and developing countries, that foreign banks from some 
nations, headquartered in specific nations with specific favourable market, regulatory, or 
supervisory conditions, operated more efficiently than foreign banks from other nations. 
These results are in line with the global limited advantage hypothesis documented in 
Berger et al.,’s study (2000). 
In addition, the estimations of the impact of bank-specific characteristics on foreign banks 
efficiency have been extensively researched.  Although there is no agreement regarding 
the choices of bank-specific variables, banks size, equity ratios, and asset quality are 
generally included in the efficiency analysis and significantly impact the level of foreign-
owned banks’ efficiency. Overall, it is not clear that bank size has a positive effect on 
foreign banks’ efficiency in all cases and a highly concentrated banking market in the host 
nation can be a double-edged sword for foreign banks’ efficiency levels. In addition, well 
capitalised foreign banks can be associated with lower cost and profit efficiency, while 
banks with a higher level of impaired assets are expected to have low efficiency levels.  
Most of the studies investigating the factors influencing foreign banks’ efficiency 
generally include an examination of the macroeconomic conditions in the host country or 
differences in economic conditions between the home and host country (cross-country 
studies). In general, income (GDP growth), interest rates, and inflation conditions in the 
host country impact foreign banks’ efficiency to different extents, based on the foreign 
banks’ efficiency scores. According to Williams (1998), bank-level characteristics have 
greater impact than country-level characteristics on foreign banks’ efficiency .  
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A cost inefficient bank might still be profit efficient because customers pay more for 
higher quality financial services, hence the banks can earn extra revenue, enough to offset 
the higher expenses. Thus, if a study only measures cost efficiency, it may ignore this 
possibility and misrepresent the nature and extent of a bank’s inefficiency (DeYoung and 
Nolle, 1996). Banks can improve cost efficiency by reducing the costs per unit of output 
for a given set of output quantities and input prices. On the other hand, improving profit 
efficiency requires putting together superior combinations of inputs and outputs. 
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) define profit efficiency in two 
ways, as standard profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. Standard profit 
efficiency assumes the output market is perfectly competitive, and is defined as the ratio 
of predicted actual profits to the predicted maximum profits for a best-practice bank. It 
estimates how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible profit, given a particular 
level of input and output prices. On the other hand, alternative profit efficiency estimates 
how close a bank is to producing the maximum possible profit for a given level of input 
price and output quantities.  
Berger and Mester (1997) argue that alternative profit efficiency is preferred over standard 
profit efficiency among bank efficiency studies for several reasons: (1) the quality of the 
financial products and services rendered differs substantially across banks, (2) markets are 
not perfectly competitive, so  banks might have some market power when pricing their 
outputs, (3) outputs are not completely variable, so  banks cannot achieve every output 
scale and product mix, and (4) output prices are not available, or are difficult to measure 
with accuracy (Isik and Hassan, 2002).      
In the foreign bank efficiency literature, estimation of cost efficiency is the most common 
choice when an empirical study employs the frontier efficiency estimation method. 
However, profit efficiency has also been favoured in recent studies by Isik and Hassan 
(2002); Rossi et al.,(2005), Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005b), Kasman and Yildrim, 
(2006), Naaborg (2007), Aysan et al. (2011), Chan and Karim (2011) and Sufian (2011). 
In line with these studies, both cost efficiency and profit efficiency concepts are employed 
in the analysis.  
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According to Fiorentino, Karmann, and Koetter (2006), the behavioural assumptions in 
the SFA method, such as cost minimization and profit maximization, are appropriate for 
bank efficiency measurement. The assumptions allow for the estimated coefficients in the 
cost and production function to vary stochastically (be positive or negative) over time, to 
reflect the changes in organizations, technologies and environment. 
The estimated coefficients in the SFA method are, however, sensitive to data outliers (Fries 
and Taci, 2005). Originally designed for cross-section data, Gong and Sickles (1992) and 
Sickles (2005) found that a stochastic frontier model using panel data could achieve 
relatively high ranking correlations between estimated and true inefficiency compared 
with cross-sectional models, as the panel data model not only incorporates additional 
information from the times series nature of the data, but also allows SFA for distributional 
assumptions by maximum likelihood estimation. 
The DEA method is the main estimation method used in previous New Zealand bank 
efficiency studies.The main argument against the SFA method being the assumptions 
made about the distribution of efficiency26. These assumptions, however, permit statistical 
hypothesis tests of the most likely shape of the frontier and the distortion of inefficiency. 
Compared with non-parametric DEA, the SFA method therefore has the ability to capture 
distortion, such as errors in the data arising from luck, data problems and other issues, thus 
making misidentification of  measurement errors, transitory differences and specification 
errors in inefficiency less likely (Bauer et al, 1998, Berger et al, 2000). In addition, the 
SFA method does not have the same difficulties as the DEA method in terms of outliers 
and noise in the data (Battese and Coelli, 1995).  
Another advantage in using the SFA method is the possibility of ranking the efficiencies 
of the firms in the same order as their cost or profit function residuals, regardless of which 
specific distributional assumptions are imposed.  
4.2.2.2 Battese and Coelli (1995)Model  
To estimate the determinants of a firm’s inefficiency, there are two options, either the 
standard two-step SFA approach of Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and Van den Broeck 
                                                          
26  Other considerations of data samples and price data availability are discussed through the remainder of 
this chapter. 
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(1977), and Pitt and Lee (1981), or a one stage SFA approach such as that in Battese and 
Coelli (1995).  
The two-step approach estimates firm-level efficiency using stochastic frontier functions, 
and then regresses the predicted firm’s efficiency on the firm-specific variables, such as 
managerial experience, ownership characteristic, etc. in an attempt to identify some of the 
reasons for differences in the predicted efficiencies between firms in an industry (Pitt & 
Lee, 1981). 
Wang and Schmidt (2002) point out that the standard two-step approach suffers from the 
assumption that the efficiency term is independently identical half-normally distributed in 
the first step, while in the second step the efficiency terms are assumed normally 
distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. This contradicts the assumption of 
identically distributed efficiency effects in the stochastic frontier. 
Based on  Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGuckin (1991) and papers from Battese and Coelli 
(1992, 1993) studies, Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a model with a single stage 
maximum likelihood procedure for technical inefficiency effects in a stochastic frontier 
production (used for profit efficiency estimation) and cost function (cost efficiency 
estimation) for cross section data and panel data (balance and unbalanced).  
Battese and Coelli (1995) specifies a stochastic cost frontier with the following properties:   
                                   i,t i,t i,t i,t i,tln C C y ,w ,q;              (4.1) 
Where i,tC  is the total cost bank i faces at time t,  i,t i,tC y , w ,  is the cost frontier, i,ty  
represents the logarithm of bank output, i, at time t, i,tw  is a vector of logarithm of bank 
input prices, i, at time t, q stands for a set of control variables and   is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. The term i,t   is a non-negative random variable, which 
accounts for cost inefficiency, assumed to be independently identically distributed (iid) 
with a truncated normal distribution. i,tv  captures measurement error and random effects 
and is distributed as a standard normal variable. Both i,tu  and i,tv  are represented as 
follows: 
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loaned and incomes generated are regarded as outputs (Avkiran, 2006). In this study, we 
define three input prices for labour, funds, and physical capital, and two outputs’ 
quantities27, total bank loans and total other earning assets. The details of input price 
measurement and output quantities and data are described below: 
Price of labour (PL) is the total personnel cost divided by the numbers of full-time 
equivalent employees reported in the individual bank’s balance sheet. In this study, KPMG 
(2002-2012a) provides the numbers of full-time employees28 for all the banks in New 
Zealand, however, some of the banks have no accounting information reported on the total 
personnel cost over the study period (Kookmin Bank, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi29) 
or none available for some of the years (for example, Kiwibank data was not available 
2002-2007). Some banks reported the data annually or semi-annually which required an 
adjustment to quarterly data (Rabobank, Kiwibank 2008-2011).  
Kiwibank, as one of the two main New Zealand owned banks, operates with more 
nationwide branches (utilising New Zealand Post retail outlets) than all other banks in New 
Zealand (Wilson, Rose, & Pinfold, 2009). The bank has competed with foreign-owned 
banks in the New Zealand banking market since 2002 when it was first established and is 
included in spite of data deficiencies30 on personnel cost for the period 2002-2007. Rather 
than simply eliminating the missing data period available data from 2008 to 2011 was 
used, based on the following assumptions.  
First, the actual ratio of total personnel cost to total operating cost per annum31 was 
calculated for the period 2008-2011, which was 38% on average. Next, based on this figure 
                                                          
27 Due to the choice of alterative profit efficiency concept used in this study, output quantity was chosen, 
not output price which is generally used in the standard profit function. 
28 Quarterly employee numbers are not available for all banks, thus the available annual employee 
numbers for the four quarters throughout the year are used. 
29 We eliminated the two banks because the banks only accounted for 0.7% of the total banking sector 
assets at December 31, 2011 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012a). This is not expected to impact the 
results of this study.  
30 Omitting the missing data period would give unbalanced panel data, which can still be estimated in the 
model, however, balanced panel data is preferred to reduce the possibility of biased results. 
31 Where data on personal expenses are not reported, the calculation of the price of labour can be 
calculated based on the assumption that the ratio of the personnel expenses to operational expenses is the 
same as the closest available year, see for example, Altunbaş, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore (2001); 
Zhang and Matthews (2012). In this study, the figure for the closest year of 2008 is 27%, which is lower 
than the industry benchmark, based on common knowledge, thus the average ratio of personnel cost to 
total operational cost from 2008-2012, which is 38%, is used. 
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and the available operating cost and employee numbers, the personnel cost per employee 
for the missing data for the period 2002-2007 was estimated and ,believed  to be  robust32.   
Price of funds (PF):  Tripe (2005b) comments that liabilities reported on individual 
bank’s balance sheets in New Zealand, and the issue of lack of consistent information on 
sources of banks’ funding, limit the usefulness of the borrowed fund data from the balance 
sheets, despite all banks separately identifying deposit categories. Thus, following Tripe’s 
suggestion, all interest-bearing liabilities, excluding subordinated debt, are used as total 
borrowed funds to reflect the funds used in the intermediation process. The price of 
borrowed funds is approximated by dividing the bank’s total interest expenses over the 
total interest-bearing liabilities, exclusive of subordinated debt. 
 
Price of physical capital (PPC): The book value of premises and fixed assets is defined 
as the total physical capital. The total physical capital is divided by the total operating cost, 
exclusive of total personnel cost, to give the bank’s price of physical capital. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Loans (LOAN): Loans is an output variable. In this study the total amount of all types of 
loans, advances and lease finance reported in the bank’s balance sheet is used. Under New 
Zealand’s disclosure regime, registered banks are not required to report their lending by 
the same sectors, thus, the lack of consistent information on lending sectors across the 
banks limits the use of classified loans as outputs. On the other hand, in order to ensure 
the number of outputs and inputs are proportionate to the sample size of the study all types 
of banks’ total loans are calculated. 
 
Other interest earning assets (OIEA) is another output quantity variable used in this 
study, which includes the bank’s trading securities, all other interest earning assets, such 
as other investment securities, plus balances with related parties, as reported on the 
individual bank’s balance sheet.  
 
                                                          
32 The estimated personnel cost per annum per employee in Kiwibank for the period 2002-2007 was 
$63,418, in line with the actual average annual personnel cost, $65,877 for 2008-2011. Thus, the 
assumption on the missing personnel cost is believed to be robust. However, it is noted that the price of 
labour increased dramatically in 2010 and 2011. 
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in New Zealand can be as efficient as domestic banks (Kiwibank and TSB). Bollard34 
(2004) commented on the impact of foreign banks’ entries in New Zealand that the entries 
are associated with diffusion of new technologies and better resource allocation,  thus 
greater efficiency should be transferred (through competition and/or imitation) to the New 
Zealand banking sector.  
 
Similarity is defined as a dummy variable in this study to test the global limited advantage 
hypothesis that some national characteristics allow banks from certain nations (Australia 
in this study) to overcome the diseconomies of operating away from their home nation. 
The variable with a value of 1 represents banks from Australia, 0 if from other countries. 
The higher level of similarity between New Zealand and Australia in terms of economy, 
language, laws and politics, is expected to have positive effects on the efficiency scores 
for foreign banks. 
To and Tripe (2002) examined the impact of the difference in GDP growth between New 
Zealand and Australia on foreign banks’ performance in New Zealand, but found no 
evidence to support any such impact. However, the similar culture, language, close 
geographical distance, regulation policies, and integration of markets between New 
Zealand and Australia are expected to contribute to the level of foreign banks’ efficiency 
in New Zealand.  
Organizational form:  Organizational form is also a dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if the bank is an incorporated subsidiary and 0 if the bank operated as a foreign branch. 
It is noticeable that Westpac Banking Corporation (Australia) had conducted its operation 
in New Zealand as a branch bank until 14 February 2006, when the bank was incorporated 
into Westpac New Zealand Limited as a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary of the same 
parent bank. Westpac New Zealand was deemed a systemically important bank and was 
therefore required to incorporate its local retail business by RBNZ in 2006, while the 
corporate business remains with the branch bank. 
                                                          
34 Dr.Alan Bollard was the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand from September 2002 to May 
2012. 
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Mergers and acquisitions: ANZ’s acquisition of the National Bank in October 2003 
made the acquiring bank35 the largest in New Zealand, with more branches, more ATMs 
and more staff supporting customers than any other. However, the two banks continued to 
operate separately for ten years, under their own brands, to retain their retail and small 
business customers. The rural market operated under the National Bank name, while other 
segments used the brand name that benefitted their business, before the bank rebranded to 
ANZ in 2012.  
 
To test whether the ANZ acquisition had any impact on banks’ efficiency during the study 
period, a dummy merger and acquisition (DM) variable was created to represent the 
variable before/after ANZ acquisition: 0 pre- acquisition36, 1 post-acquisition. All other 
banks in the panel data are set to 0 to represent no acquisitions. The Liu and Tripe (2003) 
study empirically showed that, for mergers and acquisitions between 1989 and 1998 in 
New Zealand, the majority of the mergers led to an increase in bank efficiency. Thus, the 
acquisition is again expected to significantly impact banks’ efficiency levels. 
 
Market concentration (MKTC): Market concentration ratios have the ability to capture 
structural features of the banking market, explaining competitive performance in the 
banking industry as the result of changes in market structure caused by a bank into the 
market or its exit from it, or a merger (Bikker & Haaf, 2002). Following Sufian and 
Habibullah (2012) and Hasan and Marton (2003), Fries and Taci (2005) the market 
concentration ratio (MKTC) in this study is defined as the asset share of the four largest 
banks to total New Zealand banking assets.  
Chan et al. (2007) examined the extent of competition in the New Zealand banking market, 
finding the industry to be competitive and financially stable. Within a highly concentrated 
banking market dominated by foreign-owned banks, competition between foreign and 
domestic banks in the New Zealand market are deemed to be strong. In a competitive 
banking market, the impact of market concentration on bank efficiency may depend on the 
individual bank’s managerial behaviours mitigating the competitive pressure (such as 
                                                          
35 After ANZ’s acquisition in October 2003, the bank amended its registered name to ANZ National Bank. 
Further details have been provided in Section 2.4 in Chapter 2. 
36  The ANZ acquisition was announced in October 2003, however, the aggregated accounting information 
for the acquiring bank is available from the second quarter in 2004, thus values for the DM variable for 
the period (2002:Q1- 2004:Q1) are set to 0, with 1 from quarter 2 in 2004 to quarter 4 in 2011. 
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product differentiation) to pursue their cost minimization and profit maximization 
objectives (Bikker & Bos, 2005; Shamsuddin & Xiang, 2012). 
4.2.4.2 Bank specific characteristic variables 
Bank size is considered an important determinant of bank efficiency, with the natural 
logarithm of banks’ total assets Ln (TA) used to control for bank size heterogeneity in the 
frontier efficiency estimation. It is related to economy of scale in that a larger sized foreign 
bank may reduce the cost of gathering and processing information, and has market power 
in pricing and competing with domestic banks (Berger, 2003). Larger foreign banks often 
have a greater share of low cost deposits due to their large branch networks, especially for 
foreign banks which have accessibility to international fund markets, thus the external 
influences on a bank’s interest or funding cost should impact the bank’s asset size (Fiechter 
et al., 2011). 
 
The quality of bank capital risk management is measured by the ratio of equity capital to 
total assets with Equity ratio (EQR) used as a measure of the bank’s capital strength.  A 
foreign bank, incorporated overseas, is required by RBNZ to hold the same level of capital 
adequacy in New Zealand as domestic banks, although registered foreign branches are not 
so required. Overseas banks are, however, required to comply with their home countries’ 
minimum international capital standards, and must include this information on New 
Zealand disclosure statements (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2014b).  
It is rational to assume that banks with higher capital ratios are relatively safer in the event 
of a loss or liquidation. However, the conventional risk-return hypothesis implies a 
negative effect of equity to assets ratios on foreign bank efficiency. A well-capitalized 
bank (both foreign and domestic) can still be considered to be risky, which is likely to 
reduce the bank’s incentive for cost efficiency. 
Another significant risk characteristic for both foreign and domestic banks is the bank’s 
asset quality (AQ), which is measured by the ratio of impaired assets to total gross assets 
(or gross loans) as the credit risk variable used in this study. Impaired assets are the amount 
of bank loans not fully repaid or interest on the loans which may not be fully paid by the 
borrowers, thus, information on impaired assets provides a useful indication of the quality 
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of a bank’s assets. All registered banks in New Zealand are required to disclose the amount 
of impaired assets and the level of provisioning against impaired assets.  
 
Among previous foreign banks’ efficiency studies, the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
loans has also been used to control for loan quality in some studies (Sharma et al., 2013; 
Sufian, 2011). The estimated sign using this ratio can, however, be unclear since higher 
provisions may imply either solidity or higher operating costs associated with extensive 
risk management operations (Barry, Dacanay III, Lepetit, & Tarazi, 2008). A bank can 
also spend more of their resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring to have less 
loan loss provision (Kwan, 2003).  
4.2.4.3 Macroeconomic control variables 
The differences in the level of foreign banks’ efficiency can be reduced when 
macroeconomic variables are included in the parametric frontier efficiency estimation 
model (Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000). This implies that neglecting macroeconomic 
conditions may lead to a misspecification of the common frontier, and hence overestimate 
bank inefficiency.  
There are three major macroeconomic conditions (country-level) control variables used in 
this study. These include the unemployment rate and foreign exchange rates to control for 
the price of labour and cost of funds.  
Year to year growth of the real gross domestic products (GDP) in New Zealand, a 
commonly used macroeconomic indicator to measure the total economic activities within 
an economy, was also utilised.  To and Tripe (2002) investigated the factors influencing 
the performance of foreign-owned banks in New Zealand, with their results indicating no 
impact of GDP growth rates on foreign banks’ overall profitability.  
Tripe (2003, 2005b) used interest rates (IR) as a control variable to study the cost of funds 
and bank efficiency in New Zealand from 1996 to 2003. The author suggests that the 90 
day bill is a key interest rate in New Zealand financial markets as it is the most prevalent 
maturity for bank funding and as a pricing reference (Tripe, 2005a).  Tripe’s (2003, 2005a) 
studies showed that banks in New Zealand have become more efficient, on average, over 
the period 1996 to 2002. This appears to be partially a consequence of the fall in general 
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interest rates, as measured by the 90 day bill rate, which, over the period 2002-2011, 
changed within a range of 1.5% to 5.3%.  
Following the foreign bank efficiency studies by Sufian and Habibullah (2012) and Vu 
and Nahm (2013), macroeconomic risk is also accounted for by controlling for the 
inflation rate (IFR) in the host country. The aforementioned studies reveal a positive 
relationship between inflation and bank efficiency.   
 
New Zealand has inflation targeting in its monetary policy, under the Policy Targets 
Agreement (PTA) (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2012b) between the government and 
the Reserve Bank, to achieve price stability and avoid unnecessary instability in outputs, 
interest rates and the exchange rate over the long and medium term (Monetary Policy, 
RBNZ, www.rbnz, co.nz). The PTA defines price stability as an annual increase in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) between 1 and 3, on average, over the medium term. Since 
September 2000, New Zealand’s CPI has averaged around 2.7%. In this study the 
relatively low inflation rate is expected to maintain the soundness and efficiency of the 
financial system in New Zealand.  
 
As well as the three important macroeconomic variables above, other studies (Berger and 
Mester, 1997; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Frei et al., 2000) have gone beyond the 
usual set of variables drawn from the bank’s balance sheet and have been more 
informative. Using a broader set of variables to look deeper into how the host nation’s 
macroeconomics can help explain efficiency differences between foreign-owned and 
domestic banks.  
 
Consequently, we test if the foreign exchange rate (FX) has the effect of capturing foreign 
currency risks as an off-balance sheet item.  The trade-weighted index (TWI) was used to 
examine if foreign exchange risks/exposures impact a foreign bank’s efficiency in New 
Zealand.  The TWI index is a weighted average of the New Zealand dollar against the 
currencies of New Zealand’s major trading partners. RBNZ prefers this summary measure 
for capturing medium-term effects of exchange rate changes on the New Zealand economy 
and inflation (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, n.d.)  
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performance of New Zealand‘s registered banks, major finance companies and saving 
institutions from which annual accounting operating cost efficiency, staff numbers, banks 
profiles, foreign ownership and banking industry update data was sourced. 
 
There are some issues regarding accounting information reported in the individual bank’s 
disclosure statements that deserve attention.  The first issue arises from the RBNZ 
requirements differing between on-quarter and off-quarter disclosures. The on-quarters are 
made at the half year and annual balance dates, which disclose more extensive information, 
and are subject to full external audit at the end of the financial year and a limited scope 
audit review at the half year.  Disclosure statements issued at the “off quarters” (the first 
quarter and the third quarter of the bank’s financial year) disclose relatively less 
information, and are not required to be audited (Brash, 1997).  This is, however, not 
expected to have significant impact on the estimated results.  
 
Another issue arising from the quarterly disclosures is the diversity of the balance sheet 
dates for financial statements. Each bank’s financial year ended in different quarters to be 
in line with the parent bank’s accounting policy and standard, which forces the adjustment 
of quarterly data for some banks ( if their financial year does not fit the calendar year). 
This necessitated some adjustment to the data for some of the variables (total cost, total 
profit before tax, total personnel cost, operating cost, and personnel cost) sourced from the 
bank’s income statement. Tripe (2004) uses adjusted quarterly data for the DEA model on 
bank efficiency in the integrated banking market between Australia and New Zealand and 
believes that the diversity of balance sheet dates has not led to any significant distortion in 
his results. 
  
Similarly, ANZ’s acquisition of the National Bank in December 2003 also raises a data 
issue for ANZ National (ANZ NZ) bank, the new company post- acquisition. During the 
study period 2002-2011, disclosure statements are available for the National Bank and 
ANZ bank until the first quarter of 2004, then the National Bank data was incorporated 
into ANZ NZ bank, despite the two banks continuing their operations under separate 
brands until 2012.  Thus, the data for the acquiring bank, ANZ bank, was obtained from 
the bank’s disclosure before (and including) the first quarter of 2004, and the aggregated 
data for the remaining study period (2004:Q2 to 2012:Q4) from ANZ National Bank 
disclosures.  
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Tripe (2005b) asserts that New Zealand banking is quiet heterogeneous, with bank loans 
for foreign subsidiaries, foreign branches and domestic banks  varying substantially in 
size, while  loan repayment schedules, risks, transparency of information, and type of 
collateral are also different across the banks. In terms of borrowed funds, banks with 
different ownership may pay different rates depending on their funding sources and their 
response to changes in market conditions (Bos & Kool, 2006). These differences are likely 
to affect the costs of bank loan origination and ongoing monitoring costs, amongst others, 
which should be taken into consideration when measuring foreign banks’ efficiency. 
               
One of the reasons why the Battese and Coelli (1995) model was chosen, is that it can 
account for both random noise and systemic differences between banks due to 
heterogeneity (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000), and allows a relative comparison of markedly 
different banks varying in ownership, organizational form, size, and risk portfolios: for 
example, foreign banks compared to domestic banks or foreign subsidiary banks verses 
foreign branches. However, to make the best effort to control data heterogeneity in the BC 
(1995) model inefficiency specifications, the 10 selected banks are divided into 3 groups 
according to ownership, types of business, and organizational form to define 3 common 
frontiers. This allows comparison of systemic differences between banks caused by 
different levels of data heterogeneity within these groups. Pooling the banks in different 
groups would implicitly assume efficiency differences across the banks are attributed to 
managerial decisions within the group, not technological differences.  
 
Group A includes all 10 selected banks (8 foreign-owned banks and 2 domestic banks), 
which account for 96.3 % of total banking assets as at 31 December 2011 (Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand, 2012a)(Financial Stability Report, RBNZ, 2012). This group is used to 
examine the home field advantage hypothesis (Berger and Mester, 2000) and the group 
efficiency scores also give the reader an insight the level of efficiency in the overall New 
Zealand banking industry.  
Group B is restricted to six major banks (Big Four banks, Kiwibank and TSB bank), which 
account for 88.2% of total banking assets in New Zealand (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
2012a). The six banks are full service retail banks with the same and/or similar nature of0 
business. The six banks are also subject to similar regulatory requirements and compete in 
the same market conditions, and are, therefore more homogeneous than those in group A.  

 
 
90 
Table 4.3 Description of Variables 
Notations   Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
TC Total Cost Total interest cost plus non-interest cost 
TP Total profit  Total profit before tax 
Input    
PL Price of Labour  Total personnel cost/total number of employees 
PF Price of Funds  
Total Interest expenses/Total deposits and other 
interest bearing liabilities 
PPC Price of physical capital Operating cost-personnel cost/ total fixed assets 
Output      
LOAN Loans  Total loans and advances 
OIEA Other Interest Earning assets Total other interest earning assets 
Control variable  
T Year  On the order of quarter 1 to 40 (2002-2011) 
Industry-specific variables  
DO Dummy ownership 1 if 100% foreign-owned 0 otherwise 
DS Dummy similarity  1 if Australian-owned,0 otherwise 
DORG Dummy organizational form 1 if subsidiary bank, 0 if foreign branch 
DM Dummy merger  1 if merged banks, 0 otherwise 
MKTC Market concentration 
Ratio of the 4 largest banks’ assets to the total 
of New Zealand banking assets 
Bank-specific variable 
LNTA Bank size  Log of total assets 
EQR Equity ratio  Total equity/total assets 
AQ Asset quality Ratio of impaired assets to total assets 
Macroeconomic conditions  
GDPG GDP growth Quarterly real year to year GDP growth rate  
IR Interest Rate  90 days bank bill yields wholesale rates 
IFR Inflation Rate  Real CPI inflation rate 
FX Foreign Exchange Rate  
Real Trade-Weighted index (TWI5) on New 
Zealand dollar value.  
UNEMP Unemployment Rate 
The year to year growth of the unemployment 
rate quarterly  
 
In line with the BC (1995) model cost function (equation 4.2), following similar 
approaches as Naaborg (2007), Lensink et al (2008), Tecles and Tabak (2010) and  Rossi 
et al (2005), the cost function in logs is specified below:  
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 (4.4)             
              + 2i,t i,t  Where ~N m ,    And  2i,t ~ iidN O,                                    (4.5) 
                
n ,i ,ti.t 0 n,i,t
n
m z                                                                            (4.6) 
Where the dependent variable TC (total cost), in the cost function, is the sum of interest 
cost and operating cost. To avoid the problem of singularity in the disturbance covariance 
matrix of the equations, the dependent variable (TC), and the independent variables - price 
of funds (PF) and price of physical capital (PPC) - are normalized by price of labour (PL) 
before taking logarithms to impose linear input price homogeneity.  
ln  represents the natural logarithm, i denotes individual banks, t time horizon (quarters). 
The term ,i t  captures cost inefficiency and is independently identically distributed with 
a truncated normal distribution. ,i tv  captures measurement errors and other random errors, 
and is distributed as a standard normal variable. Both ,i t   and ,i tv   are time and bank 
specific. 
Since the cost function (equation 4.4) is a second order approximation, on time-varying 
panel data, T and 2T are introduced into the model specification to allow the model to 
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  Where ,i t ~ N
  2i,tn , and  2i,t ~ iidN O,                                            (4.8) 
                
n ,i ,ti.t 0 n,i,t
n
n z                                                                           (4.9) 
The alterative profit function is specified in terms of input prices and output quantities. 
Similar to the cost function (equation 4.4), the logarithm of the price of labour (PL) is 
subtracted from both sides of the alternative profit function without losing the generality, 
as given in equation (4.7): 
Where Total profit (TP) before tax41 is the dependent variable in the alternative profit 
function (4.7). There is a possibility of shifting profitable activities from foreign banks in 
New Zealand to their parent bank overseas, which could have an impact on foreign banks’ 
net profitability, hence, the level of profit efficiencies for these foreign banks (To and 
Tripe, 2002). 
Different from , ,i t i tv  , as the disturbance term in the cost function (equation 4.4), in the 
alternative profit function (equation 4.7), , ,i t i t  represent the specified disturbance 
term. The term ,i t  captures profit inefficiency and is independently identically distributed 
with a truncated normal distribution. i,tv  captures the measurement error and random 
effects, and is distributed as a standard normal variable while 
n ,i ,tit 0 n,i,t
n
n z   
(equation 4.9) is the profit inefficiency equation. All Zs, control variables, in the equation 
can capture the systematic differences (i.e. profit inefficiency) due to the data 
heterogeneity. 
Similar to the cost function (equation 4.4), T and 2T  are also used as control variables in 
the alternative profit function to allow the model to capture changes in technology, 
                                                          
41 Return on equity has been used as a dependent variable in the alternative profit function, however, 
according to Tripe (2005b), in New Zealand, the book value of equity in accounting disclosure appears to 
be much less than market value, which could impact the level of banks’ profit (Return on Equity). 
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regulatory reforms and other external shocks that can transform the banking environment 
as a whole. 
There is an issue in the presence of negative profit for some banks, for example, Kiwibank 
has negative annual profits from 2002 to 2004, while Rabobank has negative quarterly 
profit after the adjustment from annual to quarterly data. In a translog specification, the 
log of negative numbers is not defined and different solutions exist in the literature. One 
solution is to eliminate such observations, which is not encouraged due to the small data 
sample. Another solution is to add the minimum profit (i.e. the maximum negative profit 
in the sample) plus 1 to each bank’s profits before taking the log. Both of these approaches 
can bias the results (Bos, Heid, Koetter, Kolari, & Kool, 2005).  
Following the suggestion by Bos et al. (2005), a negative profit indicator variable, NPI, 
was constructed as an additional right-hand side variable. For banks that exhibit positive 
profits, the NPI variable has a value of one, while for banks with negative profits,  the 
negative profit variable on the left  hand (TP) was replaced with value 1, and on the right 
hand the absolute value of negative profits was included as the NPI variable, but  the value 
in the translog function was logged. 
The primary advantage of the alternative profit function is that it allows for measurement 
of inefficiency on both output and input sides of the firm, providing a way of controlling 
for unmeasured quality differences in banking services. In other words, it enables us to 
examine the ability of foreign versus domestic banks or large banks versus small banks, to 
generate profits for the same levels of output and therefore reduce the bias that might be 
present in the standard profit function. The alternative profit function assumes banks have 
some market power to vary output prices, which it is believed, to some extent, exists in 
New Zealand’s banking market.  
The profit efficiency scores can be directly generated using the computer program Frontier 
4.1. The measure of profit efficiency also ranges over the [0, 1] interval and equals one for 
the best-practice bank in the sample.  The efficiency scores indicate the percentage of 
actual profits (before tax) relative to what the bank could have realised given its price of 
input and output mix. A 0.70 profit efficiency suggests that the bank would earn about 
30% more profits than what it is making now if it were operating on the efficiency frontier. 
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Table 4.4 Variables in Inefficiency Equations by Bank Groups and Models 
       
 
4.4.3.1 Bank Industry and Bank Specific Inefficiency Model (Model 1) 
The cost inefficiency equation (4.6) and alternative profit inefficiency equation (4.9) in 
the standard Battese and Coelli (1995) model discussed in Section 4.2 can be rewritten in 
equation (4.12) and (4.13), respectively.  
 
Groups Model 1 Model 2
Group A : 10 sample banks
ANZN Industry-Specific Macroeconomic
BNZ Ownerhsip GDP growth 
Westpac Merger Interest rate
BNZ Market Concentration Inflation rate
HSBC Bank-specific Foreign exchange rate
Rabobank Bank size Unemployment rate
Deutsche Bank Equity ratio
Citibank Asset quality
Kiwibank
TSB
Group B: 6 Major Banks 
ANZN Industry-Specific Macroeconomic
BNZ Ownerhsip GDP growth 
Westpac Merger Interest rate
BNZ Market Concentration Inflation rate
Kiwibank Bank-specific Foreign exchange rate
TSB Bank size Unemployment rate
Equity ratio
Asset quality
Group C: 8 Foreign Banks 
ANZN Industry-Specific Macroeconomic
BNZ Similarity GDP growth 
Westpac Organizational form Interest rate
BNZ Merger Inflation rate
HSBC Market Concentration Foreign exchange rate
Rabobank Bank-specific Unemployment rate
Deutsche Bank Bank size
Citibank Equity ratio
Asset quality
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, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tm DO DM MKTC LnTA EQR AQ          (4.12) 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i tn DO DM MKTC LnTA EQR AQ          (4.13) 
Where ,i tm and ,i tn  are the inefficiency distribution specifications extended, based on 
equations (4.6) and (4.9), for cost inefficiency and alternative inefficiency, respectively, 
where n,i,t represents the bank-specific explanatory variables (discussed in Section 4.2.4):  
 DO:      Dummy ownership  
 DM:     Dummy merger 
 MKTC:   Market concentration  
 LNTA: Total assets 
 AQ:      Asset quality 
 EQR:    Equity ratio 
The above two inefficiency measurement equations apply to both banks in group A and 
group B panel datasets, as the two groups of banks are designed to test the home field 
advantage hypothesis and the general form of the global advantage hypothesis.   
To test the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis, and investigate the impact of 
organizational form on foreign banks’ efficiency, the dummy ownership variable (DO) is 
removed, but the following two dummy variables (similarity and organizational form) are 
added into equation (4.12) and equation (4.13), which generate the cost inefficiency 
equation (4.14) and alternative profit inefficiency equation (4.15) to measure group C 
banks’ panel data.  
 
   , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tm DS DORG DM MKTC LnTA EQR AQ              (4.14) 
,, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7. , , , , ,i ti t i t i t i t i t i t i t
n DS DORG DM MKTC LnTA EQR AQ                    (4.15) 
The cost inefficiency equation (4.14) and alternative profit inefficiency equation (4.15) 
when applied to group C banks, show the factor of banks’ efficiency without and with 
macroeconomic variables, respectively. The main focus is to investigate how merger 
activities, similarity and organizational form influence foreign banks’ efficiency. 
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4.4.3.2 Macroeconomic Conditions Model (Model 2) 
To investigate the impact of the macroeconomic conditions on foreign banks’ efficiency 
in group A and group B banks, five macroeconomic variables:  
 GDPG:  GDP growth  
 IR: interest rate measured by 90 day bill rate 
 IFR: CPI inflation rate 
 FX: foreign exchange rate 
 UNEMP: Unemployment rate 
are added into equation (4.12) and (4.13) in model (1), to obtain the cost inefficiency 
equations (4.16) and alternative profit inefficiency equations (4.17), respectively for 
model (2). 
                   , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 10 .
lni t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
m DO DM MKTC TA EQR
AQ GDPG IR IFR FX UNEMP
           
          
        (4.16) 
                   , 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 10 ,
lni t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
n DO DM MKTC TA EQR
AQ GDPG IR IFR FX UNEMP
           
          
          (4.17) 
For foreign banks in group C, the same set of  macroeconomic variables are added into 
equation (4.14) and (4.15) in model (1), to generate the cost inefficiency equation (4.18) 
and profit inefficiency equation (4.19) for model (2), respectively: 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 10 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
m DS DORG DM MKTC LnTA
EQR AQ GDPG IR IFR FX UNEMP
           
            
 (4.18)  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 10 ,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
n DS DORG DM MKTC LnTA
EQR AQ GDPG IR IFR FX UNEMP
           
            
 (4.19) 
All the inefficiency equations in both model (1) and (2) are estimated in the cost function 
(equation 4.4) and alternative profit function (equation 4.6) simultaneously, using 
maximum likelihood estimation as a one stage approach via the computer program 
Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Industry-and Bank-specific Variables 
 
The table reports the means, and standard deviations (SD) of the variables42. The price of 
funds (PF), price of labour cost (PL), price of physical capital (PPC), asset quality (AQ) 
and capital equity ratios (EQR) across the 3 groups of banks exhibit low standard 
deviations (SD). Notably, almost no SD value was reported in all three groups of banks 
for the price of funds, which indicates the responses are fairly uniform on the input price 
                                                          
42  The Coefficient of variation (CV) was computed (SD scaled by mean), and the results in group B banks 
exhibit the lowest CV ratios among the three groups of banks, which indicate more homogenous in group Banks 
compared with the other two groups of banks.  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent Variable
Total costs (TC) 406.53 485.45 628.90 517.99 489.692 509.139
Total profits before tax(TP) 98.68 119.57 148.67 129.56 120.548 124.382
Inputs
Total interest expenses 314.99 386.10 483.68 420.23 381.54 404.76
Total funds 23801.43 26833.09 36189.10 28481.10 28744.87 27839.25
Price of funds(PF) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Personnel expenses 42.85 52.99 68.35 55.25 51.82 55.69
Total staff numbers 2300.00 2841.00 3745.00 2869.00 2761.65 3001.00
Price of labour(PL) 0.15 1.65 0.02 0.01 0.18 1.85
Fixed assets 105.34 168.34 173.33 188.95 127.28 181.73
Operating costs 48.79 57.25 76.87 58.95 56.45 61.07
Price of physical capital(PPL) 1.92 3.86 0.74 0.76 2.16 4.27
Outputs
Total loans(LOAN) 21397.98 25908.28 33872.40 26928.70 25929.54 27089.91
Other Interest earning assets(OIEA) 3692.35 3514.00 4275.14 3064.27 4366.45 3616.19
Explantory variable
Total assets (TA) 27596.47 31875.82 42104.50 34053.50 33318.11 33198.83
Total Impaired assets 222.25 423.17 333.86 509.06 273.86 458.65
Asset quality(AQ) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Equity 1933.04 2672.22 3056.08 2945.32 2353.58 2835.29
Equity ratios(EQR) 0.06 0.04 0.71 0.03 0.05 0.04
Maket Concentraion(MKCT) 0.86 0.03 0.86 0.03 0.86 0.03
Notes:  
1) Other than prices, ratios, staff numbers, all variables are in millions of New Zealand dollars.
     Observations for group B=240
     Observations for group C=320
Variables
Group A Group B Group C
2) Observations for group A=400
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alternative profit function at 5% significance, which indicates the existence of cost and 
profit inefficiency effects in the frontier models; in addition, the presence of the 
inefficiency effect is not spurious, and the explanatory variables in the cost and profit 
inefficiency equations are stochastic, related to deviations from the estimated common 
cost and alternative profit frontiers.  
The higher overall LR ratios in model (2) in all groups of banks reveal that the 
macroeconomic variables included in the cost inefficiency equations provide a better 
statistical fit than model (1). In addition, it is likely that the joint effects with 
macroeconomic explanatory variables (model 2) on the inefficiencies of production are 
significant, although the individual effects of one or more of the variables may not be 
statistically significant. Notably, the relatively lower LR ratios in group B banks in both 
models might be partially due to the smaller number of observations47 (n=240) compared 
with group A (n=400), and C (n=320) banks. 
The sign and magnitude of the T variable and ½ T squared variables is presented under 
the first category in the cost and alternative profit function in Tables C.1 and C.2, which 
together determine the characteristic of the functions that can be increasing or decreasing 
over the study period. Therefore, the overall statistically significant negative in Table C.1 
(positive in Table C.2) coefficients of variable T (1/2 squared T variables are overall 
positive) indicate an overall decreasing (increasing) time effect on the cost (alternative 
profit) function. The results on T variables in this study also support the advantage of the 
panel-data frontier estimation technique that enables us to distinguish inefficiency from 
observable explanatory variables and time specific effects (Kumbhakar, 1991).   
In terms of the appropriateness of the sample size in this study, this is a relatively small 
sample size with a large t (40 quarters) and small n (10 banks). However, according to 
Mendenhall and Sincich (2012), for multiple regression models, the number of data points 
                                                          
relationship in the model is valid. However, it does not apply to the test with Chi-squared distribution 
(Coelli et al, 2005). We obtained the chi-squared critical value of degree of freedom=20 in cost function 
(equation 4.4) and degree of freedom=21 in equation 4.7 at 5% significance from (Kodde & Palm, 1986), 
Table 1: Upper and Lower bounds for the critical value for jointly testing equality and inequality 
restrictions. 
47 However, caution is required as the matters regarding the properties of log LR statistics are not 
straightforward if the sample size is small (Coelli et al., 2005, p. 225). 
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The efficiency ratios for the big four foreign banks (ANZN, BNZ, ASB and Westpac) 
range from 40.01% to 46.23%. The efficiency ratio of ANZN, BNZ and Westpac bank 
remained relatively flat over the study period while ASB continuously exhibits decreasing 
ratios (indicates increasing operating efficiency) from 51.26% in 2002 to 42.94% in 2011. 
Rabobank Bank’s efficiency ratios also increased significantly over the period with 
exceptional increase from 53.38 in 2004 to 58.01 in 2005 possibly affected by the 
increased marketing cost for promoting a new brand (Raboplus) in this year (KMPG, 
2006). However, Deutsche Bank shows significant decreases in the operating efficiency 
ratios: 8.68% in 2002 and 90.48% in 2010. The high ratio in 2007 may partially due to the 
bank’s unwound structure financial deal in 2005 which lowered the trading income on 
derivatives (KPMG, 2008).                                  
Recently, the big four foreign banks in New Zealand appear to be embracing the use of 
social media to transform communication and ease the payment system thus reducing their 
operational costs.  ASB bank has made the greatest inroads in the Social Media World, 
while domestic banks such as TSB and Kiwibank appear to have less ability to develop 
and compete in this new business culture.  
For the two domestic banks, TSB has a mean ratio of 41.79%, which is lower than ANZN, 
BNZ and ASB bank (46.23%, 45.26%, 44.73%, respectively), but slightly higher than 
Westpac (40.01%). Kiwibank a newly established bank, exhibited high ratios (low 
efficiency) in the early years but improved over time, 64% by 2011, although still not quite 
comparable with other major banks. The higher ratio was largely a result of Kiwibank’s 
continuing expansion. Given the size of the Kiwibank branch network, personnel expenses 
represent a significant expense for the bank with employee numbers increasing to 1029 in 
2011 (KPMG, 2011) 
Although the operating cost to operating income ratio is well accepted by finance 
practitioners as an operating efficiency indicator, it does have theoretical and practical 
limitations (see Chapter 3). It might also neglect to control for product mix or input prices 
(Berger, et al, 1993). A blind pursuit of accounting based efficiency might reduce a bank’s 
cost efficiency by cutting back on those expenditures necessary for the banks’ operation 
(DeYoung, 1998).  
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A summary of the mean cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency scores for group 
A, B and C banks in models (1) and (2) is presented in Table 5.4.  
The estimated mean cost efficiencies are 0.824, 0.959, and 0.848 in model (1) for the full 
sample banks (group A), major banks (group B) and full sample foreign banks (group C), 
respectively. This suggests that, banks, on average, need 17.6%, 4.1 % and 15.2% more 
resources to produce the same outputs as the best-practice bank under the common 
frontier.  
Turning to the mean alternative profit efficiency (APE) scores in Table 5.4, the data shows 
that the APE scores range from 0.536 to 0.720 across the three groups of banks in the two 
models. This suggests that, on average, the banks could have realised between 
approximately half or a quarter more profit, compared with actual profit, if the banks had 
chosen optimal input and output mixes, which is higher than that in alternative profit 
efficiency studies of U.S banks. For example, Berger and Mester (1993) found that the US 
banking industry appeared to lose about half of its potential variable profits to inefficiency, 
while 0.33 to 0.67  were reported in Berger and Mester’s (1997) study. 
There are two noteworthy results in Table 5.4. First, there are large differences in mean 
CE and APE across the three groups of banks and in both models, which may strengthen 
the need to estimate common frontiers under each banking group due to the data 
heterogeneity.  The highest CE of 0.963 and PE of 0.719 in both models for group B banks, 
for instance, suggest that higher efficiency levels are associated with a more homogenous 
dataset. Vedula and Tripe (2004b), in their DEA study, report that major banks achieved 
X-efficiency ranging from 0.86 to 0.96 for the period 2000 to 2002.  
Second, the mean cost efficiency substantially outweighs the alternative profit efficiency 
in all groups and in both model (1) and (2), which supports the findings in Rossi et al’s 
(2005) study on banks in 9 CEE countries (1995-2002) and Yildirim and Philippatos’s 
(2007) in 12 CEE countries (1993-2000), where foreign banks were found to be more cost 
efficient but less profit efficient relative to banks with other types of ownership.  The 
overall lower profit efficiency level indicates that banks’ management in New Zealand 
might have pursued growth in order to maximise managers’ interests rather than 
shareholders’ utility, which could reduce the banks’ profits. Williams (1998), De Young 
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and Nolle (1996) and Mghaieth and El Mehdi (2014) also reported similar results in their 
studies.  
The mean CE and APE for banks in all the groups in model (2) differ marginally from the 
results in model (1), with the largest difference only 0.026 (in group C banks). This 
information alone does not necessarily suggest that the macroeconomic factors have no 
impact on banks’ cost efficiencies, as the overall higher LR-test statistics in model (2) 
across all three banking groups support the importance of considering macroeconomic 
variables in this study.  
Figure 5.1 shows  a higher level of cost efficiency overall for the six major banks (group 
B) compared with other two group of banks in model (2), and a slight increase in cost 
efficiency over the study period, which is in line with the improvement in the mean 
accounting measurement operating efficiency shown in Table 5.3.  
Figure 5.1 Comparison of Mean CE by Bank Groups in Model (2) (2002-2011) 
        
   
The level of mean APE across all groups ( Figure 5.2) shows more variation compared 
with that of mean CE,  slightly decreasing overall through the 40 quarters, except for the 
sharp fall shown 2009/ 2010, possibly due to the deterioration caused by the GFC from 
2007 to 2009.  
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banks over the study period 2002 to 2011, although in the retail banking market (group B), 
with fewer differences in cost efficiency among the six major banks.  
   Table 5.5 Mean CE by Banks, Groups and models 
               
There are marginal differences in the mean CE scores for individual banks across groups 
between models (1) and (2). Kiwibank exhibits the lowest efficiency scores compared with 
other banks in both group A and B  in both models This may indicate new bank entry into 
a competitive banking market, and  macroeconomic conditions such as  interest  and 
inflation rates may have more impact  on this bank’s efficiency than the well-established 
banks. 
Group A: Full Sample Banks CE Rank CE Rank
ANZN 0.938 4 0.949 2
BNZ 0.934 5 0.942 4
ASB 0.957 1 0.958 1
Westpac 0.944 2 0.948 3
Rabobank 0.876 6 0.883 6
HSBC 0.939 3 0.933 5
Citibank 0.814 7 0.821 7
Deutsche 0.604 9 0.677 8
TSB 0.653 8 0.638 9
Kiwibank 0.586 10 0.577 10
Group Mean Efficiency 0.824 0.833
Group B: Six Major Banks.
ANZN 0.967 4 0.957 5
BNZ 0.983 2 0.976 2
ASB 0.986 1 0.982 1
Westpac 0.982 3 0.975 3
TSB 0.922 5 0.958 4
Kiwibank 0.911 6 0.929 6
Group Mean Efficiency 0.959 0.963
Group C:  Full Sample Foreign Banks
ANZN 0.965 3 0.945 4
BNZ 0.967 2 0.956 3
ASB 0.977 1 0.968 1
Westpac 0.960 4 0.960 2
Rabobank 0.770 6 0.774 6
HSBC 0.846 5 0.880 5
Citibank 0.695 7 0.716 7
Deutsche 0.608 8 0.615 8
Group Mean Efficiency 0.848 0.852
Model (1) Model (2)
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The ranking in Table 5.5 is based on the average cost efficiency scores over 40 quarters 
for the banks in each group and two models.  There are slight changes in the ranking order 
for some of the banks, such as ANZN, BNZ, and TSB banks, although the ranking orders 
show less variability in group B compared with that in other groups in both models. This 
suggests the impact of data heterogeneity in groups A and C might have resulted in an 
overestimation of inefficiency estimations. 
ASB Bank is ranked as the most cost efficient bank across all groups in both models over 
the study period, for example, with the highest efficiency scores of 0.957, 0.986 and 0.977 
in groups A, B and C, respectively, in model (1).  This indicates that ASB bank only need 
improve 4.3%, 1.4% and 2.3% under the common frontier in each group and to be on the 
optimal cost efficient frontier in each bank group. Tripe’s (2004b) study reported that ASB 
bank exhibited continuous improvements in technical efficiency over the three year period 
from 2000 to 2002. Interestingly, ANZ National Bank ranked with different orders across 
the groups and models.     
 
A review of the results for group B in model (2) in Table 5.5 shows there is marginal 
difference in cost efficiencies among the major banks. ASB bank is the most cost efficient 
bank with the highest 0.982 efficiency score, closely followed by BNZ bank (0.976) and 
Westpac bank (0.975). Notably, TSB can be as same cost efficient (0.958) as ANZ 
National bank (0.957) while Kiwibank (0.929) is the least cost efficient bank. 
Not surprisingly, Kiwibank, a newly established bank, is the least cost efficient bank 
among all the sample banks in this study, reflecting that a bank’s age might be related to 
efficiency since bank production might involve higher learning costs in the short term 
(Berger and Mester, 1997).  
TSB, another domestic bank, also shows a relatively lower cost efficiency score compared 
with other foreign banks, including both incorporated and foreign branch banks, which 
could indicate that foreign banks are more effective in controlling cost compared with 
domestic banks in New Zealand. 
Among the small foreign branches in Groups A and C, HSBC bank is the most cost 
efficient foreign branch bank while Duetsche Bank is the least efficient (excludes Westpac 
bank as a large foreign branch.) Different from other small foreign branch banks, HSBC 
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Table 5.6 Mean APE by Banks, Groups and Models 
                                                                                                          
It is apparent that Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that there are adverse changes in the ranking 
orders of CE and APE for ASB and ANZ National banks. Isik and Hanssan’s (2002) study 
of banks in Turkey found that the coefficient correlations (0.19) between banks’ cost and 
profit efficiency were low,  suggesting that cost inefficient banks can become more profit 
efficient at the same time in a concentrated banking market such as Turkey. It appears to 
be true in the New Zealand context too. 
Group A: Full Sample Banks APE Rank APE Rank
ANZN 0.791 1 0.787 1
BNZ 0.743 2 0.747 2
ASB 0.619 5 0.635 5
Westpac 0.715 3 0.727 4
Rabobank 0.377 7 0.390 8
HSBC 0.368 8 0.388 9
Citibank 0.217 10 0.225 10
Deutsche 0.423 9 0.419 6
TSB 0.714 4 0.736 3
Kiwibank 0.391 6 0.415 7
Group mean efficiency 0.536 0.547
Group B: Six Major Banks.
ANZN 0.794 1 0.793 1
BNZ 0.752 2 0.745 4
ASB 0.726 5 0.712 5
Westpac 0.751 3 0.755 2
TSB 0.732 4 0.746 3
Kiwibank 0.565 6 0.567 6
Group mean efficiency 0.720 0.719
Group C:  Full sample Foreign Banks
ANZN 0.775 2 0.785 1
BNZ 0.737 3 0.758 2
ASB 0.769 1 0.740 3
Westpac 0.705 4 0.700 4
Rabobank 0.572 5 0.483 5
HSBC 0.487 6 0.458 6
Citibank 0.478 7 0.389 8
Deutsche 0.451 8 0.458 7
Group mean efficiency 0.622 0.596
Model (1) Model (2)
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Figure 5.3 Evolution of CE by Groups in Model (2) (2002-2011) 
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The most obvious observations are the lower CE efficiency scores for ANZ (prior to the 
ANZ acquisition in 2003) and the earlier period for Kiwibank, established in 2002. The 
operation of ANZ Bank and National Bank with two separated brands from 2003 to 2013 
resulted in an increase in some costs related to merger and acquisition activities, such as 
the increase in personnel cost in the early merger period. Some of the employees were 
filling roles associated with integration or roles created to bring back ANZ New Zealand’s 
retail banking system from Australia.  
Figure F.1 (in Appendix F) illustrates the changes in cost efficiency for major banks in 
group B in model (2) based on the results in Table 5.7. It is evident that there are slight 
increase in CE levels for ANZN, Kiwibank, while ASB, BNZ and TSB show stable levels 
of CE throughout the study period. Surprisingly, there is a dramatic decrease in mean CE 
for Westpac Bank, which may partially be explained by the significant increase in 
impaired assets for the bank and risk management cost during the GFC period (KPMG, 
2010b). 
Kiwibank experienced great improvements in cost efficiency, despite the bank being, 
overall, the least cost efficient bank over the study period. Since 2007, Kiwibank has 
continued to grow in line with other major banks efficiency levels.  
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Table 5.7 Quarterly Mean CE in Model (2): Major Banks (2002-2011) 
                 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Mean
1 0.865 0.984 0.970 0.986 0.903 0.861 0.928
2 0.842 0.983 0.973 0.987 0.980 0.613 0.896
3 0.833 0.973 0.971 0.984 0.974 0.746 0.913
4 0.841 0.967 0.973 0.986 0.969 0.795 0.922
5 0.850 0.963 0.968 0.983 0.969 0.876 0.935
6 0.838 0.972 0.974 0.979 0.952 0.894 0.935
7 0.841 0.966 0.972 0.980 0.961 0.945 0.944
8 0.989 0.978 0.984 0.980 0.975 0.948 0.976
9 0.991 0.986 0.979 0.980 0.982 0.930 0.975
10 0.984 0.979 0.982 0.980 0.986 0.940 0.975
11 0.982 0.901 0.984 0.975 0.965 0.961 0.961
12 0.983 0.959 0.984 0.981 0.977 0.925 0.968
13 0.980 0.967 0.982 0.980 0.968 0.870 0.958
14 0.961 0.962 0.985 0.974 0.961 0.942 0.964
15 0.990 0.984 0.982 0.962 0.950 0.976 0.974
16 0.980 0.948 0.981 0.982 0.973 0.884 0.958
17 0.982 0.982 0.979 0.985 0.975 0.892 0.966
18 0.983 0.986 0.980 0.984 0.961 0.903 0.966
19 0.984 0.979 0.983 0.944 0.967 0.858 0.953
10 0.978 0.983 0.984 0.973 0.978 0.869 0.961
21 0.986 0.982 0.991 0.983 0.970 0.976 0.981
22 0.986 0.987 0.990 0.983 0.954 0.937 0.973
23 0.986 0.983 0.991 0.979 0.955 0.979 0.979
24 0.985 0.981 0.991 0.978 0.947 0.971 0.976
25 0.988 0.965 0.980 0.987 0.728 0.968 0.936
26 0.985 0.985 0.980 0.971 0.909 0.955 0.964
27 0.981 0.982 0.980 0.955 0.908 0.968 0.962
28 0.985 0.984 0.979 0.958 0.907 0.977 0.965
29 0.990 0.990 0.988 0.977 0.978 0.985 0.985
30 0.990 0.989 0.988 0.975 0.968 0.989 0.983
31 0.984 0.987 0.987 0.972 0.977 0.947 0.976
32 0.985 0.984 0.986 0.976 0.981 0.978 0.982
33 0.983 0.984 0.987 0.978 0.981 0.988 0.983
34 0.972 0.982 0.988 0.971 0.971 0.990 0.979
35 0.971 0.984 0.987 0.976 0.981 0.991 0.982
36 0.975 0.984 0.986 0.971 0.979 0.992 0.981
37 0.935 0.980 0.982 0.953 0.968 0.986 0.967
38 0.969 0.978 0.978 0.961 0.980 0.986 0.975
39 0.991 0.966 0.983 0.956 0.976 0.980 0.975
40 0.961 0.979 0.978 0.972 0.986 0.983 0.977
Mean 0.957 0.976 0.982 0.975 0.958 0.929 0.963
Rank 5 2 1 3 4 6
Note:  T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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   Figure 5.4 Comparison of APE by Groups in Model (2) (2002-2011) 
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Table 5.8 Quarterly Mean APE in Model (2):  Major Banks (2002-2011) 
             
The quarterly efficiency scores from this study’s preferred group B banks in model (2) are 
presented in Table 5.8, with the mean efficiency for each quarter and rank information for 
each banks. The quarterly mean APE for group B banks in model (1), group A and C banks 
in both models (1) and (2) are presented Table E.1-E.5 in Appendix E. 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Mean
1 0.829 0.802 0.639 0.232 0.812 0.857 0.695
2 0.961 0.738 0.665 0.854 0.589 0.825 0.772
3 0.871 0.658 0.655 0.934 0.600 0.668 0.731
4 0.868 0.832 0.689 0.686 0.619 0.866 0.760
5 0.891 0.878 0.758 0.803 0.535 0.313 0.696
6 0.905 0.896 0.721 0.080 0.687 0.203 0.582
7 0.923 0.758 0.640 0.743 0.850 0.279 0.699
8 0.543 0.826 0.748 0.845 0.839 0.107 0.652
9 0.880 0.841 0.687 0.890 0.666 0.144 0.685
10 0.758 0.807 0.640 0.911 0.868 0.194 0.696
11 0.638 0.411 0.696 0.869 0.876 0.222 0.619
12 0.652 0.851 0.722 0.919 0.811 0.664 0.770
13 0.723 0.833 0.760 0.904 0.799 0.800 0.803
14 0.768 0.804 0.710 0.915 0.839 0.626 0.777
15 0.928 0.236 0.785 0.905 0.880 0.675 0.735
16 0.910 0.848 0.790 0.908 0.821 0.910 0.865
17 0.877 0.753 0.787 0.886 0.801 0.908 0.836
18 0.914 0.828 0.783 0.895 0.850 0.862 0.856
19 0.879 0.761 0.755 0.911 0.867 0.387 0.760
10 0.844 0.886 0.843 0.817 0.853 0.746 0.831
21 0.856 0.836 0.762 0.881 0.846 0.955 0.856
22 0.808 0.876 0.864 0.878 0.923 0.046 0.732
23 0.879 0.861 0.606 0.856 0.917 0.772 0.815
24 0.877 0.851 0.721 0.823 0.847 0.885 0.834
25 0.895 0.923 0.882 0.922 0.572 0.448 0.774
26 0.805 0.856 0.627 0.938 0.812 0.496 0.756
27 0.612 0.879 0.449 0.773 0.788 0.440 0.657
28 0.598 0.934 0.696 0.818 0.818 0.695 0.760
29 0.817 0.713 0.775 0.321 0.572 0.757 0.659
30 0.233 0.411 0.464 0.201 0.888 0.909 0.517
31 0.807 0.015 0.480 0.456 0.882 0.555 0.532
32 0.781 0.681 0.662 0.331 0.786 0.441 0.614
33 0.454 0.666 0.605 0.611 0.644 0.720 0.616
34 0.900 0.849 0.662 0.824 0.696 0.526 0.743
35 0.795 0.214 0.758 0.634 0.559 0.424 0.564
36 0.864 0.787 0.692 0.785 0.503 0.261 0.649
37 0.798 0.564 0.737 0.753 0.403 0.037 0.549
38 0.885 0.727 0.822 0.743 0.549 0.378 0.684
39 0.538 0.953 0.847 0.899 0.811 0.816 0.811
40 0.945 0.944 0.883 0.834 0.552 0.860 0.836
Mean 0.793 0.745 0.712 0.755 0.746 0.567 0.719
Rank 1 4 5 2 3 6
Note: T: quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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These findings are not consistent with the results in foreign bank efficiency literature in 
other developed countries, where foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks. 
Hermes and Lensink (2003) show that the effect of foreign ownership participation in more 
developed markets is not as strong as that in transition countries because the potential for 
learning from foreign banks is not so great. This appears not to be the case in New Zealand, 
where foreign banks have dominated the banking market for so long. 
Although the rank results for individual banks are not identical across the three banking 
groups and in the two models, ASB bank is ranked as the most cost efficient bank across 
all groups and in both models over the study period, but, conversely, the least profit 
efficient bank compared with other large foreign banks. The ANZ National Bank exhibits 
the highest profit efficiency relative to other large foreign banks across all 3 groups in both 
models.   
Kiwibank, a start-up domestic bank, shows the greatest improvement in both cost and 
profit efficiency over the period, similar to the changes shown in accounting operating 
efficiency ratios. TSB as a regional domestic bank was found to be more cost efficient 
than some of the foreign banks, such as ASB bank, and more profit efficient than ANZ 
National Bank.  
The efficiency results presented in this chapter are used for further investigation in the 
next chapter into what determines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ efficiency in 
New Zealand. 
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in group A banks in both models, and group B banks in model (2), respectively, however, 
insignificant and positive in group B banks in model (1). 
 
Table 6.1 Coefficients of Industry-specific Variables in Inefficiency Equations 
  Group A Group B Group C 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Cost Inefficiency Eq.4.12 Eq. 4.14 Eq. 4.12 Eq. 4.14    Eq. 4.16 Eq.4.18 
DO -0.293 a -0.387a 0.150 -0.215c   
 (-4.159) (-5.366) (0.557) (-1.723)   
DS     -1.263 a -1.697a 
     (-10.176) (-10.266) 
DORG     -0.479 a 0.035 
     (-7.445) (0.279) 
DM 0.360 b 0.362 b 0.480 C 0.541 a 0.303 a 0.724 a 
 (2.519) (2.137) (1.651) (4.738) (3.971) (2.576) 
MKCT -0.643 -1.310 3.702 -1.053 2.066 a 4.852 a 
  (-0.578) (-1.101) (0.953) (-1.375) (4.301) (5.760) 
Profit 
inefficiency  Eq. 4.13 Eq. 4.15 Eq. 4.13 Eq. 4.15    Eq. 4.17 Eq.4.19 
DO 2.532a 3.109a -3.962a -3.444a   
 (6.158) (7.967) (-5.5870) (-3.396)   
DS     -1.964 -2.308 a 
     (-0.242) (-2.986) 
DORG     9.399 c -2.421 a 
     (1.675) (-3.186) 
DM -7.588 a -7.697 a -6.379 a -5.829a -2.975 a -5.468 b 
 (-3.823) (-5.732) (-19.627) (-6.368) (-4.152) (-2.129) 
MKCT 4.395 a 4.842 a -13.957 a -27.833 a 2.039 a 0.334 
 (3.695) (3.761) (-4.801) (-4.446) (4.930) (0.329) 
Observations 400.00 400.00 240.00 240.00 320.00 320.00 
Notes: a=1 % Level of statistical Significance, b= 5 % Level of Statistical significance, c=10% level of 
Statistical Significance; t-test in parentheses 
Variables Notations: 
DQ: Dummy Ownership 
DS: Dummy Similarity 
DORG: Dummy Organizational form 
DM: Dummy Merger and Acquisition 
MKCT: Market concentration 
 
 
Table 6.1 shows mixed coefficient results for the DO variable in the profit inefficiency 
equations, with DO appearing to have negative and significant impact on group B banks 
under both models. This result rejects the home field advantage hypothesis, and indicates 
that foreign ownership in the banking industry might have contributed to the high profit 
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The negative and statistically significant DS coefficients in the banks’ cost and profit 
inefficiency equations were both at the level of 1% (except for the insignificant and 
negative in profit inefficiency equation 4.17, see in Table 6.1). This result strongly 
supports the limited global advantage hypothesis that banks from some nations (Australia 
in this context) are more efficient than banks from other nations (HSBC, the UK, Citibank, 
the US, Netherland Bank, Netherland, Deutsche Bank, Germany) in New Zealand’s 
banking sector. Sturm and Williams (2009) found supporting evidence in Australia that 
foreign banks from the UK were more efficient than banks from the US due to the 
economic similarity between the UK and Australia.  
Miller and Parkhe (2002), Lensink et al (2008), Naaborg (2007), Vu and Nahm (2013), 
and Curi et al (2012) provide evidence that the liability of foreignness can be reduced 
substantially when home and host nations with great similarities share a common language 
and culture and similar regulatory/supervisory environments and financial systems. 
Australian-owned banks operating in New Zealand with a similar operating environment 
to their parent banks54 face fewer challenges and lower costs than banks from other 
nations, thus are more efficient.    
When banks expand their banking activities over geographic distances in different 
markets, despite the recent improvements in information processing and 
telecommunications, which can, to some extent, lessen the agency cost (Berger et. al., 
2004), banks can still experience special difficulties and incur additional costs due to the 
environments’ dissimilarity between the home and host country.  
Lensink et al (2008) measured similarity of home-host country institutional frameworks 
on a sample of 2095 banks in 105 countries, and reported that differences in the 
institutional environments, such as law, political stability, and government effectiveness, 
between home and host countries exhibited a positive impact on the foreign banks’ cost 
                                                          
54 It is noticeable that the parent banks of the Big Four Australian-owned foreign banks in New Zealand do 
not dominate the Australian banking market in terms of size. The banking system in Australia is dominated 
by the Big Four largest domestic banks. This dominance acts as an effective barrier for foreign banks wishing 
to operate in the Australian market. 
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Table 6.1 shows mixed results regarding the impact of DORG, with the coefficient on cost 
inefficiency in model (1) negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, but 
statistically insignificant and positive in model (2). In contrast, the DORG coefficient in 
the profit inefficiency equation is positive at a 10% significance level in model (1) while 
negative and significant in model (2) at the 1% significance level. The mixed results could 
be affected by the data heterogeneity caused by small foreign branch banks, and also by 
Westpac Bank being a foreign branch55 of a completely different size and operational type.  
 
The significant negative DORG coefficients in both cost and profit inefficiency equations 
( 4.16 model 1 and 4.19 model 2, respectively), suggest that foreign subsidiaries are more 
cost and profit efficient than foreign branch banks, which  is  not consistent with the 
finding of Curi et al. (2012), where foreign branch banks are more efficient than foreign 
subsidiaries in Luxembourg.  The result suggests that a foreign branch with simple 
organizational structure and entry strategy operating in Luxembourg might have more 
competitive efficiency advantages than foreign subsidiaries. However, the authors further 
confirm that organizational form does not play as important a role in determining banks' 
efficiency as similarity between home and host countries, 
The diversification of the other major foreign branches’ activities poses a challenge when 
testing the organizational form hypothesis. For instance, Rabobank Nederland bank 
specialises in certain segments of the NZ market, such as agriculture, and has a large 
market share in farming business compared with the major banks. Despite the efficiency 
scores for Rabobank, in all groups and models, being lower than the Big Four foreign 
banks, they are higher than the other two foreign branch banks, Deutsche and Citibank, 
but lower than HSBC Bank.  
Deutsche Bank exhibits more fluctuation in cost and profit efficiency levels throughout 
the study period, which may be affected more by their overseas parent bank’s worldwide 
market strategies rather than an organisational form inefficiency effect. Parent banks can 
                                                          
55 Although the retail business of Westpac Banking Corporation New Zealand Division are locally 
incorporated to Westpac New Zealand Limited since 2006, aggregated data was, however, used for the two 
banks, for the purpose of comparison in this study.  The bank was considered as a foreign branch (DORG 
with 0 value) over the full study period. 
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Figure 6.1 Total Assets: Full sample Banks (quarterly 2002-2011) 
                              
     Source: individual banks’ quarterly disclosure statements (2002-2011) 
The Ln (TA) variable is significant and negative in both cost and profit inefficiency 
equations, which suggests that large foreign banks are more efficient than small domestic 
and foreign branch banks in New Zealand. However, the results differ from the findings 
in the Liu and Tripe (2003) and Tripe (2005b) DEA studies. Liu and Tripe (2003) found 
that the Big Four foreign banks (ANZ, NBNZ, ASB and WestpacTrust) were less X-
efficient than small banks (TSB and Countrywide) from 1989 to 1998, while Tripe 
(2005a), in his unpublished PhD thesis, also found that scale efficiency was not important 
in a panel data approach57. The author’s study shows TSB bank, as the smallest bank in 
the data sample, was the most efficient bank (with 0.9802 X-efficiency score) which 
suggests that scale benefits were not important in New Zealand over the study period 1996 
to 2003.  
The negative impact of bank size on efficiency indicates that scale biases might favour 
larger foreign banks in New Zealand more than small foreign branches and domestic 
                                                          
57 Tripe’s (2005b) thesis investigates the changes in New Zealand bank efficiency by reconciling two sets 
of results from the panel data approach and Malmquist index, which measures productivity more than 
efficiency (IRD, 2006). 
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and European markets, found that banks having capital in excess of the regulatory required 
amount might have a negative effect on bank efficiency levels.  
According to Pasiouras, Tanna, et al. (2009), there are two possible reasons for the positive 
relationship between equity ratio and bank cost inefficiency. First,  the more skilful 
managers can use inputs efficiently while operating with higher leverage; second, banks 
with lower capital levels may increase their risk-taking, such as investing in more risky 
but potentially more profitable activities to become more cost efficient (but maybe only in 
the short term).   
The statistically significant and negative coefficients of EQR at the 1% level in profit 
inefficiency equations (see Table 6.2) imply that banks in New Zealand with adequate 
financial capital can increase their profit efficiency. Such evidence can be found in 
Pasiouras, Tanna, et al. (2009); Pasiouras (2008) and Chortareas, Garza‐Garcia, and 
Girardone (2011) in EU market. Berger and Patti (2006), using the distribution-free 
approach for the US banking industry over the period 1990-1995, found that smaller banks 
benefit more from sufficient capital ratios, thus bank size may affect the link between 
capital and efficiency.  
New Zealand’s banking industry has a conservative regulatory capital regime (under both 
Basel I and Basel II frameworks). In 1984, the first regulation on capital adequacy 
requirement was implemented for all domestic banks and all incorporated banks (foreign 
and domestic), with defined capital requirements and precise methods of calculation. From 
July 1, 2005, New Zealand introduced new thin capitalisation rules58 for foreign-owned 
banks with the objective of effectively measuring the income associated with bank 
activities in New Zealand.  This rule could deny foreign owned banks interest deductions 
if the bank does not have sufficient capital in New Zealand to support their business and 
their offshore investments made through New Zealand.  As a result, there was a substantial 
inflow of capital into New Zealand by foreign-owned banks at the time. However, excess 
                                                          
58 The new thin capitalisation rules were introduced in response to government concerns that tax paid in New 
Zealand by foreign-owned banking groups appeared insufficient relative to their accounting profits. The 
rules compare the equity of the New Zealand banking business with a legislatively prescribed level of equity 
based on 4% of the bank’s New Zealand risk-weighted exposures. If there is a deficiency in the New Zealand 
equity compared with the required equity, interest is denied on the shortfall. 
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capital may not be attributable to bank efficiency, but is a “spare” corporate resource which 
earns only the risk-free rate of return (KPMG, 2006). 
    Figure 6.2 Equity Ratios: Full Sample Banks (Quarterly 2002-2011) 
         
           Source:  Individual banks’ disclosure statement (2002-2011) 
 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the comparison of equity ratios for each of the sample banks, based 
on quarterly equity ratios (Table G.1 see Appendix G) over the period of 2002 to 2011. 
There are several interesting observations59 in Table G.1 that deserve attention. First, the 
significantly higher level of equity ratios for Kiwibank in the early years (2002-2004) is a 
reflection of higher capital requirements for  newly established business in general, which 
likely affected Kiwibank’s efficiency performance for that period. Second, Westpac 
                                                          
59 The significant change in equity level of Deutsche Bank between 2005 and 2007 also caught attention. Its 
parent bank relocated its capital globally due to the global market conditions during 2005, which resulted in 
a significant reduction in the bank’s structured lending in New Zealand, consequently affecting the bank’s 
equity level (KPMG, 2007). This is not necessarily a reflection of EQR on the bank’s cost and profit 
inefficiency effect. 
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Figure 6.3 Impaired Assets Ratios: Full Sample Banks (Quarterly 2002-2011) 
         
 
Source: individual banks’ quarterly disclosure statements (2002-2011) 
With regards to the quarterly impaired assets ratios (Table H.1 in Appendix H) for 
individual banks from 2002-2011, the Big Four foreign banks exhibit lower impaired asset 
ratios compared with small foreign branch banks, which could possibly explain the overall 
lower profit efficiency of foreign branch banks. The two domestic banks (TSB and 
Kiwibank) exhibit the lowest impaired asset ratios (Table H.1 see Appendix H), which 
may partially and positively contribute to the efficiency performance of TSB (better than 
one of the large foreign banks in cost and profit efficiency) and the improvement of 
Kiwibank’s efficiency over time.  
Tripe (2005b) does not incorporate problem loans in his study due to insignificant debt 
expenses occurred during the study period from 1996-2003. This study considers the ratio 
of impaired assets, as, highlighted in Berger and DeYoung (1997), efficient banks are 
better at managing their credit risk. The omission of asset quality as an extraneous variable 
in estimating bank efficiency might lead to a bias or erroneous results (Mester, 1996). 
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model (2), which supports the argument that  interest rates might be associated with higher 
levels of profit63 efficiency for major banks, and vice versa.   
Figure 6.5 shows the changes in the 90 day bank bill rates during the study period. The 
figure shows the rate increased significantly from 4.98% in the first quarter of 2002 to 
9.02% in the first quarter of 2008, then dropped rapidly through the year, and remained at 
a stable level, around 3%, from 2009 until the end of the study period, 2011.  The flat 
interest rate environment since 2009 has led to increased interest margins for major 
banks(KPMG, 2011) , which may explain, in part, the increased mean profit efficiency for 
foreign banks from 2009-2011 (see Figure 6.5).                                    
Tripe (2003) uses the DEA method and logit regression to explore the relationship between 
banks’ 90 day bank bill rate and banks’ scale efficiency over the period 1996 to 2002. The 
author found in his constant return to scale model, the coefficients for interest rate 
consistently affect bank’s efficiency negatively, which suggests that the improvement of 
the bank efficiency over the period 1996-2002 appears to be a consequence of the fall in 
the general level of interest rates. 
    Figure 6.5: 90-days Bank Bill Rates (Quarterly 2002-2011) 
                  
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Statistic 
                                                          
63 Drummond, Maechler, and Marcelino (2007) found that, in an era of low interest rates in Italy, banks’ 
interest income declined, however other income rose, which suggests that a lower interest rate environment 
could be associated with higher profit. 
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Table 6.3 shows statistically significant and positive coefficients of inflation rate and cost 
inefficiency in our preferred group B banks in both models, which suggest that banks 
operating during  periods of relatively higher inflation are less cost efficient, which is 
supported by the cross-country evidence by Pasiouras, Delis, and Papanikolaou (2009) and 
Kasman and Yildirim (2006).  
With regard to the impact of the inflation rate on profit inefficiency, all the signs are 
negative at 1% significance level, which suggests that the higher inflation rates negatively 
impact profit inefficiency. However, this finding contradicts the Vu and Nahm (2013) 
study in Vietnam which shows that the annual inflation rate (a low average of 4.3%65 in 
Vietnam) is negative and statistically significant with bank profit efficiency. This suggests 
that high inflation is associated with lower levels of bank profit efficiency in the Vietnam 
banking sector.  
According to Boyd and Champ (2006), theoretically, inflation might negatively affect 
economic growth through the banking sector by reducing the overall amount of available 
credit to businesses. However, high inflation beneath some thresholds, might actually lead 
to increase in real economic activities but only in the periods where inflation and nominal 
interest rates are both low. This may partially explain the adverse impact of relatively low 
inflation rates on banks cost inefficiency in this study. 
Inflation can affect the real value of banks costs and revenues either positively or 
negatively depending on whether it is anticipated or unanticipated (Perry, 1992). If banks 
can fully anticipate the inflation rate, they can appropriately adjust interest rates faster than 
their costs to allow them to acquire higher economic profits. 
6.4.4 Two additional macroeconomic variables  
Two important macroeconomic factors, the foreign exchange rate and the unemployment 
rate were included, in addition to GDP growth, interest rate and inflation rate, to test a 
broad set of the macroeconomic variables.  
Foreign Exchange Rate 
                                                          
65 Boyd and Champ (2006) suggest that moderate inflation rates might be 5-10 percent in the U.S context. 
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Fluctuations in foreign exchange rates over time are a useful element in assessing or 
interpreting macroeconomic developments (Steenkamp, 2014). Mendes and Abreu (2003) 
found that exchange rate instability increases risk in cross-border bank activities and losses 
could have occurred in foreign exchange transactions.  
A foreign exchange rate (FX) variable is included here and measured by the TWI (Trade-
weighted index)66to examine the possible influence of FX on banks’ efficiency in New 
Zealand. The index measure of foreign exchange rate can capture the medium-term effect 
of exchange rates on the New Zealand economy and inflation (Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, n.d.) 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the changing trend in the quarterly TWI index, ranging from 53 in 
2002 to 77.73 in 2011.The increasing FX rate from 2002 indicates New Zealand’s currency 
strengthened, which reflects a strong domestic economy, risk in export commodity prices 
and associated increasing interest rates, until a sharp fall in the NZD in 2007-2009, against 
some of the currencies in the TWI, due to deterioration caused by the GFC. 
Figure 6.7:  New Zealand Dollars Exchange Rates-TWI (Index: 1979=100) 
 (2002-2011) 
           
             Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
Notes: The Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate Index is the nominal New Zealand-dollar exchange rate 
weighted 50/50 by New Zealand's trade with its major trading partners (US, Australia, Japan, the UK, and 
the Euro) and the nominal GDPs (in US dollars) of those countries.  On 30 June 1979, the basket equalled 
100 (Index: 1979=100) (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, statistic). 
                                                          
66 A ”Trade-weighted index”(TWI) is one way of constructing an effective exchange rate index, based 
simply on trading partners’ share of New Zealand’s foreign trade(Steenkamp, 2014). 
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The FX coefficients (in Table 6.3) in the cost inefficiency equation for group (B) banks in 
model (2) are significant and positive at the 5% level, but significant and negative in the 
profit inefficiency equations at the 1% level.  This seems to confirm the necessity of 
selecting foreign exchange rate as a macroeconomic condition to test for the inefficiency 
effect. It also appears that the fluctuation of foreign exchange rate has impacted more on 
profit efficiency than cost efficiency (in terms of the t statistics).  
 
The fluctuations in foreign exchange may be caused by a number of factors such as interest 
rates, inflation rates, terms of trade and public debt (Otuori, 2013), consequently, the 
relation between foreign exchange rate and bank efficiency can be complex and is beyond 
the scope of this study.  
 
Poghosyan and Poghosyan (2010) study cost efficiency in 11 CEE countries, introducing 
foreign exchange rate, with GDP growth and inflation rate, to control for the 
macroeconomic environment in their cost inefficiency specifications. The authors found 
positive and significant effects of foreign exchange rate depreciation on loan rates, which 
suggests that currency stability has important implications for the lending decisions of 
banks in CEE countries.  
Unemployment Rate  
 
Unemployment rate is also not a usual macroeconomic variable used in bank efficiency 
measurement literature. However, as a main macroeconomic indicator, it reflects the 
overall health of an economy or business cycle, important to other macroeconomic 
conditions such as the inflation level, and the growth of wages, thus, impacting banking 
savings, demand for credit volume and quality. 
 
The sign and significance of the unemployment rate (UNEMP) variable in Table 6.3 shows 
a significant positive relation of unemployment growth rate on both bank cost and 
alternative profit inefficiency67. The results are consistent with the Fitzpatrick and 
McQuinn (2008) study that found an increase in the unemployment rate in Ireland, the 
                                                          
67  Except for the negative correlation of unemployment rate growth with cost inefficiency in foreign banks 
group C in model 1.  
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UK, Canada and Australia, could increase the level of both foreign and domestic 
commercial bank inefficiency. 
Figure 6.8:  Unemployment Y/Y Growth Rate (2002-2011) 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Statistic 
Figure 6.8 illustrates an overall increase in the unemployment growth rate over the 40-
quarter period of 2002-2012, in particular, during the GFC and domestic recession, since 
late 2008, leading to a level not seen for over a decade. According to , the unemployment 
rate in New Zealand reached a peak of 10.6% in 1992, fell to 6.3%, rose to 7.7% in 1998 
then declined steadily before rising again to 6.9% in 2010 and decreasing in 2011. The 
progressive increase in unemployment rate growth from 2008 to 2011 (in Figure 6.9) 
reveals that it could be a key change in the New Zealand economy and a key factor in 
terms of the performance of financial institutions (with foreign and domestic ownership) 
in New Zealand (KPMG, 2009). 
An increase in the unemployment rate might produce a demand for new bank loans, which 
may cause a contraction of the reimbursing capacity of households, triggering an increase 
in the loan default rate (Moinescu, 2008). At the height of unemployment growth, around 
2010 in New Zealand (see Figure 6.8), interest rates were at record lows, and the dollar 
was stable. Both foreign and domestic banks struggled to grow their loan books and many 
banks had flat or low returns due to bad debts through customers being unable to repay 
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technologies and products compared with smaller foreign and domestic banks. 
Interestingly, less-capitalised foreign banks, such as ASB bank, exhibited higher profit 
efficiency than other banks. The results of the study also reveal that banks in New Zealand 
over the study period 2002-2011 have relatively low impaired asset ratios, thus the banking 
industry behaved both cost and profit efficiently. 
 
The estimated coefficients of the macroeconomic variables in cost and profit inefficiency 
equations indicate that the variation in banks’ cost and profit inefficiency is empirically 
explained by interest and inflation rates, which confirm the general belief that a fall in 
interest rate, and a relatively low-inflation economy provides a favourable environment 
for foreign banks’ efficiency performance. The two additional macroeconomic variables, 
foreign exchange rate and unemployment growth rate, could also have considerable 
influence in determining the level of foreign banks’ cost and profit efficiency.   
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Due to data availability, ten banks (eight foreign banks, two domestic banks) were selected 
which continuously operated in New Zealand from 2002 to 2011. To address the data 
heterogeneity caused by ownership, bank size, organisational form, these were classified 
into three bank groups, the full sample of banks in group A, major banks which compete 
mainly in the retail market in group B and all selected foreign banks in group C. With the 
group datasets, the application of the Battese and Coelli (1995) model permits the 
identification of effects of technological change and of time-varying efficiency (Battese 
and Coelli, 1995).  
An intermediation approach is employed as the theoretical framework in this study using 
the input and output variables. Efficiencies for both foreign and domestic banks are 
modelled in the SFA cost and alternative profit functions as multi-product firms that 
produce two outputs (loans and other earning assets) with three input prices (price of 
labour, funds and physical assets).  
 
Frontier efficiency studies by SFA should account for heterogeneity across sample banks, 
especially when efficiency measures are employed for policy purposes. The SFA approach 
to handling the data heterogeneity issues was taken from the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model, as a means of exploring the cost and profit inefficiency of individual sample banks. 
The “one-step approach” of this model is a panel data stochastic frontier and a time 
dependent inefficiency model, simultaneously estimating cost and alternative profit 
frontiers (equation 4.4 and 4.7) and modelling the cost and profit inefficiency equations 
(4.11-4.19) in Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). These methods enabled parameter estimates and 
efficiency scores for individual banks to be obtained.   
The SFA method and Battese and Coelli (1995) model inefficiency specifications also 
account for non-stochastic and stochastic environmental variables in the inefficiency 
equations.  In this study, two models were designed to estimate the impact of a set of 
industry-specific and bank-level specific characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. 
The estimates’ parameters in cost and profit frontier functions and the coefficients in cost 
and alternative profit inefficiency specifications are, overall, statistically significant at the 
10% level or more, confirming that the SFA approach and the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model specifications suffice to capture the inefficiency effects in this study, further 
supported by the high value of gamma and LR-tests. Moreover, the higher LR ratios of the 
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comprehensive model (2) were analysed as they account for all explanatory variables in 
the inefficiency equations.  
 
The results for group B major banks under model (2) confirm the significant impact of 
foreign ownership on banks’ cost and profit efficiency. Major foreign banks in New 
Zealand are found, on average, more cost and profit efficient than domestic banks, which 
may relate to the openness of New Zealand’s banking system, and  may suggest that 
foreign owned banks in New Zealand might not have acted as entry barriers to new 
business. Foreign banks in New Zealand have increasingly used outsourcing of IT systems 
and other functionalities to either parent banks or third parties to reduce their costs in areas 
such as risk management, accounting and computer processing (Bloor & Hunt, 2011), in 
particular, the major foreign banks have a relatively high level of product homogeneity, 
easy access to market information and relatively low implied switching costs, hence, could 
have achieved considerable scope for efficiency gains in the banking industry. 
There is evidence to support the limited global advantage hypothesis (Berger et al., 2000) 
that foreign banks from one specific nation, Australia, have enjoyed a competitive 
advantage when operating or monitoring their subsidiaries or branches in New Zealand. 
Australia is relatively closer to New Zealand compared with other nations, with the same 
language, and similar cultural, regulatory, and supervisory structures, hence facing less 
bias against them or other explicit or implicit barriers. Moreover, Australian-owned banks 
could have transferred knowledge, experience, technology and expertise in products and 
service to the New Zealand banking market, hence operated both more cost and profit 
efficiently than domestic banks and foreign banks from other nations.  
The concentrated nature of the New Zealand banking system raises questions about the 
level of competition and its impact on banks’ profit efficiency rather than cost efficiency 
in the market. The results imply that foreign banks exhibited comparative advantages in 
New Zealand, which might have contributed to their gain of an increasing share of the 
market. In addition, foreign banks in the monopolistically competitive market might have 
some degree of market power over the prices of the products and services, and can be 
rewarded with higher alternative profit efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997).  
The results on bank size effect suggest that technological progress could allow large 
multimarket banks to compete more efficiently against small, single-market banks (Berger 
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method to measure foreign banks efficiency, and  represents a useful addition to current 
modelling by regulators for benchmarking banks’ efficiency performance in New Zealand. 
7.3.1 Implication for SFA Approach in Bank Efficiency Measurement 
Despite the varying significant research efforts mounted over the last few years to examine 
foreign banks’ efficiency, there is limited empirical efficiency measurement, using SFA, 
in a single developed nation with small data samples. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, of the total 65 previous studies reviewed, addressing the effect of foreign 
ownership on bank efficiency, none has employed an SFA approach using similar samples 
in terms of the size and data heterogeneity.  
 
This is also the first study that has employed the SFA parametric method coupled with an 
intermediation approach, and undertaken a systematic inefficiency measurement to 
estimate banks' cost and profit efficiency in New Zealand. The estimated coefficients are, 
overall, statistically significant in the cost and profit inefficiency equations, which strongly 
advocates the use of stochastic frontier approach (SFA), and the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model rather than the two step regression approach for bank efficiency study.  
 
There is also evidence in this study to support the importance of accounting for data 
heterogeneity among sample bank groups in the SFA approach. The 10 sample banks were 
pooled in three panel data groups to control for differences in ownership, organisational 
form, bank size, business or product mix, and quality of service. The results show the 
efficiency scores differ remarkably for some of the banks (domestic banks and foreign 
branch banks) across the groups although the ranking information remains stable, 
particularly for extreme performers. The results support Berger and Mester’s (1997) 
finding that failure to account for heterogeneity is a likely candidate for instability of 
efficiency results.   
 
The results confirm that SFA efficiency measurement needs to account for the systematic 
differences across banks, since efficiency estimation in the fairly homogeneous sample of 
major banks (in group B) improved considerably compared with the other two groups (A 
and C) which included small foreign branch banks. (Bos et al., 2005) stated that controlling 
for heterogeneity results in efficiency studies that more accurately reflect the 
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management’s ability to minimize costs and maximise profits, which also influence 
efficiency performance. 
7.3.2 Policy Implication  
The New Zealand banking system is unique by world standards. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand has a specific concern for bank performance, given their legislative requirement 
to promote a sound and efficient financial system. The findings of this study offer 
important policy implications from several different perspectives, but general policy 
implications only are provided, based on the conclusive results in this study.  
From the bank authorities’ perspective, the estimates of foreign banks ‘efficiency and 
comparison of individual bank’s efficiency  can be a sectoral lens for the efficiency 
evaluation of the New Zealand banking system. The results in this study confirm that 
foreign banks in the highly concentrated New Zealand banking market have achieved 
important cost and profit efficiency gains over the period 2002-2011. These might have 
arisen from scale, diversification of the banks’ assets portfolios, advanced risk 
management skills, or also through integrated branch networks in the local market and 
integrated markets between home and host country. The results also support banks’ 
efficiency performance being associated with healthy competition and some favoured 
macroeconomic conditions in the host nation, such as low interest rates inflationary 
pressure, and a productive employment market. 
 
The study may also give insights into  foreign-owned banks’ performance assessment for 
researchers and regulators in New Zealand and elsewhere, which also have a high presence 
of foreign banks, for example, 97.4% in Estonia and 84.1% in Croatia (in 2000), in the 
integrated EU market. The findings in this study suggest that foreign banks could 
indirectly force improvements of efficiency in the domestic financial system, and stimulate 
competition and condensability of domestic financial markets.  
 
From the perspective of financial stability, the policy implications of the study are 
ultimately related to the debate on the issues of banks’ efficiency gains and financial 
stability. Benchmarking the performance of the Big Four banks as systemically important 
banks in this study is an important element when monitoring the soundness and stability 
of the financial system in a country where foreign banks dominate the banking system, as 
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in the New Zealand context. Systemically important banks can be viewed as too-big-to 
fail. However, the four large foreign banks maintain higher levels of cost and profit 
efficiency than domestic banks and small foreign branch banks, which could be a 
reflection of the impact of market discipline through the requirement for disclosure 
statements by The Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The results provide no evidence of a 
trade-off between banks’ efficiency gains and financial stability in New Zealand for the 
period 2002-2011.  
The identification of most and least efficient banks is more important for regulatory policy 
decisions than the absolute measure of efficiency levels, as policymakers can identify if 
there are failing banks, which tend to be located far from the best practise frontier, then 
adjust their policies and procedures to avoid “worst practise” (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997).The results in this study show only marginal differences among the systemically 
important banks, compared to the best performer, which provides no evidence of any bank 
failing in New Zealand. Kiwibank, as a newly established domestic bank, has been 
identified in this study as the least cost and profit efficient bank compared with other major 
banks. However, the overall improvement in both cost and profit efficiency over the study 
period could be the reflection of a healthy banking system and structure in New Zealand. 
The results also provide the valuable insight that foreign banks could withstand the 
sizeable global financial crisis and exposure to the banks’ lending growth, quality, cost of 
funds and interest margins.  Given the high bank concentration and large offshore 
wholesale funding needs, the merits of New Zealand’s conservative approach in 
implementing the Basel framework might have contributed to the relatively stable cost 
efficiency for major foreign banks during the crisis period, in spite of the significant 
decrease in their profit efficiency for a short period. In addition, the results prove the 
importance of the New Zealand government’s retail guarantee program and the support 
from foreign banks’ parent banks for the efficiency and contestability of New Zealand’s 
banking system when facing an unexpected crisis. 
From a bank group’s perspective, the results in this study can provide an important lesson 
on the influence of similarity of home and host country characteristics such as language, 
culture, regulation and economic conditions in their cross-banking activities. The findings 
imply that cross-border banking activities can gain efficiency from the integration of 
financial services, resulting in a broader range of assets and services and a reduction of 
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cross-border operating cost (de Guevara, Maudos, & Pérez, 2007). In addition, 
benchmarking the performance of the their subsidiaries or branches in the host country 
enables the parent bank in the home country to adjust their offshore expansion motivations, 
entry modes, consolidation strategies and business focus in order to achieve the best 
efficiency performance.  
 
The empirical evidence may also point towards some policy implications for bank 
management. Foreign banks should consider the rules and regulations in the host nation, 
and have advanced risk management skills, in particular, for controlling the quality of 
assets and the level of equity ratios to ensure high levels of cost and profit efficiency.  
 
The ranking information for individual bank’s efficiency provide a benchmark for bank 
management to analyse other bank’s efficiency performance and also learn from the “best 
practice” bank or those with better efficiency performance. For example, ASB is ranked 
as the most cost efficient bank in this study, which should encourage other banks to follow 
ASB and focus on product and service innovation and asset quality. The ANZ National 
Bank ranking as the most profit efficient bank might give insight for other banks’ deciding  
on consolidation and/or expecting improved efficiency from economies of scale.  
7.4 Limitations of the Study   
It is important to highlight some shortcomings in this study for future studies to address. 
The level of efficiency estimates, to some extent, depend on the methodology adopted 
which may, in turn,  be affected by the data, due to accounting issues, therefore the results 
should also be interpreted with some caution. 
 
In terms of the impact of the limited sample data size, the two domestic banks from the 
total 10 selected sample banks, with only approximately 3% of total market share, could  
challenge the findings of the study which generalise the efficiency comparison when 
examining the ownership hypothesis.  However, there is no solution to the small data 
sample in the New Zealand context.  In addition, data based on adjusted quarterly data 
from the banks’ balance sheet and income statements, might have resulted in the volatility 
of quarterly profit efficiency scores, and affect the evolution of profit efficiency over the 
study period.  
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There is also an argument regarding the input variable price of physical capital, due to the 
concern that foreign branch banks typically choose to rent physical assets in the host 
nation, while nationwide foreign banks and domestic banks most likely set up 
administrative centres. This then reflects that each bank may face exogenous rather than 
the usually computed endogenous input prices. Moreover, physical capital is a durable 
input which can be purchased in one period and consumed over a life time or until 
replaced.  
The changes in financial reporting standards over the study period might also raise an issue 
for the adjusted data. The introduction of the New Zealand equivalents to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS) in 2005 was the most significant accounting 
change to impact on banks and financial institutions in New Zealand. Foreign banks had 
to adapt their timetable of quarterly disclosure statements with that of their parent 
company. As a result, the change has brought the first accounting standard on the 
classification and measurement of assets and liabilities to banks in New Zealand, which 
could have an impact on the quality of the data for the period since banks adopted the NZ 
IFRS.  
 
Regulators and bank managers also need to be cautious in their interpretation the efficiency 
scores and ranking orders for individual banks which identify which banks are “best-
practice” or “worst-practice” due to possible unobserved heterogeneity and imperfect 
variable measurement, which is unlikely to be resolved in SFA bank efficiency studies. 
 
The ANZ’s acquisition of the National Bank (non-Australian banks), and its effect on bank 
cost and profit efficiency, might have reinforced the importance of cooperation and 
coordination between the regulatory authorities in the Trans-Tasman market. However, 
only one case study of merger activity included in this study might not be enough to 
generate the statement. Ideally, the case may help to inform future empirical work about 
likely sources of efficiency gain.  
 
The results concerning the impact of organisational form on foreign banks’ efficiency 
appear to provide no strong evidence that foreign branches are more efficient than 
subsidiaries, which may possibly be affected by the complex business mode and operating 
structure changes of Westpac Banking Corporation. The bank registered as a foreign 
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branch in 1987 then, as requested by The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, incorporated its 
retail banking business as Westpac New Zealand Limited, a subsidiary, in 2006. Since the 
disclosure statement for the two entities are consolidated, Westpac was defined as a 
foreign branch over the whole study period. In practice, most cross-border banking 
activities have fairly complex organizational structures, which challenge the evaluation of 
the impact of organizational form on foreign banks’ efficiency. 
7.5 Future Research 
In terms of the perspective of efficiency measurement techniques, our study provides 
complementary insights to the existing bank efficiency studies by David Tripe (see Table 
B.7) and produces more robust estimates of bank efficiency in the context of New Zealand 
banking industry. The results also suggest several lines of future research related to the 
investigation of foreign-owned banks’ efficiency in New Zealand and other nations. 
 
Future research could extend this study to empirically investigate the efficiency 
determinants of full sample banks, in particular, when the new established Kiwibank and 
merged ANZ bank have operated longer. The total number of omitted banks for the study 
period only account for 3.4% of the banking sector (based on the market share data as at 
December 2011), which will unlikely impact on the overall results. However, future 
studies should attempt to study all banks to improve the small data sample quality. 
 
In terms of data, the adjusted quarterly data might not accurately represent changes in the 
banks’ financial performance, and position within a given year, thus, this study could be 
strengthened by employing both quarterly and annual data.  Moreover, it could also be 
interesting to utilise lagged financial ratios to reduce the level of noise and other 
approximation problems in econometric estimation. 
 
It has been suggested by some studies, for example, Naaborg (2007) and Lenlink et al, 
(2008), that cost and profit frontier functions could exclude the variable of physical capital 
(PPC) to avoid biased results. Future studies could do this to evaluate its possible impact. 
 
In terms of methodology, the existing NZ efficiency literature uses DEA, the DEA-like 
Malmquist index and second-stage regression to estimate banks’ efficiency and the 
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productive growth of banks in New Zealand. This study fills a gap by using the alternative 
efficiency measurement of SFA and a one-stage BC model. Future studies could employ 
both DEA and SFA with identical sample data within the same period for robustness.  
 
Finally, with regard to the inefficiency determinants for individual banks, the present study 
could also be extended to include estimates on the level of efficiency for branches of the 
major banks. These results could give a deeper understanding and more insight to bank 
managers of the impact of geographic location and the level of branch management 
efficiency, and inform decisions on the closure of branches in order to maintain a high 
level of efficiency for the bank as a whole.  
 
 
. 
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      Table A. 2: Events in Banking Industry in New Zealand (2002-2001) 
Year Timeline of Event  
2002 
Significantly improved profitability across the banking sector, the key drivers were 
asset growth, increased non-interest income, and cost control. Kiwibank commenced 
February 2002 
2003 
ANZ Bank acquired The National Bank, each bank has retained a separate banking 
licence and both continue to operate their individual brands.  A continued improvement 
in the operating cost, impaired asset declined significantly 
2004 
Six increases in OCR due to inflation pressure, competition intensified especially in 
mortgage market. Unemployment dropped to the lowest in the OECD. The 
introduction of New Zealand equivalents to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (NF IFRS)                                                                                                                                  
2005 
Continued intensive competition. Deutsche Bank total asset and net profit after tax 
reduced significantly; Impaired assets increased overall; Sign of economy slowdown; 
RBNZ released the finalised policy on bank outsourcing; Basel II introduced. 
Kiwibank turned a loss into a modest surplus. 
2006 
A marked slowdown in earning growth; The banking industry continued to maintain 
the growth rates of recent years.  Interest margin continued tight due to the intense 
competition.  House price inflation. Big four banks contributed almost 90% of total 
banking sector profitability; Westpac dropped return to asset significantly.  
2007 
The international credit crunch slowed asset growth in banking sector but increased 
impaired assets.  RBNZ announced as a temporary measure to accept NZ 90 day’s 
bank bills in its overnight reverse repurchase facility to ease short term interbank 
liquidity pressure. Reserve bank raised the OCR to 8.25% in July 2007.   An impressive 
10.1% profit growth from ANZ National. 
2008 
A broad deterioration in credit quality with strong increase in impaired assets; 
Domestic recession continued; Falling interest rate environment; RBNZ cut the OCR 
rates from 8.25% to 3%; Kiwibank grown gross loan 57% over the year driven by the 
aggressive pricing in the residential mortgage market. Increase in the unemployment 
rate. Government launched Deposit Guarantee Scheme. 
2009 
New entrants:  Bank of Baroda (New Zealand) Limited, ABN Amro was acquired by 
Royal Bank of Scotland.  ANZ Banking group established New Zealand Branch.  
Banks performance continually deteriorated substantially from the previous year.  
Significant increase in impaired asset expense. Majority of banks adopted Basel II 
capital Adequacy calculations.  
2010 
Overall registered banks sector improved significantly, driven by the reduction of 
impaired assets; deposit war deteriorated banks net interest margin among major 
banks; overall capital adequacy improved but operating expenses increased; ANZ 
National planned to put ANZ and National Bank onto one IT Platform, restructured 
management; Basel III final rules sent out, require minimum common equity from 2% 
to 4.5%, tier 1 from 4% to 6%.  Employees’ numbers rose sharply. 
2011 
Two foreign banks registered: Bank of India and The Co-operative Bank (from PSIS). 
The banking sector had a continuation in the growth of profits driven by reduction of 
impaired assets and improved interest margins in a flat lending environment. 
Sources:  KPMG (2002-2011a)  
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      Table B. 2:  Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in the EU market (cross-country studies) 
            
Authors                          Countries/Regions  Period 
Efficiency 
Concept 
Technique Empirical Findings 
Berger et al (2000) 
France, German, 
Spain, UK and USA 
1993-1998 PE DFA 
Foreign banks from most foreign countries may be less or about 
equally efficient than domestic banks in these countries, but foreign 
banks from one (the US) are more efficient than domestic banks. 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) 
10 European countries 
(f) 
1993 TE DEA 
Foreign banks performed have high pure technical efficiency levels at the 
countries with good environmental conditions such as Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.  Environmental variables play 
important role in banks efficiency cross the countries in the integrated 
market.  
Weill (2003) 
Czech Republic and 
Poland 
1997 CE SFA 
 There is a positive influence of foreign ownership on cost efficiency in both 
transition countries. The degree of openness of the banking sector to foreign 
capital has a positive impact on banks performance.  
Green, Murinde, and 
Nikolov (2004) 
9 CEEs 1995-1999 
CE                   
(Scale and 
Scope)   
Cost function 
No evidence that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks. 
Economies of scale for foreign banks are not systematically more scale 
efficient than that for domestic banks.  
Bosco (2003) 
10 CEEs and 12 
Mediterranean EU 
partners countries* 
1993-2000 CE PE 
Probit             
Logit model 
The aggregate level foreign bank do perform better than domestic banks.  
Rossi et al.(2005)  CEEs (b) 1995-2002 CE PE SFA 
There is a negative correlation between foreign-owned banks assets 
and cost efficiency and positive correlation of foreign ownership and 
the capitalization ratio with profit efficiency.  
Zajc (2006) 6 CEEs 1995-2000 CE SFA foreign banks are less cost efficient than domestic banks 
Bonin et al (2005) 
11 transition 
countries 
1996-2000 CE PE SFA Foreign-owned banks are more cost -efficient than other banks. 
Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006) 
8 countries in CEE  
(c) 
1995-2002 CE PE SFA Foreign banks are more profit efficient than domestic banks.  
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Yildirim and Philppatos 
2007) 
12 countries in CEE 
(d) 
1993-2000 CE PE DEA & DFA 
Foreign banks are found to be more cost efficient but less profit 
efficient compared to domestic banks. 
Naaborg (2007) CEE (d) 1998-2001 CE PE SFA 
Foreign banks are less efficient than domestic banks; foreign banks 
inefficiency are reduced when similarity between home and host 
nations rise; institutional environment differences explain the 
differences in banks efficiency compared foreign banks with domestic 
banks. 
Lozano-Vivas and Weill 
(2008) 
10 countries in EU 1994-2005 CE SFA 
Greenfield banks can enhance cost efficiency. M&A is significantly 
negative on cost efficiency. Only greenfield non EU bank exerts a 
positive role on cost efficiency. 
Thi et al. (2008) 
Czech Republic    
Hungary and Poland       
1994-2005 CE SFA 
Greenfield banks are more cost efficient than foreign banks entered 
through mergers and acquisition due to a more selective structure of 
activities with the focus on multinational or corporate clients. 
Poghosyan and 
Poghosyan(2009) 
11 CEEs 1992-2006 CE SFA 
Foreign greenfield banks outperform domestic banks in terms of cost 
efficiency, the efficiency of foreign acquired banks is not significantly 
different from domestic banks. 
Anayiotos et al (2010) 
 14 emerging 
European countries  
2004,        
2007-2009 
X-Efficiency  DEA 
Foreign-owned banks are somewhat more efficient than domestic 
banks in emerging Europe. However, foreign-owned banks are less 
efficient than their parent banks operating in the same region.  
Košak and Zorić (2011)  
8 New CEE members 
and 3 Baltic countries 
1998-2007 CE SFA Foreign ownership has no significant correlation with cost efficiency. 
Fang et al (2011)  
6 South-Eastern 
Europe Countries 
(SEECs) 
1998-2008 CE SFA Foreign banks are associated with higher cost efficiency. 
Borovicka (2013) 
19 EU transition 
countries 
1995-2004 CE SFA 
Foreign-owned banks primarily targeting more efficient domestic banks, but 
have negative association between foreign ownership and cost efficiency. 
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Table B. 3:  Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in the EU market (single-country studies) 
            
Authors                          Countries Period 
Efficiency 
Concept 
Technique Empirical Findings 
                                      Developing Country                                            
Kraft, Hofler, and 
Payne (2006) 
Croatia 1994-2000 CE SFA Reputable foreign banks have strong efficiency advantage.   
Hasan and 
Marton(2003) 
Hungary 1993-1998 PE SFA 
Domestic banks are found significantly profit efficient than banks with 
foreign involvement.  
Haverylchyk (2005) Poland 1997-2001 
CE, X-
efficiency                         
Scale 
Efficiency 
DEA 
Foreign banks exhibit a higher level of technical and allocative efficiency than 
domestic banks.  Dutch banks have achieved higher efficiency than banks 
from other countries 
Styrin (2005) Russia 1998-2002 CE 
SFA and 
DEA 
Foreign banks are more efficient than their Russian peers. 
Isik and Hassan (2002) Turkey 1988-1996 CE PE SFA 
Foreign banks both in subsidiary and branch form had higher cost and profit 
efficiency than their domestic peers, the difference in profit efficiency is much 
more pronounced. 
Aysan et al (2011) Turkey 2002-2007 CE PE SFA 
The overall cost efficiency of foreign banks in Turkey is poorer during the 
period of 2002-2005, whereas the state and domestic banks have better cost 
efficiencies. 
El-Gamal & Inanoglu 
(2005) 
Turkey 1990-2000 
 CE                  
(Labour-
efficiency)             
SFA 
Foreign owned banks are ranked at the top, followed by state-owned banks. 
Foreign banks net influence on overall banking system efficiency and stability 
is ambiguous.  
                                                 Developed Country 
Gaganis and Pasiouras 
(2009) 
Greece 1999-2004 
X-efficiency                         
scale 
efficiency 
DEA 
Foreign banks had lower pure TE but higher scale efficiency. Ownership has 
no significant impact on banks' efficiency 
Curi et al (2012) Luxembourg 1991-2009 X Efficiency  DEA 
Group efficiency results show that foreign branch banks are more efficient than 
subsidiary banks; higher capital requirement appear to have significant effect on 
foreign bank efficiency, geographical origin of the parent banks appears to be 
significant. 
Béjaoui Rouissi and 
Bouzgarrou (2012) France 2000-2007 CE PE SFA 
Foreign commercial banks in France are more cost efficient than other domestic 
commercial banks. 
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Table B. 4: Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in Australia 
          
Authors Period Efficiency 
concept 
Technique Empirical  Findings 
Sathye (2001)  1996 TE and AE DEA 
Foreign-owned banks were less efficient than domestic banks. The source 
of inefficiency is technical rather than allocative components. 
Sturm and Williams (2004)  1988-2001 
TE, PTE, 
Scale 
DEA, Malmquist 
Indices & SFA 
The DEA results found foreign banks display superior technical efficiency 
due to superior scale efficiency compared with Big Four banks or the other 
domestic banks. 0.63 overall correlation was found between SFA and DEA 
results.  
Sturm and Williams (2008)  1988-2001 TE 
Parametric distance 
function 
Foreign banks are on average less efficient than the domestic incumbents. 
Banks from the UK are significantly more efficient than the average foreign 
banks. Banks from the US and Switzerland are significantly less efficient 
than overage foreign banks, but no evidence support global limited 
advantage hypothesis. 
Sturm and Williams (2009)  1988-2001 TE 
Parametric distance 
function,      Factor 
analysis 
Foreign banks are on average less efficient than the domestic incumbents.  
The global limited advantage hypothesis was supported to US bank revenue 
creation efficiency. The New trading theory explains that bank from the US 
tends to be less efficient while banks from the UK and Japan are more 
efficient. 
Sturm and Williams (2010)  1988-2001 TE 
Parametric input-
distance function 
Limited global advantage hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000) applies to 
Australian efficiency study, the dominance of big four banks in Australia 
acts as barrier to foreign banks entry also reduce efficiency. Foreign banks 
from the UK were relatively more efficient, while banks from the US were 
less efficient compared with banks from other nations operating in 
Australia.  
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            Table B. 5:  Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in other countries (cross-country studies) 
            
Authors/country Countries/Regions Period Efficiency 
Concept 
Technique Empirical Findings 
Miller and Parkhe (2002) 
13 host countries 
worldwide       
1989-1996 X-Efficiency  SFA Average level of foreign owned banks are significantly less 
than host country banks.  
Nguyen and Williams 
(2003) 
5 South East Asian 
countries 
1990-2002 PE SFA 
Foreign ownership yields a significantly higher level of mean 
profit efficiency irrespective of the host country.  
Saif and Yaseen (2005)  
11 Middle East and 
North Africa 
countries 
1995-2002 X-Efficiency  Translog function 
There is virtually no evidence that foreign banks are more 
efficient than domestic banks in terms of an absolute cost 
advantage, or in terms of economies of scale and scope. 
Figueira et al (2006) 40 African countries 2001-2002 
X-Efficiency    
CE  
DEA and SFA 
Domestic banks are less efficient than foreign banks in Africa.  
Environmental variables were significant in explaining banks 
performance differences.  
Figueira et al. (2009) 
20 countries in Latin 
America 
2001 X-Efficiency  DEA  and SCF 
DEA results show evidence that domestic banks are more 
efficient than banks under majority foreign ownership.  
Lensink et al (2008) 
105 countries world 
wide 
1998-2003 CE SFA 
On avergea, Foreign ownership negatively affected bank 
efficiency. Higher similarity between home and host country 
institutional quality reduce foreign bank inefficiency.  
Pasiouras et al (2009) 74 countries  2000-2004 CE SFA 
Higher proportion of foreign banks has a positive impact on 
banks cost efficiency. 
Wezel (2010) 
5 countries in Central 
American region 
2002-2007 TE, CE    DEA and SFA 
Foreign banks were not more technical efficient than domestic 
banks however, foreign banks had a better cost efficiency. 
Environmental conditions are significant effect on individual 
banks efficiency scores.  
Chan and Karim (2011)  
4 countries in 
southeast Asian  
2001-2008 CE PE SFA 
Foreign banks in Malaysia are the most cost and profit 
efficient while Indonesia the least.  
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              Table B. 6: Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in other single countries 
            
Authors Country    Period 
Efficiency 
Concept 
Technique Empirical Findings  
Chantapong and 
Menkhoff (2005) 
Thailand 1995-2003 CE 
Translog 
function 
Foreign banks did not outperform domestic banks in terms of 
cost efficiency.  
Sensarma (2006) India 1986-2000 CE SFA Foreign banks had poor cost efficiency and productivity.  
Sufian (2011) Malaysia 1995-2007 CE,TE DEA 
Foreign banks from North America were the most efficient 
banking group, support the global limited advantage 
hypothesis. 
Berger et al (2009) China 1994-2003 CE PE SFA 
Majority of foreign banks are the most cost and profit efficient 
banks. Minority foreign ownership is associated with 
significantly improved efficiency. 
Tahir et al (2010) Malaysia 2000-2006 CE PE SFA 
Majority of foreign banks are the most cost and profit efficient 
banks. 
San, Theng, and Heng 
(2011) 
Malaysia 2002-2009 PTE DEA 
Domestic banks have higher TE than foreign banks, which 
mainly effect by capital strength, loan quality, and expense and 
asset size. 
Vu and Nahm (2013) Vietnam 2000-2006 PE Tobit model  
Foreign banks from Australia, Japan, the US and Europe 
perform better in terms of profit efficiency than domestic banks 
and banks from other Asian nations.  
Tecles and Tabak 
(2010) 
Brazil 2000-2007 CE SFA 
Foreign banks show lower cost efficiency but higher profit 
efficiency compared with domestic banks. 
Yamori and Harimaya 
(2010) 
Japan 1994-2005 TE 
Stochastic 
distance function 
The traditional Japanese trust banks have experienced superior 
technical efficiency compared with foreign-owned trust banks. 
Jiang and Yao (2010) China 1995-2008 CE PE SFA 
Foreign owned banks are less cost efficient than domestic 
banks. 
Pessarossi and Weill 
(2013) 
China 2004-2009 CE SFA DEA 
Foreign banks are more efficient than other banks. Increase in 
capital ratio improves banks cost efficiency, depends on some 
extent on the banks' ownership type, but not in bank size. 
Sharma et al (2013) Fiji 2000-2010 
X-efficiency                         
scale efficiency 
DEA 
Scale efficiency scores are generally lower than the TE scores 
especially for larger foreign banks. 
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         Table B. 7:  Summary of the findings on the efficiency of foreign banks in New Zealand  
          
Authors 
Study 
period 
Efficiency 
concept 
Technique Empirical Findings 
Liu and Tripe (2003) 1989-1998 X Efficiency      DEA  
DEA results shows greater efficiency in New Zealand than other countries over the 
same period and banks gained efficiency associated with mergers and acquisitions in 
New Zealand. 
Tripe (2003)  1996-2002 
X Efficiency   
Scale efficiency   
DEA  
New Zealand banks has become more efficient, which may possibly due to the fall of 
interest rate, improved managerial practice or technical progress.  
Tripe (2004) 1996-2003 X Efficiency     DEA  
No significant difference in efficiency scores between NZ banks and Australia-owned 
banks in DEA model. 
Vedula & Tripe (2004) 2000-2002 X Efficiency     DEA 
Overall banks efficiency scores were high, which indicates banks in New Zealand have 
improved their efficiency over time  
Tripe (2005a) 1996-2003 X Efficiency     DEA 
There has been an improvement in bank efficiency over the time with significant 
differences in efficiency between banks.  There is negative correlation between banks 
efficiency and 90-day bill rate.  
Tripe(2005b) 1996-2003 
Scale efficiency              
X-Efficiency             
DEA                       
Malmquist Index                    
DEA results by panel data approach shows that most efficient banks were TSB and 
ANZ, the least efficient bank was ASB.  
Adjei-Frimpong et 
al.,(2014) 
2007-2011 X-efficiency 
DEA                       
Malmquist Index                    
New Zealand banks generally have higher levels of efficiency. The DEA results 
suggests scale inefficiency for the banks rather than pure technical inefficiency.  
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Table 1 Continued 
  
Industry specific variables                        
DO Dummy Ownership -0.293 a -4.159 -0.387 a -5.366   0.150 0.557 -0.215 c -1.723         
DM Dummy Merger 0.360 b 2.519 0.362 b 2.137 0.480 c 1.651 0.541 a 4.738 0.303 a 3.971 0.724 a 2.576 
MKCT Market concentration -0.643 -0.578 -1.310 -1.101 3.702 0.953 -1.053 -1.375 2.066 a 4.301 4.852 a 5.760 
DS Dummy Similarity                -1.263 a -10.176 -1.697 a -10.266 
DORG Dummy Organizational Form                 -0.479 a -7.445 0.035 0.279 
Bank Specific Variables                        
  Constant 5.775 a 4.729 5.347 a 4.632 -2.082 a -0.636 0.576 0.785 -0.182 -0.354 -1.704 a -2.510 
LnTA Ln(Total Assets) -0.626 a -9.678 -0.596 a -10.350 -0.157b -2.072 -0.062 b -2.240 -0.159 a -4.572 -0.224 a -6.972 
EQR Equity ratio 2.225 a 3.758 1.408 b 2.309 0.528 0.962 0.622 c 1.760  2.675 a 7.290 3.683 a 9.067 
AQ Impaired assets ratio -47.72a -3.808 -39.14a -4.160 15.487 1.120 3.845 b 2.437 -5.448 a -10.266 -8.787 a -6.151 
Macroeconomic Variables                        
GDPG GDP growth     0.000 -0.398     0.000 -0.232    0.000 0.033 
IR Interest rate     3.428 a 3.280     6.710 a 4.156    0.787 0.630 
IFR Inflation rate     0.046 1.600     0.027 b 2.000    -0.048 a -2.850 
FX Foreign exchange rate     0.009 b 2.210     0.004 b 2.479    -0.005 b -2.108 
UNEMP Unemployment rate     0.005 a 2.917     0.007 a 4.328    -0.003 a -3.529 
Model Indicators:                        
  sigma-squared 0.175 a 5.067 0.131 a 6.262 0.009 b 2.228 0.007 a 7.369 0.058 a 11.839 0.089 a 17.316 
  gamma 0.995 a 300.290 0.983 a 206.753 0.824 a 8.115 0.790 a 14.594 0.986 a 246.027 0.997 a 640.293 
  Log Likelihood function 275.381  276.632  375.923  385.215   317.561   328.910  
  Likelihood ratios 220.811   223.313   78.784   97.369   203.467   226.164   
Notes: a=1 % Level of statistical Significance, b=5 % Level of Statistical significance, c=10% level of Statistical Significance; t-test in parentheses.  Coeff: coefficients 
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Table C. 2: Parameters estimations-Alternative Profit Functions 
Dependent variable: Ln(TC/PL) Group A Group B Group C 
                       Model 1              Model 2                    Model 1              Model 2                    Model 1              Model 2 
Parameters  Coeff T-ratio  Coeff T-ratio  Coeff T-ratio  Coeff T-ratio  Coeff T-ratio  Coeff T-ratio 
θ0 Constant 3.882 a 3.200 4.162 a 3.535 0.467 0.245 -0.159 -0.054 -18.99a -8.088 -5.731 a -2.600 
θ1 In(PF/PL) 1.763 a 3.713 1.927 a 3.873 3.609 a 3.861 3.527 a 4.137 -1.408 c -1.714 -2.157 a -3.446 
θ2 In(PPC/PL) -1.072 a -3.166 -0.971 a -3.244 -0.915 -1.638 -0.786 -1.220 0.215 0.813 -0.670 b -2.046 
θ3 ln(LOAN) -0.342 -1.392 -0.492 b -2.076 -1.074 c -1.733 -0.976 -1.518  2.357 a 5.347 1.225 a 3.634 
θ4 ln( OIEA) 0.986 a 3.935 1.028 a 3.967 2.512 a 3.374 2.534 a 3.360 0.253  0.739 0.903 a 2.936 
θ5 1/2{ln(PF/PL)}2 0.373 a 4.208 0.383 a 4.107 0.133 0.333 0.077  0.219 -0.354 a -2.573 -0.407 a -4.516 
θ6 1/2{ln(PPC/PL)}2 0.179 a 2.953 0.141 b 2.509 0.240 b 2.324 0.232 b 2.117 -0.002 -0.050 0.138 a 3.331 
θ7 1/2{ln(LOAN)}2 0.134 a 4.014 0.159 a 4.414 0.606 a 4.137 0.590 a 4.586 -0.323 a -4.203 0.110 a 3.181 
θ8 1/2{ln(OIEA}2 0.006 0.181 0.009 0.313 0.193 0.722 0.177 0.738 -0.111 b -2.074 0.064 c 1.935 
θ9 ln(PF/PL)Ln(PPC/PL) -0.377 a -6.046 -0.368 a -5.878 -0.250 c -1.777 -0.267 b -2.148 0.039 0.618 0.006 0.132 
θ10 ln(PF/PL)ln(LOAN) -0.013 -0.315 -0.031 -0.754 -0.265 c -1.722 -0.256 c -1.749 0.142 a 2.548 0.220 a 4.435 
θ11 ln(PF/PL)ln(OIEA) 0.000 c 1.811 0.000 b 2.071 0.030 0.136 0.026 0.126 0.000 b -2.152 0.000 0.994 
θ12 ln(PPC/PL)ln(LOAN) 0.104 c 5.067 0.102 c 4.981 -0.048 -0.580 -0.059 -0.712 -0.046 c -1.845 -0.001 -0.055 
θ13 ln(PPC/PL)ln(OIEA) -0.037 -1.185 -0.040 -1.574 0.128 1.036 0.128 1.039 0.025 1.121 0.043 c 1.859 
θ14 ln(LOAN)ln(OIEA) -0.065 a -2.965 -0.072 a -3.452 -0.457 b -2.433 -0.447 a -2.643 0.027 0.447 -0.141 a -4.437 
θ15 In(PF/PL)T 0.017 a 2.890 0.016 a 2.618 0.010 0.680 0.008 0.653 -0.002 -0.709 -0.002 -0.521 
θ16 In(PPC/PL)T -0.019 a -3.991 -0.015 a -3.323 -0.022 a -3.238 -0.021 a -3.149 0.006 b 2.492 0.002 0.684 
θ17 ln(LOAN)T -0.002 -0.905 -0.003 -1.273 -0.012 b -2.086 -0.011 c -1.996 -0.009 a -2.647 -0.003 -0.752 
θ18 ln(OIEA)T -0.002 -0.363 -0.002 -0.330 0.013 1.252 0.013 1.441 0.008 c 1.788 -0.002 -0.342 
θ19 T 0.025 0.799 0.029 0.864 0.016 0.367 0.003 0.081  1.967 b 4.586 -0.037 -0.664 
θ20 1/2 T2 0.003 a 4.824 0.003 a 4.045 0.003 a 3.826 0.002 a 3.343 6.921 a 5.527 0.003 a 4.108 
θ21 ln(NPI) -0.324 a -6.879 -0.334 a -6.834 -0.305 a -2.929 -0.346 a -3.788 5.050 a 2.122 -0.345 a -7.361 
 Notes: Coeff: Coefficients; NPI: negative profit indicator 
 
 
193 
  Table C.2 Continued  
Inefficiency equations                         
Industry-specific variables                         
  Constant 9.004 a 5.816 6.262 a 4.845 5.015 a 2.666 32.72 a 5.966 26.11 b 2.322 0.151 0.141 
DO Dummy Ownership 2.532 a 6.158 3.109 a 7.967 -3.96 a -5.587 -3.44 a -3.396         
DS Dummy Similarity                 -1.964 -0.242 -2.308 a -2.986 
DORG Dummy Organizational form               9.399 c 1.675 -2.421 a -3.186 
DM Dummy Merger -7.59 a -3.823 -7.70 a -5.732 -6.38 a -19.627 -5.83 a -6.368 -2.975 a -4.152 -5.468 b -2.129 
MKCT Market concentration 4.395 a 3.695 4.842 a 3.761 -13.96 a -4.801 -27.83 a -4.446 2.039 a 4.930 0.334 0.329 
Bank-specific Variables                         
LnTA Ln( Total assets) -1.71 a -9.486 -1.84 a -10.852 0.54 a 3.633 -0.465 -1.428  -13.797 -1.328 -0.725 b -2.216 
EQR Equity ratio -10.29 a -2.874 -6.23 a -2.566 -5.571 a -3.645 -22.62 a -5.755 0.827 a 3.755 -3.028 b -2.195 
AQ Impaired assets ratio 1.327 1.274 2.48 b 2.135 3.098 b 2.521 15.306 a 4.683 -0.038 a -3.279 0.751 0.638 
Macroeconomic 
variables                           
GDPG GDP growth     -0.013 -1.168     0.012 1.366     -0.022 -1.292 
IR Interest rate     2.012 c 1.725     -40.84 a -4.979     4.997 c 1.683 
IFR Inflation rate     -0.25 b  -2.179     -1.165 a -6.997     -0.322 b -2.405 
FX Foreign exchange rate     0.046 b 2.277     -0.094 a -2.680     0.084 a 3.318 
UNEMP Unemployment rate     0.001 0.150     0.043 a 4.789     0.018 b 2.482 
Model Indicators:                         
  sigma-squared 2.351 a 7.850 2.428 a 9.690 2.151 a 7.026 4.682 a 12.696 4.721 a 4.010 2.718 a 4.010 
  gamma 0.988 a 226.478 0.986 a 212.513 0.987 a 210.787 0.995 a 679.315 0.993 a 389.084 0.987 a 197.478 
  Log Likelihood functions   -356.08   -353.13   -106.18   -96.81   -232.18   -251.26 
  Likelihood ratios   182.01   187.92   142.73   161.48   282.80   167.56 
Notes: (1) a=1 % Level of statistical Significance, b=5 % Level of Statistical significance, c=10% level of Statistical Significance; t-test in parentheses 
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Table D. 2:  Quarterly Mean CE for Group A Banks in Model (2) 
    
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Rabobank HSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.938 0.978 0.963 0.968 0.767 0.047 0.814 0.978 0.965 0.891 0.831
2 0.910 0.980 0.961 0.971 0.707 0.112 0.765 0.956 0.990 0.803 0.815
3 0.897 0.942 0.961 0.868 0.705 0.228 0.924 0.975 0.959 0.910 0.837
4 0.908 0.967 0.962 0.967 0.710 0.272 0.895 0.963 0.786 0.840 0.827
5 0.894 0.951 0.949 0.955 0.680 0.323 0.447 0.954 0.989 0.826 0.797
6 0.879 0.963 0.949 0.893 0.668 0.371 0.901 0.947 0.826 0.878 0.827
7 0.872 0.912 0.907 0.952 0.688 0.402 0.876 0.978 0.900 0.893 0.838
8 0.973 0.925 0.959 0.929 0.682 0.407 0.850 0.969 0.785 0.789 0.827
9 0.983 0.918 0.949 0.941 0.651 0.396 0.879 0.957 0.819 0.850 0.834
10 0.960 0.892 0.949 0.883 0.671 0.403 0.881 0.945 0.959 0.893 0.844
11 0.948 0.810 0.964 0.916 0.674 0.434 0.840 0.952 0.832 0.387 0.776
12 0.952 0.912 0.964 0.938 0.663 0.433 0.886 0.946 0.909 0.878 0.848
13 0.954 0.900 0.965 0.955 0.669 0.427 0.510 0.941 0.831 0.989 0.814
14 0.887 0.888 0.965 0.918 0.632 0.462 0.834 0.918 0.543 0.483 0.753
15 0.963 0.856 0.964 0.916 0.640 0.451 0.962 0.939 0.757 0.977 0.842
16 0.955 0.871 0.961 0.950 0.653 0.411 0.854 0.931 0.692 0.562 0.784
17 0.953 0.958 0.953 0.899 0.644 0.493 0.887 0.942 0.769 0.796 0.829
18 0.953 0.956 0.956 0.955 0.623 0.505 0.905 0.931 0.968 0.755 0.851
19 0.964 0.938 0.961 0.893 0.626 0.547 0.900 0.933 0.679 0.495 0.794
10 0.958 0.959 0.960 0.926 0.650 0.544 0.906 0.903 0.609 0.685 0.810
21 0.972 0.953 0.980 0.937 0.645 0.618 0.636 0.927 0.807 0.701 0.818
22 0.976 0.968 0.972 0.953 0.589 0.571 0.946 0.890 0.730 0.655 0.825
23 0.975 0.965 0.978 0.946 0.610 0.693 0.895 0.853 0.727 0.745 0.839
24 0.977 0.959 0.976 0.954 0.586 0.684 0.931 0.861 0.717 0.526 0.817
25 0.979 0.937 0.942 0.975 0.366 0.696 0.963 0.842 0.725 0.590 0.802
26 0.980 0.973 0.940 0.970 0.542 0.684 0.902 0.844 0.757 0.425 0.802
27 0.977 0.972 0.938 0.971 0.549 0.724 0.952 0.971 0.725 0.415 0.819
28 0.978 0.964 0.949 0.971 0.548 0.760 0.937 0.914 0.734 0.989 0.874
29 0.973 0.972 0.959 0.970 0.616 0.784 0.938 0.920 0.877 0.624 0.863
30 0.974 0.967 0.958 0.969 0.595 0.828 0.942 0.916 0.699 0.597 0.844
31 0.956 0.965 0.967 0.966 0.626 0.524 0.954 0.914 0.870 0.598 0.834
32 0.942 0.954 0.956 0.970 0.636 0.534 0.923 0.939 0.883 0.629 0.836
33 0.960 0.962 0.964 0.972 0.632 0.841 0.939 0.962 0.962 0.584 0.878
34 0.949 0.957 0.965 0.972 0.584 0.889 0.944 0.919 0.838 0.591 0.861
35 0.943 0.965 0.966 0.974 0.620 0.920 0.963 0.939 0.884 0.535 0.871
36 0.956 0.962 0.966 0.970 0.613 0.961 0.963 0.914 0.809 0.549 0.866
37 0.931 0.961 0.964 0.965 0.615 0.922 0.981 0.947 0.859 0.582 0.873
38 0.957 0.961 0.956 0.970 0.637 0.923 0.964 0.954 0.778 0.550 0.865
39 0.953 0.944 0.958 0.963 0.835 0.904 0.966 0.975 0.967 0.442 0.891
40 0.954 0.954 0.936 0.977 0.668 0.933 0.982 0.964 0.914 0.168 0.845
Mean 0.949 0.942 0.958 0.948 0.638 0.577 0.883 0.933 0.821 0.677 0.833
Rank 2 4 1 3 9 10 6 5 7 8
Note:  T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Table D. 3:  Quarterly Mean CE for Group B Banks in Model (1)  
               
 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Mean
1 0.916 0.992 0.986 0.992 0.962 0.950 0.966
2 0.876 0.991 0.985 0.992 0.982 0.693 0.920
3 0.859 0.986 0.983 0.988 0.975 0.823 0.935
4 0.872 0.987 0.986 0.992 0.978 0.895 0.951
5 0.875 0.984 0.981 0.990 0.972 0.914 0.953
6 0.874 0.987 0.986 0.987 0.956 0.936 0.954
7 0.886 0.988 0.987 0.990 0.978 0.976 0.967
8 0.986 0.988 0.989 0.987 0.978 0.972 0.983
9 0.993 0.992 0.989 0.989 0.985 0.956 0.984
10 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.985 0.980 0.956 0.982
11 0.990 0.962 0.991 0.987 0.973 0.977 0.980
12 0.988 0.977 0.989 0.987 0.971 0.940 0.976
13 0.987 0.981 0.989 0.987 0.963 0.874 0.963
14 0.972 0.977 0.990 0.982 0.918 0.910 0.958
15 0.990 0.985 0.986 0.973 0.907 0.956 0.966
16 0.981 0.957 0.984 0.985 0.938 0.890 0.956
17 0.982 0.984 0.981 0.985 0.936 0.833 0.950
18 0.983 0.988 0.984 0.987 0.893 0.855 0.948
19 0.986 0.980 0.985 0.949 0.893 0.819 0.935
10 0.980 0.985 0.985 0.977 0.947 0.823 0.950
21 0.987 0.983 0.991 0.984 0.926 0.934 0.967
22 0.985 0.986 0.990 0.983 0.844 0.851 0.940
23 0.986 0.983 0.991 0.981 0.876 0.933 0.958
24 0.984 0.980 0.990 0.978 0.840 0.897 0.945
25 0.987 0.963 0.980 0.988 0.646 0.872 0.906
26 0.982 0.983 0.972 0.968 0.769 0.826 0.917
27 0.981 0.982 0.977 0.959 0.788 0.881 0.928
28 0.988 0.988 0.982 0.976 0.802 0.929 0.944
29 0.990 0.990 0.986 0.980 0.923 0.957 0.971
30 0.987 0.985 0.986 0.975 0.873 0.968 0.962
31 0.978 0.981 0.985 0.966 0.912 0.767 0.932
32 0.980 0.973 0.981 0.970 0.931 0.811 0.941
33 0.988 0.986 0.990 0.985 0.959 0.978 0.981
34 0.981 0.985 0.990 0.981 0.899 0.983 0.970
35 0.986 0.989 0.992 0.987 0.960 0.988 0.983
36 0.986 0.989 0.990 0.983 0.951 0.990 0.981
37 0.977 0.989 0.990 0.984 0.955 0.986 0.980
38 0.988 0.989 0.989 0.986 0.976 0.986 0.986
39 0.993 0.984 0.990 0.984 0.975 0.978 0.984
40 0.988 0.991 0.990 0.991 0.989 0.987 0.989
Mean 0.967 0.983 0.986 0.982 0.922 0.911 0.959
Rank 4 2 1 3 5 6
Note:  T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
 
 
197 
Table D. 4:  Quarterly Mean CE for Group C Banks in Model (1) 
 
               
 
 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac Rabobank HSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.975 0.991 0.980 0.983 0.569 0.951 0.806 0.690 0.868
2 0.949 0.993 0.979 0.986 0.557 0.885 0.979 0.607 0.867
3 0.936 0.965 0.981 0.861 0.725 0.919 0.740 0.725 0.857
4 0.952 0.990 0.981 0.985 0.706 0.874 0.580 0.621 0.836
5 0.944 0.984 0.971 0.978 0.567 0.867 0.964 0.644 0.865
6 0.922 0.987 0.973 0.896 0.731 0.851 0.671 0.710 0.843
7 0.914 0.967 0.932 0.974 0.728 0.971 0.676 0.739 0.863
8 0.979 0.977 0.983 0.955 0.684 0.957 0.561 0.609 0.838
9 0.989 0.980 0.978 0.964 0.717 0.927 0.607 0.687 0.856
10 0.969 0.959 0.979 0.892 0.743 0.894 0.821 0.805 0.883
11 0.965 0.847 0.987 0.931 0.714 0.902 0.629 0.272 0.781
12 0.969 0.944 0.987 0.957 0.730 0.880 0.683 0.794 0.868
13 0.971 0.943 0.988 0.976 0.377 0.889 0.685 0.988 0.852
14 0.881 0.924 0.989 0.936 0.711 0.833 0.421 0.325 0.752
15 0.969 0.893 0.986 0.937 0.822 0.908 0.582 0.810 0.863
16 0.958 0.900 0.984 0.971 0.752 0.880 0.518 0.347 0.789
17 0.955 0.981 0.979 0.920 0.822 0.906 0.610 0.566 0.842
18 0.945 0.979 0.980 0.973 0.837 0.857 0.884 0.605 0.882
19 0.975 0.948 0.984 0.891 0.749 0.855 0.529 0.312 0.780
10 0.964 0.978 0.982 0.939 0.753 0.832 0.474 0.466 0.798
21 0.982 0.968 0.992 0.956 0.536 0.895 0.641 0.559 0.816
22 0.985 0.981 0.988 0.973 0.781 0.817 0.593 0.722 0.855
23 0.983 0.975 0.991 0.962 0.694 0.759 0.609 0.752 0.841
24 0.984 0.975 0.990 0.968 0.747 0.735 0.608 0.523 0.816
25 0.986 0.942 0.968 0.986 0.932 0.731 0.586 0.647 0.847
26 0.986 0.986 0.948 0.974 0.782 0.713 0.593 0.375 0.795
27 0.984 0.985 0.944 0.968 0.805 0.970 0.559 0.339 0.819
28 0.986 0.985 0.959 0.979 0.828 0.768 0.632 0.988 0.891
29 0.984 0.989 0.972 0.979 0.789 0.811 0.859 0.707 0.886
30 0.985 0.987 0.976 0.979 0.849 0.777 0.573 0.632 0.845
31 0.969 0.986 0.985 0.973 0.864 0.767 0.761 0.623 0.866
32 0.962 0.974 0.972 0.979 0.860 0.780 0.929 0.692 0.894
33 0.972 0.981 0.982 0.981 0.889 0.878 0.955 0.635 0.909
34 0.958 0.979 0.983 0.972 0.875 0.783 0.808 0.647 0.876
35 0.958 0.984 0.985 0.968 0.896 0.776 0.798 0.585 0.869
36 0.971 0.982 0.985 0.968 0.873 0.772 0.751 0.590 0.861
37 0.943 0.977 0.981 0.975 0.967 0.794 0.744 0.634 0.877
38 0.975 0.977 0.981 0.970 0.930 0.780 0.684 0.544 0.855
39 0.982 0.968 0.977 0.975 0.946 0.912 0.940 0.540 0.905
40 0.971 0.966 0.949 0.988 0.974 0.801 0.737 0.250 0.829
Mean 0.965 0.967 0.977 0.960 0.770 0.846 0.695 0.608 0.848
Rank 4 5 1 2 6 3 7 9
Note:  T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Table D. 5:  Quarterly Mean CE for Group C Banks in Model (2)  
     
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac Rabobank HSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.947 0.994 0.967 0.983 0.551 0.955 0.820 0.678 0.867
2 0.909 0.995 0.967 0.988 0.596 0.904 0.985 0.589 0.839
3 0.895 0.943 0.969 0.832 0.658 0.941 0.762 0.713 0.826
4 0.911 0.985 0.972 0.989 0.728 0.907 0.518 0.602 0.853
5 0.902 0.965 0.948 0.976 0.524 0.892 0.985 0.634 0.834
6 0.882 0.978 0.955 0.883 0.750 0.867 0.650 0.708 0.855
7 0.878 0.927 0.909 0.971 0.725 0.986 0.710 0.731 0.832
8 0.949 0.948 0.982 0.941 0.687 0.974 0.575 0.597 0.852
9 0.989 0.957 0.971 0.956 0.711 0.949 0.613 0.668 0.879
10 0.945 0.918 0.974 0.875 0.753 0.918 0.855 0.794 0.775
11 0.935 0.813 0.988 0.920 0.704 0.931 0.656 0.255 0.860
12 0.943 0.902 0.988 0.953 0.742 0.904 0.675 0.772 0.839
13 0.945 0.898 0.989 0.979 0.296 0.906 0.713 0.985 0.739
14 0.851 0.875 0.990 0.929 0.702 0.856 0.408 0.297 0.842
15 0.918 0.836 0.987 0.925 0.800 0.929 0.606 0.733 0.776
16 0.922 0.861 0.983 0.978 0.766 0.902 0.505 0.289 0.842
17 0.919 0.981 0.971 0.927 0.839 0.939 0.617 0.546 0.891
18 0.897 0.985 0.967 0.988 0.854 0.895 0.934 0.605 0.781
19 0.972 0.938 0.980 0.902 0.756 0.892 0.540 0.265 0.799
10 0.952 0.983 0.974 0.947 0.762 0.869 0.493 0.415 0.820
21 0.979 0.966 0.994 0.960 0.543 0.930 0.675 0.512 0.867
22 0.988 0.983 0.985 0.982 0.786 0.840 0.628 0.745 0.854
23 0.980 0.974 0.992 0.974 0.691 0.784 0.645 0.794 0.829
24 0.983 0.972 0.989 0.982 0.755 0.761 0.643 0.544 0.854
25 0.985 0.931 0.944 0.991 0.945 0.748 0.616 0.674 0.796
26 0.987 0.989 0.902 0.979 0.795 0.742 0.618 0.360 0.817
27 0.984 0.988 0.902 0.979 0.820 0.978 0.580 0.302 0.901
28 0.989 0.989 0.922 0.984 0.838 0.812 0.685 0.989 0.911
29 0.985 0.993 0.939 0.985 0.799 0.860 0.912 0.813 0.866
30 0.986 0.992 0.961 0.986 0.862 0.826 0.619 0.695 0.890
31 0.953 0.990 0.985 0.980 0.877 0.816 0.820 0.702 0.914
32 0.941 0.974 0.958 0.985 0.870 0.834 0.962 0.787 0.932
33 0.958 0.985 0.979 0.986 0.908 0.936 0.990 0.715 0.894
34 0.937 0.981 0.984 0.972 0.889 0.835 0.832 0.723 0.888
35 0.935 0.988 0.988 0.963 0.910 0.830 0.822 0.667 0.879
36 0.954 0.985 0.988 0.962 0.886 0.826 0.769 0.657 0.893
37 0.917 0.978 0.979 0.975 0.982 0.853 0.774 0.683 0.870
38 0.961 0.979 0.984 0.967 0.942 0.837 0.703 0.586 0.921
39 0.984 0.959 0.977 0.971 0.959 0.973 0.974 0.570 0.830
40 0.953 0.961 0.937 0.992 0.984 0.861 0.745 0.204 0.830
Mean 0.945 0.956 0.968 0.960 0.774 0.880 0.716 0.615 0.852
Rank 4 3 1 2 6 5 7 8
Note:  T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Table E. 2:  Quarterly Mean APE for Group A Banks in Model (2) (2002-2011)    
    
 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Rabobank HSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.800 0.760 0.481 0.262 0.493 0.777 0.131 0.187 0.216 0.461 0.457
2 0.945 0.685 0.502 0.855 0.700 0.612 0.083 0.055 0.156 0.642 0.524
3 0.818 0.669 0.502 0.944 0.675 0.377 0.308 0.203 0.433 0.645 0.558
4 0.815 0.776 0.523 0.762 0.606 0.350 0.214 0.100 0.087 0.680 0.491
5 0.859 0.860 0.612 0.859 0.561 0.283 0.800 0.174 0.175 0.872 0.605
6 0.866 0.854 0.586 0.088 0.719 0.188 0.232 0.059 0.041 0.885 0.452
7 0.891 0.820 0.584 0.785 0.745 0.203 0.219 0.146 0.237 0.734 0.536
8 0.724 0.857 0.655 0.873 0.798 0.058 0.309 0.692 0.292 0.698 0.596
9 0.826 0.905 0.634 0.890 0.734 0.105 0.367 0.225 0.122 0.597 0.540
10 0.748 0.877 0.609 0.911 0.890 0.124 0.215 0.192 0.350 0.896 0.581
11 0.752 0.462 0.663 0.882 0.826 0.134 0.379 0.148 0.151 0.876 0.527
12 0.707 0.775 0.645 0.900 0.822 0.350 0.486 0.224 0.079 0.799 0.579
13 0.748 0.814 0.705 0.881 0.744 0.494 0.240 0.317 0.131 0.568 0.564
14 0.817 0.761 0.701 0.869 0.875 0.388 0.069 0.193 0.034 0.476 0.518
15 0.887 0.249 0.681 0.871 0.847 0.325 0.789 0.211 0.152 0.223 0.524
16 0.825 0.800 0.688 0.875 0.817 0.384 0.183 0.122 0.412 0.179 0.528
17 0.792 0.734 0.691 0.862 0.819 0.720 0.103 0.226 0.263 0.675 0.589
18 0.787 0.800 0.670 0.873 0.862 0.580 0.497 0.364 0.014 0.797 0.624
19 0.859 0.789 0.639 0.886 0.871 0.315 0.407 0.228 0.132 0.042 0.517
10 0.827 0.867 0.719 0.762 0.844 0.531 0.407 0.297 0.118 0.040 0.541
21 0.868 0.831 0.606 0.864 0.743 0.950 0.019 0.298 0.171 0.018 0.537
22 0.772 0.865 0.778 0.828 0.880 0.048 0.677 0.342 0.208 0.018 0.542
23 0.856 0.838 0.486 0.815 0.844 0.690 0.184 0.382 0.252 0.299 0.564
24 0.823 0.813 0.567 0.772 0.756 0.795 0.479 0.353 0.063 0.038 0.546
25 0.850 0.896 0.785 0.905 0.802 0.455 0.010 0.360 0.472 0.196 0.573
26 0.721 0.803 0.492 0.898 0.773 0.495 0.066 0.385 0.125 0.019 0.478
27 0.553 0.828 0.379 0.675 0.750 0.543 0.537 0.175 0.802 0.252 0.549
28 0.568 0.912 0.594 0.728 0.847 0.824 0.917 0.564 0.861 0.645 0.746
29 0.839 0.737 0.658 0.303 0.651 0.684 0.875 0.594 0.335 0.915 0.659
30 0.279 0.481 0.447 0.191 0.891 0.802 0.328 0.673 0.552 0.435 0.508
31 0.831 0.018 0.460 0.426 0.871 0.304 0.710 0.623 0.260 0.349 0.485
32 0.829 0.785 0.651 0.306 0.809 0.270 0.297 0.851 0.109 0.064 0.497
33 0.519 0.755 0.589 0.555 0.688 0.439 0.499 0.772 0.189 0.107 0.511
34 0.906 0.877 0.693 0.739 0.748 0.316 0.504 0.800 0.153 0.063 0.580
35 0.808 0.239 0.770 0.549 0.603 0.272 0.804 0.733 0.182 0.053 0.501
36 0.861 0.814 0.706 0.676 0.548 0.160 0.771 0.897 0.093 0.093 0.562
37 0.810 0.614 0.711 0.682 0.418 0.025 0.398 0.723 0.201 0.439 0.502
38 0.884 0.760 0.822 0.653 0.607 0.215 0.333 0.685 0.096 0.205 0.526
39 0.678 0.944 0.847 0.843 0.340 0.490 0.374 0.879 0.224 0.754 0.637
40 0.940 0.941 0.884 0.780 0.614 0.530 0.381 0.073 0.069 0.032 0.524
Mean 0.787 0.747 0.635 0.727 0.736 0.415 0.390 0.388 0.225 0.419 0.547
Rank 1 2 5 4 3 7 8 9 10 6
Note:T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Table E. 3: Quarterly Mean APE for Group B Banks in Model (1) (2002-2011)    
                 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac TSB Kiwibank Mean
1 0.861 0.807 0.662 0.236 0.831 0.875 0.712
2 0.962 0.747 0.685 0.854 0.617 0.841 0.784
3 0.893 0.670 0.677 0.933 0.630 0.713 0.752
4 0.890 0.836 0.708 0.685 0.649 0.878 0.774
5 0.907 0.882 0.776 0.805 0.566 0.341 0.713
6 0.919 0.898 0.747 0.084 0.710 0.226 0.597
7 0.932 0.776 0.670 0.743 0.863 0.300 0.714
8 0.595 0.839 0.775 0.848 0.855 0.120 0.672
9 0.882 0.851 0.713 0.889 0.697 0.158 0.698
10 0.767 0.819 0.668 0.913 0.864 0.212 0.707
11 0.657 0.431 0.730 0.873 0.883 0.242 0.636
12 0.659 0.857 0.738 0.915 0.814 0.689 0.779
13 0.726 0.841 0.774 0.900 0.806 0.809 0.809
14 0.780 0.813 0.727 0.915 0.825 0.614 0.779
15 0.924 0.243 0.796 0.904 0.871 0.655 0.732
16 0.903 0.853 0.799 0.904 0.812 0.913 0.864
17 0.873 0.764 0.798 0.886 0.793 0.897 0.835
18 0.906 0.830 0.790 0.877 0.829 0.848 0.847
19 0.872 0.759 0.767 0.895 0.845 0.391 0.755
10 0.833 0.884 0.848 0.800 0.842 0.738 0.824
21 0.842 0.835 0.766 0.882 0.833 0.949 0.851
22 0.790 0.869 0.864 0.867 0.906 0.046 0.724
23 0.861 0.852 0.616 0.842 0.903 0.747 0.803
24 0.853 0.845 0.721 0.797 0.811 0.857 0.814
25 0.876 0.917 0.880 0.916 0.528 0.403 0.753
26 0.773 0.847 0.621 0.928 0.753 0.429 0.725
27 0.586 0.868 0.447 0.732 0.729 0.392 0.626
28 0.600 0.934 0.709 0.807 0.776 0.637 0.744
29 0.830 0.746 0.781 0.329 0.561 0.741 0.665
30 0.249 0.447 0.490 0.209 0.874 0.906 0.529
31 0.756 0.017 0.505 0.469 0.872 0.588 0.534
32 0.811 0.725 0.690 0.341 0.776 0.472 0.636
33 0.478 0.703 0.628 0.623 0.625 0.737 0.632
34 0.903 0.866 0.689 0.821 0.650 0.520 0.742
35 0.806 0.227 0.779 0.631 0.525 0.423 0.565
36 0.862 0.797 0.705 0.770 0.465 0.255 0.642
37 0.801 0.577 0.742 0.751 0.374 0.037 0.547
38 0.880 0.729 0.823 0.729 0.499 0.357 0.669
39 0.527 0.950 0.845 0.890 0.702 0.790 0.784
40 0.942 0.941 0.883 0.831 0.515 0.842 0.826
Mean 0.794 0.752 0.726 0.751 0.732 0.565 0.720
Rank 1 2 4 3 5 6
Notes:  (1) T: 40 quarters (Q1: 2002-Q4:2011)
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Table E. 4: Quarterly Mean APE for Group C Banks in Model (1) (2002-2011)    
         
 
 
 
T ANZN BNZ ASB Westpac Rabobank HSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.814 0.920 0.826 0.316 0.546 0.503 0.430 0.409 0.595
2 0.947 0.863 0.841 0.874 0.555 0.057 0.371 0.589 0.637
3 0.859 0.889 0.828 0.955 0.807 0.594 0.938 0.520 0.799
4 0.818 0.832 0.796 0.717 0.767 0.303 0.122 0.904 0.658
5 0.842 0.843 0.853 0.769 0.829 0.393 0.432 0.850 0.727
6 0.827 0.859 0.822 0.090 0.705 0.171 0.080 0.811 0.546
7 0.871 0.768 0.810 0.690 0.469 0.327 0.776 0.701 0.677
8 0.615 0.797 0.828 0.801 0.716 0.929 0.893 0.789 0.796
9 0.698 0.834 0.808 0.833 0.630 0.442 0.531 0.761 0.692
10 0.699 0.810 0.757 0.897 0.442 0.356 0.876 0.886 0.715
11 0.636 0.431 0.780 0.843 0.473 0.286 0.631 0.867 0.618
12 0.619 0.798 0.755 0.885 0.846 0.390 0.365 0.835 0.687
13 0.695 0.798 0.784 0.850 0.791 0.512 0.430 0.774 0.704
14 0.768 0.780 0.742 0.837 0.112 0.319 0.128 0.860 0.568
15 0.917 0.271 0.750 0.813 0.819 0.310 0.589 0.281 0.594
16 0.882 0.816 0.758 0.872 0.313 0.172 0.882 0.254 0.619
17 0.838 0.685 0.751 0.854 0.132 0.319 0.602 0.782 0.620
18 0.902 0.852 0.759 0.896 0.772 0.545 0.034 0.451 0.651
19 0.899 0.736 0.729 0.898 0.400 0.306 0.298 0.013 0.535
10 0.851 0.878 0.846 0.802 0.464 0.400 0.176 0.036 0.557
21 0.874 0.808 0.809 0.865 0.023 0.339 0.326 0.012 0.507
22 0.844 0.843 0.874 0.845 0.842 0.370 0.279 0.004 0.613
23 0.898 0.805 0.675 0.838 0.204 0.391 0.339 0.173 0.540
24 0.890 0.757 0.725 0.800 0.690 0.368 0.077 0.007 0.539
25 0.908 0.790 0.845 0.856 0.013 0.335 0.496 0.098 0.543
26 0.845 0.772 0.678 0.878 0.094 0.322 0.085 0.012 0.461
27 0.663 0.789 0.487 0.548 0.551 0.484 0.811 0.497 0.604
28 0.648 0.872 0.750 0.604 0.440 0.440 0.831 0.846 0.679
29 0.834 0.606 0.826 0.273 0.923 0.528 0.483 0.694 0.646
30 0.274 0.418 0.529 0.169 0.412 0.705 0.695 0.281 0.435
31 0.257 0.016 0.527 0.385 0.863 0.665 0.484 0.232 0.429
32 0.805 0.684 0.721 0.280 0.488 0.766 0.284 0.035 0.508
33 0.460 0.668 0.668 0.524 0.679 0.881 0.578 0.033 0.562
34 0.881 0.846 0.761 0.696 0.792 0.881 0.592 0.076 0.691
35 0.765 0.216 0.846 0.515 0.862 0.819 0.658 0.034 0.590
36 0.833 0.814 0.755 0.652 0.857 0.907 0.349 0.050 0.652
37 0.780 0.636 0.776 0.662 0.613 0.806 0.634 0.423 0.666
38 0.874 0.796 0.864 0.659 0.482 0.845 0.352 0.634 0.688
39 0.715 0.947 0.901 0.855 0.747 0.927 0.776 0.904 0.846
40 0.936 0.952 0.921 0.817 0.704 0.048 0.423 0.615 0.677
Mean 0.775 0.737 0.769 0.705 0.572 0.487 0.478 0.451 0.622
Rank 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 8
Notes: T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Table E. 5:   Quarterly Mean APE for Group C Banks in Model (2) (2002-2011)    
                   
   
T ANZN BNZ ASB WestpacRabobankHSBC Citibank Deutsche Mean
1 0.756 0.797 0.572 0.288 0.424 0.334 0.421 0.467 0.507
2 0.942 0.707 0.610 0.877 0.236 0.106 0.275 0.691 0.555
3 0.833 0.752 0.630 0.953 0.613 0.376 0.895 0.610 0.708
4 0.824 0.784 0.653 0.815 0.543 0.184 0.380 0.721 0.613
5 0.867 0.852 0.774 0.885 0.845 0.306 0.335 0.839 0.713
6 0.879 0.851 0.711 0.099 0.525 0.108 0.071 0.830 0.509
7 0.898 0.807 0.696 0.837 0.441 0.230 0.593 0.700 0.650
8 0.692 0.833 0.749 0.890 0.637 0.870 0.801 0.612 0.761
9 0.758 0.876 0.735 0.905 0.677 0.320 0.346 0.490 0.638
10 0.761 0.864 0.691 0.921 0.399 0.275 0.577 0.906 0.674
11 0.757 0.511 0.753 0.900 0.603 0.211 0.355 0.679 0.596
12 0.724 0.842 0.750 0.913 0.806 0.321 0.220 0.808 0.673
13 0.781 0.862 0.793 0.898 0.645 0.448 0.267 0.450 0.643
14 0.828 0.853 0.772 0.896 0.125 0.276 0.092 0.442 0.535
15 0.930 0.323 0.799 0.892 0.767 0.277 0.299 0.332 0.577
16 0.893 0.874 0.805 0.891 0.281 0.157 0.893 0.701 0.687
17 0.870 0.789 0.806 0.873 0.140 0.284 0.570 0.832 0.645
18 0.902 0.827 0.816 0.863 0.676 0.449 0.023 0.860 0.677
19 0.866 0.777 0.783 0.867 0.497 0.287 0.268 0.137 0.560
10 0.828 0.865 0.852 0.752 0.509 0.364 0.216 0.083 0.559
21 0.860 0.815 0.799 0.851 0.024 0.335 0.262 0.030 0.497
22 0.769 0.848 0.889 0.806 0.818 0.411 0.308 0.019 0.609
23 0.850 0.811 0.669 0.753 0.228 0.473 0.375 0.299 0.557
24 0.823 0.812 0.774 0.672 0.574 0.427 0.086 0.044 0.527
25 0.866 0.879 0.880 0.888 0.011 0.457 0.663 0.195 0.605
26 0.723 0.814 0.689 0.862 0.074 0.426 0.168 0.037 0.474
27 0.535 0.823 0.509 0.524 0.558 0.669 0.875 0.755 0.656
28 0.569 0.913 0.757 0.662 0.921 0.562 0.820 0.931 0.767
29 0.848 0.758 0.816 0.263 0.867 0.629 0.341 0.817 0.667
30 0.284 0.478 0.553 0.162 0.331 0.755 0.784 0.378 0.466
31 0.840 0.018 0.508 0.331 0.703 0.629 0.355 0.287 0.459
32 0.840 0.756 0.720 0.251 0.296 0.817 0.149 0.055 0.485
33 0.553 0.736 0.653 0.481 0.474 0.787 0.318 0.101 0.513
34 0.898 0.866 0.750 0.609 0.475 0.815 0.311 0.059 0.598
35 0.779 0.234 0.813 0.451 0.723 0.731 0.445 0.038 0.527
36 0.852 0.820 0.740 0.570 0.674 0.891 0.204 0.076 0.603
37 0.763 0.633 0.751 0.602 0.333 0.729 0.386 0.347 0.568
38 0.884 0.760 0.830 0.572 0.264 0.699 0.218 0.167 0.549
39 0.329 0.940 0.859 0.784 0.305 0.832 0.479 0.786 0.664
40 0.934 0.940 0.897 0.689 0.268 0.065 0.124 0.702 0.577
Mean 0.785 0.758 0.740 0.700 0.483 0.458 0.389 0.458 0.596
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 7
Note: T: 40 quarters (Q1:2002-Q4:2011)
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Figure F. 2: Major Banks: Quarterly Mean APE (Model 2) over 2002-2011 
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